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Introduction
In 2012 I stumbled upon Colin Klein’s article: Philosophical Issues in Neuro-
imaging. The article tackles questions such as: what kind of evidence about
cognition can neuroimaging methods such as fMRI give us? What are the
steps and assumptions involved in going from magnetic fields to claims about
language, memory, and visual processing? And how can we improve the
methodology involved in those steps? Back then I didn’t know I would move to
the other side of the world for Colin Klein to be my supervisor, but I did know
I had found the topic of my PhD thesis.
Some years before I sat in a neuroscience 101 class, and a teacher explained
that to find out what part of the brain was dedicated to semantic processing,
we can deduct the brain activity linked to reading pseudo-words from the
brain activity linked to reading real words. Perhaps it was youthful arrogance,
perhaps it was the college’s focus on being critical and being interdisciplinary,
but from that time, a seed was planted in my mind that philosophy could add
something to neuroscience. Surely there was a di↵erence between subtracting
neural activation, and subtracting cognitive processes?
There is—as many people had actually already argued. Swept away by
enthusiasm over this newly found debate in the philosophy of neuroscience, I
started to pit the two fields against each other. Here were the neuroscientists
with the machines that generated beautiful images that were supposed to
solve all our questions about ourselves. And over there were the philosophers,
who opened everyone’s eyes to the limitations and flaws of the neuroimaging
methods.
I think I have moved on from this dichotomy. Partly because more research
usually yields more nuance, and partly because this topic has become truly
interdisciplinary: neuroscientists, psychologists, philosophers and computer
scientists work together to improve neuroimaging research. They reflect on what
questions neuroimaging is supposed to answer, how we should categorise our
cognitive processes, and how the experimental data can support the conclusions
we want to draw.
From this interdisciplinary field emerged my research questions. My main
research question in this thesis is: what can functional neuroimaging tell us
about the connection between brain and cognition? This research question splits
into two sub-questions: i: what can neuroimaging tell us about categorising
cognition? and ii: how should neuroimaging data be used to construct ex-
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planations combining brain and cognition? The first sub-question dives into a
debate that concerns cognitive ontologies. In this debate, people discuss whether
we should keep using familiar categories such as long-term memory, visual
recognition, or bilingual language switching, or whether perhaps the organisation
of the brain should fundamentally change this categorisation. Chapter two to
four of my thesis will tackle various aspects of this debate.
The second sub-question deals with neuroscientific explanations. What is
the model of explanation that we should use when turning neuroimaging data
into explanations? In chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis I argue that the existing
models of explanation are not adequate for neuroimaging studies and propose
an adapted model of explanation.
How are the two parts of my thesis linked? In short, the link is the central
importance of causation in cognitive neuroscience. I began to see this direction
of my research when I gave a presentation to a group of neuroscientists at the
Free University in Amsterdam. In this presentation, I explained the di↵erent
interpretations of causation, and the group of cognitive neuroscientists seemed
very enthusiastic about “di↵erence-making”: the idea that causation is about
a cause making a di↵erence to some e↵ect, rather than two objects physically
bumping up against each other or transmitting energy. When I saw that Colin
Klein’s project proposal integrated di↵erence-making within philosophy of neu-
roscience, I decided to pursue these ideas. Thus far, nobody had systematically
applied di↵erence-making to cognitive ontology. Furthermore, following the core
ideas of di↵erence-making led me to adapt existing models of explanation. The
idea that what really matters is manipulation and control links the two main
parts of my thesis.
When I tell people about my topic, the combination of cognitive neuroscience
and philosophy sparks the most interesting and bizarre conversations. From
people reciting neuroscientific evidence of gender di↵erences to science fiction-
like predictions of the future of artificial intelligence—the brain and what it
does clearly strikes a chord for many people. And I think it is an important
area of research. Probably not for what it can reveal about science fiction or
gender di↵erences, but neuroscience has a lot of potential to help solve the
puzzle about how mind and brain are linked. Neuroimaging, in particular, is a
significant scientific innovation, and a lot of time, money, and energy are being
invested in neuroimaging research. And like other innovations in the (natural)
sciences, this research practice needs philosophical, methodological, and critical
reflection. Philosophical analysis allows us to take a step back and can thus
help yield a clearer view of how to modify future practices, especially if it is
done in tandem with those actually working in the field.
Although I would have loved to answer every one of the questions I got in
response to my topic, I have had to reign the thesis in. I focus on neuroimaging
studies linking the brain to cognition in healthy participants. This means I do
not deal with neuroimaging methods that only look at the brain itself: x-rays,
MRI scans, etc. This also meant that I had to disregard the (very interesting)
debates within philosophy of psychiatry. Last, I did not research mathematical
models, artificial intelligence, or dynamical systems.
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I have tried to make this thesis as practical as a philosophical thesis allows.
Investigating the ways in which we can use neuroimaging to study the mind
is not only an abstract endeavour—it has its roots in actual neuroscientific
research. The problems that I am trying to solve ultimately arise from neuro-
scientific research itself, and the solutions that I propose should also work for
actual research. This “practical stance” has two main consequences. First, it
leads to a thesis that is thoroughly pragmatic. Put as a slogan, pragmatism
means: if it works, it is real enough. Rather than going the metaphysical route
of trying to find out “what cognition really is” or “what the brain really does”,
I wanted to focus on how we can make neuroimaging work for us, while at the
same time being as rigorous and consistent as scientific analysis should be.
The second consequence of my practical stance is that this thesis spans many
traditional areas of philosophy, without neatly fitting one of them. This is not a
philosophy of mind thesis, or a philosophy of science thesis. Instead, I navigate
various debates within philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics,
and of course, cognitive neuroscience. Modern philosophy of neuroscience clearly
has roots in all these fields, but in a way it has also grown into an independent
branch of philosophy. Throughout the thesis I will indicate how my positions
relate to more traditional debates, such as the natural kinds debate, theories
of mind, and the causal exclusion debate. Below I outline the contents of this
thesis.
Overview of thesis
Chapter 1: Connecting mind and brain with functional
neuroimaging
In the first chapter I introduce the philosophical debates that concern functional
neuroimaging. Many of these debates are about the practices of localisation and
reverse inference. Localisation means that we start with a cognitive theory and
try to localise its components in the brain. With reverse inference we start from
neuroimaging data and try to draw conclusions about cognitive theories. In
this chapter I will argue that the experimental reality of neuroscience is more
diverse. We need to look at studies that try to gauge the influence that cognitive
processes have on neural phenomena and vice versa. Furthermore, we should
look at how scientists use neuroimaging to help shape and redefine cognitive
categories.
I also introduce the case study that will be running through my thesis: the
study of bilingualism. This field of research investigates how bilinguals are able
to switch languages, and how factors such as age of acquisition and proficiency
influence its performance. Chapter 1 thus lays the groundwork for the rest
of my thesis, by reconceptualising the problems that we should tackle and by
introducing bilingualism research and other debates that will figure prominently
in the other chapters.
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Chapter 2: Cognitive ontology and the mapping norm
The first kind of endeavour in cognitive neuroscience that I will discuss is that
of finding a good cognitive ontology. How do we go about finding adequate
cognitive categories? First, I clarify what I mean by a cognitive ontology. As
well as providing a means for anchoring definitions of cognitive categories, many
hope that a cognitive ontology will help solve the many-to-many structure-
function mapping problem. I summarise the views of those that want to revise
our cognitive ontology from the top-down, and bottom-up, respectively.
Both these revisionist strategies are based on what I call a “mapping norm”:
they take a certain mapping (one-to-one, many-to-one, or many-to-many) as a
normative guide for ontology building or revision. I argue against employing
the mapping norm: it is a substantial a priori metaphysical stance on the
relationship between cognitive and neural categories which, as I will argue, is
hard to justify.
Chapter 3: Cognitive ontology and the causal norm
Instead, I argue that what we should apply is the causal norm. This norm is
based on Woodward’s theory of di↵erence-making (2003). I explain how the
causal norm can be used for cognitive ontology building. The main idea is
that a category belongs in a cognitive ontology when it can be reliably used to
manipulate another category of interest.
Would the causal norm lead to an explosion of categories in our cognitive
ontology? In the cognitive sciences, the number of possible cognitive categories is
vast, and applying the causal norm does not seem to constrain this set. Doesn’t
everything make a di↵erence to something else, in some way? I introduce the
notion of causal relevance to solve this explosion problem. While many categories
are somewhat causally relevant, constraints on the type of variables and the form
of the causal relation can inform which variables have most causal relevance in
each context.
Chapter 4: Dependency relations in a cognitive ontology
Having solved the explosion problem, there remains another task. At present
there is no systematic way to determine how two cognitive categories relate to
each other: are they fully distinct, do they stand in a synonymous, kind-of, or
component-of relation? In order to find causal relations between categories, we
must first know whether perhaps they are dependent on each other in a di↵erent
way.
Luckily, di↵erence-making can help us sort out these dependency relations.
If you cannot manipulate one category without thereby manipulating the other,
then they are dependent on each other. Furthermore, the exact form of these
possible manipulations can tell us what kind of dependency relation obtains.
Chapter 4 thus completes my discussion of cognitive ontology: di↵erence-making
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can be used to find the most useful cognitive categories, and can also determine
causal and dependency relations between them.
Chapter 5: The web model of explanation
Recently, the constitutive mechanistic model of explanation (Craver, 2007) has
become very popular in all kinds of disciplines, including cognitive neuroscience.
Can we use this model to support the other endeavours that the cognitive
neuroscientist is interested in, like the interweaving of cognitive and neural
categories to construct a neuroscientific theory? The constitutive mechanis-
tic model goes a long way. In chapter 5, however, I argue that it is not the right
model for interpreting neuroimaging studies.
The main problem is that the constitutive mechanistic model relies too
much on constitutive (or: componency) relations. These relations form the
cornerstone of the model, but they face epistemological challenges and restrict
the shape that an explanation can take. The web model of explanation that I
develop in this chapter takes away the primary focus on constitutive relations
and instead does justice to all kinds of relations that can obtain in cognitive neu-
roscience, and neuroimaging studies in particular. The web model of explanation
captures the important practices in the field, but also gives normative criteria
for adequate explanations.
Chapter 6: Explanations in experimental practice
In the sixth chapter I return to bilingualism. I apply the web model to two
neuroimaging studies: one about bilingualism, cognitive control and the role of
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (Abutalebi et al., 2011) and one about the e↵ect
of proficiency on cognitive control for bilinguals (Grant et al., 2015). I contrast
the web model of explanation with the mapping model and the constitutive
mechanistic model. This application shows that the di↵erence between the
models is not only theoretical: it has a profound influence on how we analyse
and interpret neuroimaging studies.
Conclusion
My conclusion contains a summary of the thesis, and subsequently zooms out to
show its main findings. I end by looking briefly at promising avenues for further
research. The thesis ends with two appendices about debates that are related
to the main topic, but whose discussion is not crucial for the delevopment of
my line of argument.
Appendix A: Online collaborative databases for cognitive
ontologies
In appendix A I look at online collaborative cognitive ontologies. These
databases contain neuroimaging data from many studies and try to organise
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the data in a way that allows for meta-analyses and for standardisation of
the terms in cognitive neuroscience. I first look at four di↵erent online
databases—BrainMap, CogPO, Cognitive Atlas, and NeuroSynth—and analyse
their di↵erences. I also give a normative account in this chapter: do these
online databases align with my di↵erence making view of cognitive ontology,
and how should they change to capture all important relations between neural
and cognitive categories?
Appendix B: Natural kinds
The causal norm in chapter 3 describes how we can find the categories that
we should use in cognitive neuroscience. A philosopher might wonder: are the
cognitive categories that the causal norm prescribes Natural Kinds? There has
been a whole debate in philosophy about what counts as a natural kind and
thus which categories we should use in science. In this appendix I show why the
natural kinds debate is not adequate for solving the questions around cognitive
ontology. Some of the positions in the debate have useful elements, but these
elements can be lifted from the debate to avoid philosophical and metaphysical
baggage.
Author’s note
Subsection 2.1.1 borrows heavily from Janssen et al. (2017). Furthermore, the
Dutch summary at the end borrows substantially from Janssen (2018).
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Chapter 1
Connecting mind and brain with functional neuroimaging

Chapter 1
Connecting mind and brain
with functional
neuroimaging
Neuroimaging is heralded as the most promising technique in cognitive neuro-
science for yielding knowledge of our brain and mental life. At last, we can
see what is happening in the brain while people engage in cognitive tasks. But
what can neuroscience really teach us about cognition? Will we be able to tell
what someone is thinking by looking into their brains? Can we now see what
consciousness is by looking at fMRI, PET, EEG, or MEG scans?1
Perhaps neuroimaging can be some kind of arbiter for our theories about
cognition, in that it can distinguish good cognitive theories from bad ones.
Some researchers think neuroscience can play this role: neuroimaging data can
adjudicate between rivalling cognitive theories. Others are more critical, and
think the study of cognition should be autonomous from neuroscience. In this
chapter, I introduce this debate. I argue that the way the debate has played out
so far does not take enough notice of the experimental reality of neuroscience.
The way that neuroscientists operate is more diverse and requires a di↵erent
framework for integrating mind and brain.
In order to show these diverse projects that neuroscientists engage in, I
introduce a field of study in section 1.1: bilingual language processing. This area
of research is representative of the kind of work that cognitive neuroscientists
do, and will serve as a case study throughout my thesis. In section 1.2, I give a
short introduction on the commonly used neuroimaging techniques, with a focus
on EEG/MEG and fMRI. Then, in section 1.3, I give an overview of the debate
about the extent to which neuroimaging can give us evidence about cognitive
theories. I explain what role the Sceptics, Moderates, and Defenders attribute to
neuroimaging and what arguments they give for their positions. While Sceptics
1See for example Lamme (2006), who argues that neuroscientific findings can influence the
definition of consciousness.
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see little future in neuroimaging studies when it comes to proving cognitive
theories, the Moderates are more optimistic and the Defenders try to counter
the arguments from the Sceptics and the Moderates.
The debate mostly focusses on practices of localisation and reverse inference.
Localisation is the practice of trying to map a cognitive process onto a neural
area or network. Reverse inference builds on these mappings and subsequently
tries to prove that completion of a cognitive task requires a particular cogni-
tive process. I argue that there are other kinds of practices that neuroscientists
engage in. For example, they wonder how cognitive processes influence neural
mechanisms, and vice versa, or whether we are using the right cognitive
concepts. Recognition of this experimental diversity will change the main
question from “what can functional neuroimaging tell us about cognition?”
to “what can functional neuroimaging tell us about the relationship between
cognition and the brain?”. This then forms the background against which the
other chapters in this thesis should be read.2
1.1 Control in the bilingual brain
The study of language is an important area of research in cognitive neuro-
science: what are the mechanisms by which are we able to understand and
produce language successfully? A subfield of language research is the study
of bilingualism. Bilinguals—people that speak two or more languages3—
often have to switch between those languages in di↵erent contexts. Cognitive
neuroscientists are interested in how this phenomenon of language switching
works.
In this section, I look at questions that arise in the study of language
switching for bilinguals. The questions that are typically investigated in this
research area are: i) how the first and second language are represented in
the brain, ii) how factors such as the age of acquisition and proficiency can
influence language mechanisms, and iii) how bilinguals are able to switch
between languages accurately. Another subfield of bilingual studies is language
acquisition: how do bilinguals acquire their languages? In this section and in
the rest of this thesis, I will bracket this discussion and will focus on language
switching and the factors that influence it.
2A note on some of the terms that I employ: I use the concepts “mental”, “cognitive” and
“psychological” synonymously, as anything to do with the mind. There might be theories
that imply a distinct meaning for these terms, but these are not relevant for my project.
Furthermore, I do not mean to place a theoretical load on the terms “cognitive process” and
“neural mechanism”. In later chapters, I discuss the mechanistic theory of explanation, but
for now, both these terms should be interpreted very broadly. Last, for stylistic reasons I do
not always spell out “functional neuroimaging”. As I explain in section 1.2, I do not concern
myself with structural neuroimaging, so wherever I write “neuroimaging”, I mean functional
neuroimaging.
3In the literature, calling someone a bilingual does not seem to require a high level of
proficiency for the second (or third, or fourth, etc) language. So “bilinguals” refers to a very
broad group of people that have some basic level of proficiency in more than one language.
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The first question is whether the languages that bilinguals speak are di↵er-
entially represented in the bilingual brain. That is, are the mechanisms for the
first and second language supported by the same brain structures, or by di↵erent
brain structures? Certain lesion studies indicate that there are important
di↵erences. In these studies, patients showed di↵erent recovery patterns for their
first and second languages after they had su↵ered from a lesion. This led the
researchers to believe that the first and second language were neurofunctionally
distinct (Abutalebi and Green, 2007). However, the advance of imaging studies
complicated this picture. On the one hand, the authors of several review studies
have come to the conclusion that language perception and production for the
first and second language activate similar neural networks (Buchweitz and Prat,
2013; Indefrey, 2006; Wong et al., 2016). On the other hand, some have shown
that some aspects of the first and second language are processed di↵erently
(Dowens et al., 2010; Proverbio et al., 2002).
Most recent studies show that the systematic di↵erences between the first
and second language’s neural structures can be predicted by low proficiency
(Abutalebi and Green, 2007) or late age of acquisition for the second language
(Pakulak and Neville, 2011; Saidi et al., 2013). With this in mind, we can
tentatively conclude that for proficient bilinguals who have learned their second
language early on in life, neural networks for the first and second language are
largely shared. This is consistent with the “convergence hypothesis”, which
states that when proficiency increases, bilinguals process their second language
similarly to first-language speakers (Abutalebi and Green, 2007). By examining
the pattern of neural activation for the first and second language, these re-
searchers have also provided an answer to the second question: factors such
as proficiency and age of acquisition have an e↵ect on language processing in
bilinguals.
Their findings subsequently raise the third question: how are bilinguals able
to control their languages? If the neural networks are shared, how can bilinguals
produce the appropriate response in di↵erent linguistic contexts? How is it that
they speak Spanish to their grandparents and English in the classroom, and not
the other way around? It seems that some kind of control structure would be
necessary for switching between languages.
The term “cognitive control” is often coined to refer to this process of
control. Cognitive control can be defined as “the top-down modulation of cog-
nitive processes based on higher-order representations such as goals or plans”4.
In the case of bilingual language switching, the type of language would be
modulated based on someone’s goal of speaking the appropriate language for
that context. A Spanish-English bilingual could speak either Spanish or English
in the classroom, but because she wants to comply with the norms in the
classroom, English output is preferred.
Cognitive control also comes into play in non-linguistic contexts. In the
Stroop test for example, text and colour compete with each other. In this test,
4http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/concept/id/trm_4aae62e4ad209/, accessed on
13/09/2018
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participants are presented with a list of words, written in various colours, and
they are asked to name the colour of the words. In the incongruent condition,
the ink of the words is di↵erent from what the word itself reads. For example,
they are presented with the word “red” written in purple letters. In order to
complete the task successfully, participants have to suppress the urge to read
out “red”, and instead should respond with “purple”. There should be some
control mechanism that ensures that the response is appropriate to the task
(MacDonald et al., 2000). Neuroscientific research of control structures in the
brain reveals that the interaction of several brain areas, including the prefrontal
cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex play a role in those
control mechanisms (Abutalebi and Green, 2007), drawing on evidence from
(Braver et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2002; De Zubicaray et al., 2000).
Research of these control structures subsequently leads to the question: is
there a specific mechanism for switching between languages (colloquially termed
“the language switch”), or do bilinguals use control mechanisms that are also
operative in non-linguistic task switching?
Several imaging studies tentatively point to converging mechanisms. Abuta-
lebi and Green (2008) for example, have developed an influential model in which
five brain areas are crucial for bilingual language switching: the left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral supramarginal gyri (SMG), anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), and the caudate nucleus. All of these areas have also been
implicated in non-linguistic contexts for control: the left DLPFC and bilateral
SMG are part of an attention network, the caudate nucleus is involved in motor
response control, and the ACC is also often active in control tasks.
Some authors corroborate these findings to a large extent, concluding that
neural areas for language switching and non-linguistic switching are very similar
(Buchweitz and Prat, 2013; Coderre et al., 2015; De Baene et al., 2015;
Hernandez et al., 2000; Lei et al., 2014; Luk et al., 2012). However, (small)
di↵erences have also been observed (De Baene et al., 2015; Weissberger et al.,
2015), leading some to propose a so-called “hodological model” in which a
specific subset of language areas are modulated by a more general network
for cognitive control (Moritz-Gasser and Du↵au, 2009). It remains unclear,
however, whether on a more fine-grained neural level we could find di↵erences
for linguistic and non-linguistic control. Furthermore, we do not yet know how
the neural structures cooperate exactly to switch languages appropriately, and
why bilinguals are generally better at general task switching than monolinguals.
1.2 Functional neuroimaging
Answering the questions in the area of bilingualism seems to require more
empirical work. But in order to come up with satisfying answers, we must also
investigate what kind of evidence we need. Most of the studies that I referred to
in the previous section use neuroimaging methods such as functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or magnetoencephalography (MEG). Following their
rise of popularity in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, philosophers have examined
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neuroimaging methods. How exactly would neuroimaging prove that bilinguals
use the same mechanisms for their languages? How do we weigh behavioural
data and neural data when investigating whether proficiency and age of
acquisition have an influence on bilingual processing? And how can brain scans
tell us about the relation between cognitive control and language switching?
In the next section I give an overview of this debate, in which philosophers
discuss what neuroimaging can tell us about cognition and the brain. Before
doing so, I will use this section to give a short introduction of the main types
of neuroimaging.
Some well-known examples of neuroimaging are CAT, MRI, PET, MEG/EEG,
and fMRI. These techniques can be grouped into two categories: structural and
functional neuroimaging. Structural neuroimaging maps out the anatomy of
the brain. It can show the position and shape of the various components that
make up the brain. CAT and MRI are both structural neuroimaging methods.
In this thesis, I will be concerned with functional neuroimaging, and not with
structural neuroimaging. This is because I am mostly interested in the relation
between the brain and cognition, and structural neuroimaging can only tell us
something about cognition in limited cases.
Functional neuroimaging measures brain activity rather than anatomy. The
techniques are either based on measuring blood flow in the brain (PET and
fMRI) or electric/magnetic activity of neurons (EEG/MEG). While PET and
fMRI have a very good spatial resolution when compared to EEG and MEG,
the latter two have a good temporal resolution when measuring brain activity.
Below, I will discuss these types of neuroimaging techniques in turn.
1.2.1 PET and fMRI
With Positron Emission Tomography (PET), a radioactive tracer is injected in
the blood stream. Its radiation shows the oxygen and/or glucose in the blood,
which is coupled with neural activity. PET can be used for clinical purposes,
to diagnose brain tumours, dementia, and strokes, but can also show general
di↵erential activity for cognitive tasks between certain groups of people. When
fMRI was invented, PET became less popular with cognitive neuroscientists,
due to its inferior spatial resolution, the fact that scan sessions have to be short
because the radioactivity decays rapidly, and the risks that come with exposing
people to radioactivity.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) also works on the basis of
the coupling between blood flow and neural activity. When there is increased
synaptic activity, there is a greater local demand for delivery of oxygen. This
leads to an increased local blood flow, and also to a di↵erent concentration of
oxygen in the blood. The magnetic properties of this di↵erence is what the
scanner picks up on. The response that is measured by this form of fMRI is
called BOLD: Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent.
The data of a participant’s blood flow are analysed by testing whether
the activity is significantly di↵erent across tasks. The generated Statistical
Parametric Map subsequently reflects the degree of certainty that there is a
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di↵erence in a particular voxel (a three-dimensional part) of the brain. The
spatial resolution of fMRI is in the order of 1-2 mm, and it can be used for both
clinical and non-clinical purposes. fMRI is well-suited to link neural activity to
psychological tasks in patients and healthy participants.
1.2.2 EEG and MEG
Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) measure
neural depolarisation. Neurons send signals to each other partly through
biochemical processes that result in an electrical current along their axons. EEG
measures these electrical currents and MEG measures the magnetic fields that
result from the electrical currents. Both EEG and MEG are only sensitive to
signals that originate near the surface of the brain. In the case of EEG, the
electrical signal travels through several layers of tissue (skull, skin, extracellular
fluid) before it can be measured, causing smearing of the signal. The magnetic
fields that MEG measures drop o↵ significantly with distance. This is why they
cannot measure deeper signals properly.
Both EEG and MEG can measure the frequency of the brain waves (neural
oscillations), to see whether there is distorted activity in one of the frequency
bands of the brain. They can also measure Event-Related Potentials (ERP,
measured by EEG) and Event-Related Fields (ERF, measured by MEG). ERP’s
and ERF’s are neural responses to certain stimuli, and particular components of
them are thought to correspond to di↵erent cognitive processes. For example,
the “N400 component” (negative part of the waveform at 400 ms after the
stimulus) is thought to correspond to semantic integration.
Temporal resolution of EEG and MEG is good, because electrical and
magnetic signals travel very fast and they can be recorded at a high frequency.
Their spatial resolution is bad because of the Helmholtz principle: knowing
where the source is underlying the electric or magnetic signal is unsolvable. This
is because there are multiple solutions when working backwards from recording
site to electrical source. For EEG this is slightly worse than for MEG, because
electrical currents seek the path of least resistance and thus an electrical current
measured on the left side of the scalp could theoretically come from the right
side. Magnetic fields do not su↵er from this exact problem, but there are still
few sensors as compared to potential sources. Consequently, MEG’s spatial
resolution is still very much inferior to that of fMRI.
1.3 Reflection on functional neuroimaging
Philosophers critically reflect on the use of functional neuroimaging. These
reflections can be divided into technical or methodological issues on the one
hand, and conceptual issues on the other. Technical problems with neuro-
imaging are problems that have to do with the technical aspects of the scanning
process or the machine used in neuroimaging. Methodological problems can
occur during the subsequent process of statistical analysis of the data. Put
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simply, they are problems that occur in the process of trying to reflect brain
activity by generating statistical parametric maps. What divides technical and
methodological issues on the one hand and conceptual problems on the other,
is that given better scanners, or infinite amounts of time and money, the former
could be solved, while conceptual problems require mostly critical thinking.
The main problem under which all technical and methodological problems
can be grouped is that the images of the brain do not present raw data on brain
activity (Fitzpatrick and Rothman, 1999; Klein, 2010a). Instead (at least in
fMRI studies), they show metabolic change as compared to a null hypothesis,
which is supposed to reflect a brain state with “normal activity”. Interpreting
the images is not straightforward: neuroimaging does not give us a “photo”
of our brain or mind (Roskies, 2007). Going from statistical parametric maps
to hypotheses about cognition requires a number of steps. The whole process
of creating and interpreting this statistical information comes with numerous
technical and statistical decisions and assumptions.
A whole debate exists on the technical and methodological issues with neuro-
imaging. Some argue, for example, that cognitive processing can go unnoticed
due to spatial averaging of neighbouring voxels (Logothetis, 2008), or because
it does not produce a large enough metabolic change (Hardcastle and Stewart,
2002). Also, generalisability of the results is questioned, because it is unclear
how evidence obtained in a loud scanner relates to every day life (Huber and
Huber, 2009; Klein, 2010a), and because usually, neuroimaging studies only draw
on a small number of participants (Huber and Huber, 2009; Yarkoni, 2009).
I will not discuss technical or methodological problems in this chapter, or
the rest of this thesis. Not because I think they are unimportant, but because I
have little to add to their formulation (or solution). I trust that these issues can
in principle be solved, and instead focus on conceptual issues. This is a broad
category of problems that all have to be identified or solved by some kind of
conceptual analysis. A substantial part of philosophers’ business is conceptual
analysis, which is why they are involved in this debate about the underlying
assumptions of neuroimaging methods and what it is that this method can
prove exactly.
In the rest of this section, I will outline a prominent debate on one of
the conceptual issues with functional neuroimaging: the debate on what kind
of evidence functional neuroimaging techniques can give us about cognition.
Can functional neuroimaging techniques help us prove cognitive theories? I
review the positions by grouping them into three categories: the Sceptics, the
Moderates, and the Defenders. The extent of optimism about the usefulness of
functional neuroimaging varies between these groups.
1.3.1 Reverse inference and localisation with imaging
We can distinguish between two practices of linking cognitive theory on the
one hand and neural activation on the other: reverse inference and localisation
(Poldrack and Wagner, 2004). The former means adopting a hypothesis about
cognition based on neuroimaging data. The latter entails locating cognitive
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functions in a particular brain area or network. In simple terms, neuroscientists
do reverse inference when they use functional neuroimaging data to prove
hypotheses about cognition. Localisation means using functional neuroimaging
data to make conclusions about the organisation of cognition in the brain. I am
not claiming that localisation and reverse inference are the only types of practice
that neuroscientists engage in. In fact, in section A.4 I argue that we should
recognise other practices besides these two. But it is a good place to start,
even if only for the reason that they have been distinguished in the literature
reflecting on functional neuroimaging.
Localisation has been the most common type of inference in the functional
neuroimaging literature. It starts from the organisation of our cognitive
processes and wants to know how these processes are organised on a neural
level. More specifically, the goal of localisation studies is to pinpoint the neural
location of the cognitive processes. The localisation paradigm works as follows:
if we had a perfect measuring process, and found that whenever cognitive process
X is engaged, brain area Y is active, it can be concluded that X is localised in Y.
For example, if every time someone is involved in motor planning, the prefrontal
cortex is active, then this strategy would localise motor planning or some related
cognitive process in the prefrontal cortex.
Reverse inference starts from the other side: neuroscientists have knowledge
about the neural organisation of some process and with the help of neuro-
imaging, want to conclude something about the organisation of cognitive
processes. In more detail, reverse inference refers to the line of reasoning that
when the same brain area is active across studies, that means that the same
cognitive process was engaged. As Poldrack puts it:
“1. In the present study, when task comparison A was presented, brain area
Z was active.
2. In other studies, when cognitive process X was putatively engaged, then
brain area Z was active.
3. Thus, the activity of area Z in the present study demonstrates engagement
of cognitive process X by task comparison A.” (2006, p. 59)
For example, proving that the cognitive process of linguistic task switching
involves general control, could proceed as follows:
1. In the present study, the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) was active
when the task of linguistic task switching was compared to a control
condition.
2. In other studies, when participants (putatively) performed a process of
general cognitive control, the ACC was active.
3. Therefore, the activity in the ACC in the present study demonstrates that
linguistic task switching engages general control processes.5
5This process of reasoning is simplified slightly. Usually, more than one area of the brain is
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As a deductive inference, supporting a cognitive theory via reverse inference
contains the fallacy of a rming the consequent (Coltheart, 2006; Klein, 2010b;
Poldrack, 2008). The line of reasoning only works if area X is only involved
in process P, and not in other cognitive processes. This is highly problematic,
seeing as many di↵erent functions are often ascribed to the same brain region
(Anderson et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2014; Poldrack, 2006; Price and Friston, 2005).
Though everyone in the literature agrees that as a deductive inference,
reverse inference is invalid, many authors have commented on this type of
inference. They bring more arguments against reverse inference to the table,
or outline how reverse inference as a non-deductive enterprise could still be
valid. In the rest of this section, I include these arguments, and combine them
with discussions of localisation in functional neuroimaging. In section A.4 I will
outline my own stance in the debate.
Sceptics
The first group I discuss is sceptical of functional neuroimaging. The authors
in this group point to fundamental problems which are unlikely to be solved.
I discuss their positions in this section, going from broad criticism of cogni-
tive neuroscience to more specific issues with reverse inference on the basis of
neuroimaging results.
The criticism stated most generally is that neural data cannot constrain the
cognitive level: psychology is autonomous from neuroscience. This means that
cognitive or psychological theories should not be fundamentally amended on
the basis of neuroscientific findings. The most influential proponent of this view
is Fodor, when he argues for the autonomy of the special sciences, including
cognitive psychology (1974). His argument relies on the multiple realisability of
cognitive processes: the same cognitive state can be realised by many underlying
physical (or neural) states. And vice versa, the same neural activation pattern
could realise di↵erent cognitive processes: hence, “there’s no good reason to
think that similarity of psychological functions generally predicts similarity of
brain locations or vice versa” (Fodor, 1999). This means that there are no
psychophysical laws: it is not true that every time we observe one type of
neural activity, it has to mean that the participant is engaged in a particular
cognitive process (see also Davidson (1970)). Neuroscience cannot adjudicate
between cognitive theories, because observing activity in the ACC for example,
does not automatically imply that we use general control processes for language
switching. Hence, neuroscience cannot tell us what cognitive theory is superior.
Aizawa and Gillett (2011), Harley (2012), Hathfield (2000) and Weiskopf
(2015) agree with the central tenets of Fodor’s argument. Harley explains that
found to be active for a task contrast. Language switching is linked to the ACC, together with
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral supramarginal gyri (SMG), and the
caudate nucleus (Abutalebi and Green, 2008). However, this form of reasoning is employed
in cognitive neuroscience studies. Luk et al. (2012) believe that party overlapping activity
for linguistic and non-linguistic task switching shows that bilinguals draw on general control
mechanisms to switch between languages.
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we should not expect our cognitive level dissection of the mind to correspond to
the neural organisation of the brain. Weiskopf adds that not only is it impossible
for cognitive explanations to be constrained by the neural level, they are also
su cient, and do not need reference to neural structures. Cognitive theories
can be complete and satisfactory without neuroscientific explanations.
Localisation practices are equally unpopular with this group of researchers.
First, there is the problem of the assumption of modularity which is present
in most if not all neuroimaging studies (Uttal, 2001). Modularity implies that
processes can be divided into parts or components, which operate relatively
independently from each other. Assuming modularity is problematic, however
(Hardcastle and Stewart, 2002). The componential theory of cognition is
unlikely to be true, because the brain is such a causally dense system (Van Orden
and Paap, 1997) which is based on interactive processing (Farah, 1994).
Note that the definition of modules is ambiguous in some of this literature.
They can refer to modules on a cognitive level, or to modules on a neural level.
The latter assumption, colloquially termed “blobology”, has been acknowledged
to be problematic in the neuroscience literature. That is why now a number of
neuroimaging studies are focussing more on finding neural patterns and neural
networks than on finding neural modules in the brain. Though this resolves the
modularist assumption on the neural level, it does not take away the modularist
lens on the cognitive level: most neuroscientists still assume that cognitive
functions are modular.
Second, Harley maintains that even if localisation was not problematic, it
would still not be useful (2004). He draws the analogy between cars and brains
and points out that knowing all parts of a car engine will not tell us how the car
works. Similarly, knowing all parts of the brain will not tell us how cognition
works: we first need a full cognitive ontology—i.e. an idea of what cognitive
categories exist—before we can try to connect this ontology to brain areas.
Together with Loosemore he argues that currently, we are still struggling to
find that outline of the human cognitive system (Loosemore and Harley, 2010).
Lastly, Coltheart takes up these arguments to warn us against the specific
di culties of reverse inference with functional neuroimaging (2006). He agrees
with Harley that before neuroimaging can be useful, we first need a full theory
of cognition. A priori, he does not reject the possibility that neuroimaging
constrains functional analysis, but he maintains that so far, he has not found any
psychological theory that makes predictions that are testable by neuroimaging.
Instead, we need behavioural evidence for establishing dissociations between
cognitive categories.
What would the Sceptics say about using functional neuroimaging to find
out more about bilingual language switching? Can neuroimaging help prove
whether the age of second language acquisition has an influence on the per-
formance of language switching, or what role general control plays in language
switching? The short answer from the sceptical perspective is: no. The strongest
sceptical position is that no neuroimaging data could show anything about the
organisation of cognitive processes. Its proponents argue that this is because
neuroscience and psychology are autonomous fields, or because modularity is an
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inextricable part of neuroimaging (and it is false). Others maintain that neuro-
imaging is practically useless for cognitive theory, because cognitive theories do
not make predictions that are testable by neuroimaging.
Moderates
Whereas Sceptics see little future for reverse inference or localisation in neuro-
imaging studies, Moderates are critical yet tentatively optimistic. They point
to di culties with the technique, but at the same time see some use for neuro-
imaging, be it of limited scope.
One group of authors holds the view that neuroimaging data can be used for
exploratory purposes instead of confirming certain cognitive hypotheses (Feest,
2003; Huber and Huber, 2009; Huber, 2009; Huber et al., 2008; Klein, 2010a,b;
Logothetis, 2008; Poldrack, 2008, 2006). Confirmatory data provide evidence
for or against a hypothesis, thereby increasing or decreasing its likelihood.
Neuroscientists conduct exploratory analyses, on the other hand, when by
looking at the patterns in the data, they come up with new interpretations of
them. The latter, then, refers to the descriptive process of forming ideas, while
the former is the normative process of validating those ideas. The contrast
between confirmatory and exploratory analysis is also termed hypothesis-driven
versus data-driven analysis. This group of authors argue that neuroimaging can
be useful for thinking of possible hypotheses, but it cannot be used to decide
which hypothesis is correct.6.
These authors put forward four main arguments against the possibility that
neuroimaging data can confirm cognitive theories directly. First, neuroimaging
data is theory-laden (Huber, 2009; Klein, 2010b). The statistical parametric
map is generated only on the basis of a comparison between two conditions that
the researcher has formulated. Therefore, it cannot tell us whether we have
used the right concepts or models. In this sense there is an interdependency
of theory and data which makes it impossible for the data to be the unbiased
arbiter of cognitive theories.7
Second, neuroimaging will not tell you what the nature of the neural activity
is. For example, the activation pattern of fMRI studies does not distinguish
between inhibiting and exciting neural interactions (Huber and Huber, 2009;
Logothetis, 2008). Furthermore, it is not clear whether activated regions show
a bottom-up or top-down process (Huber and Huber, 2009), or whether they
show a type of information or a type of process (Klein, 2010b). The di↵erence
between information and process here, is for example that between “numeric
information” and “the process of addition”. Given a task in which participants
have to add numbers, it is thus not clear whether the resulting data shows areas
specialised in numeric information or the process of addition.
Third, it is very unlikely that there is no change in the activation pattern
of the brain between two conditions. This makes it too easy for there to be
some activity associated with psychological phenomena, thereby reifying them
6Just like the Sceptics, they do not reject multiple realisation of cognitive functions
7Huber seems to allow for iterative process between theory and data, though (Huber, 2009).
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(Klein, 2010a). In other words, even the contrast between two non-sensical
psychological phenomena is very likely to yield a neural activation contrast,
which means that we think that they are real.
Last, as Poldrack points out, reverse inference does not necessarily increase
the likelihood of cognitive theories, “particularly in cases where the prior belief
in the engagement of a cognitive process and selectivity of activation in the
region of interest are low” (2006, p. 63). What he means by this, is that when
we have low confidence that a certain cognitive process is actually engaged, or
when the neural region in question can be activated by a large number of cogni-
tive processes, the Bayes factor (the increased likelihood after the inference)
is relatively low. This means that reverse inference will not give us much
information.
A second group of Moderates distinguishes between di↵erent types of reverse
inference, claiming that one type is valid while another is not. Henson
for example, makes a distinction between function-to-structure deduction
and structure-to-function induction/reverse inference (Henson, 2005).8 With
function-to-structure deduction he explains, “a qualitatively di↵erent pattern of
activity over the brain under two experimental conditions implies at least one
di↵erent function associated with changes in the independent variable” (p. 193).
This inference does not make any claims as to what function that is exactly,
and thus only assumes some systematicity in the mapping between cognitive
function and the brain. The latter type is a situation that we usually talk about
with reverse inference, where “activity of the same brain region(s) under two
conditions implies a common function” (p. 193). This type of inference assumes
a one-to-one mapping of cognitive functions to brain areas, an assumption which
is quite unlikely and possibly unprovable.9
Del Pinal and Nathan make a di↵erent distinction: they distinguish between
reverse inference on the basis of neural location and reverse inference on the basis
of pattern analysis (2016). While the former is problematic for all the reasons
outlined above, the latter is not. With multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA),
neuroscientists draw conclusions about cognitive processes based on patterns
in brain data, rather than on the location of the activation. With MVPA,
neuroscientists train an algorithm to be able to distinguish between two types
of trials within a research paradigm. The algorithm makes this distinction on
the basis of the pattern of activation of voxels within a certain area of the brain.
It is not subject to the modularity assumption: it does not assume that a neural
location only performs one function.
The Moderates then, think that there are some ways in which neuro-
imaging can help answer questions such as whether the age of second language
acquisition has an influence on the performance of language switching, or what
role general control plays in language switching. The first group of Moderates
thinks that despite statistical and technical challenges, neuroimaging can play
8He calls function-to-structure deduction forward inference and structure-to-function
induction reverse inference.
9Though interestingly, Henson himself thinks that we can judge whether this “working
hypothesis” is correct from the success or failure of the whole neuroscientific enterprise.
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an exploratory role. So, by looking at neuroimaging data, we can get ideas
about what role general control plays in language switching. These hypotheses
subsequently need to be tested and confirmed by other means.
The second group thinks that neuroimaging can be used to confirm that
there are two di↵erent cognitive processes going on, even if we cannot tell which
ones they are, or even to confirm hypotheses if they are based on patterns of
brain data rather than “blobs” of neural activation.
Defenders
The last group defends neuroimaging against the criticisms of the Sceptics and
Moderates. Although not necessarily uncritical, they believe that neuroimaging
can provide evidence for cognitive theories. Below I will explain how they
counter the possible problems and what use they see for reverse inference and
localisation.
Shallice, in contrast to Uttal, Hardcastle and Stewart, and van Orden
and Paap, thinks that modularity is a reasonable assumption in neuroimaging
studies (1988). He backs this up with computational and empirical arguments:
the speed, accuracy and rule-based nature of our cognitive capacities could not
be easily explained if the brain was not modular in nature. In addition, these
highly specific areas have actually been observed in monkeys. With this in
mind, Shallice is not so pessimistic about reverse inference; he thinks it is part
of a scientific “bootstrapping process” in which we oscillate between the level
of cognitive theory and the level of its neural implementation, without having
to finish theories on either side right away (2003).
Bechtel proposes a di↵erent path for neuroimaging: as the literature grows,
we will have many cognitive tasks localised in one neural region. If we manage
to find a common operation of these tasks, we can include them in the cognitive
theories. Though imaging cannot strictly confirm cognitive theories by itself, if
its results align with other methods in cognitive neuroscience, they can enhance
our understanding of cognitive mechanisms (2004; 2002).
In essence, Bechtel is proposing a solution to the problem of having assigned
many cognitive tasks to one neural region. If we define these tasks more
abstractly, perhaps we can assign one function to each neural region again, which
would make reverse inference more plausible. With this, Bechtel is part of a
group of theorists that consider folk psychology the main culprit of the di culty
with connecting mental and neural terms. If instead, we adopt a di↵erent mental
vocabulary, many of these problems would disappear. In chapter 2 I will come
back to this issue, as it is one of the main topics of the cognitive ontology debate.
Against Poldrack’s worries about reverse inference, some authors argue
that with the right kinds of constraints, conditional probabilities can increase
significantly. For example, Hutzler (2014)points out that we can have that
increased probability if we take the task-setting into account. This means that
within tasks, we can use reverse inference to indicate the presence of a cognitive
process. So while it might not be possible to indicate that someone is engaging
in language switching if we are presented with a random statistical parametric
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map, it might be possible to predict language switching if there are a limited
number of possible tasks that the subjects could have engaged in (say: language
switching or non-linguistic switching). Thus even in the absence of a one-to-
one mapping of cognitive processes to neural activation, “the predictive power
of reverse inference can be ‘decisive’—dependent on the cognitive process of
interest, the specific brain region activated, and the task-setting used” (Hutzler,
2014, p. 1061).
Roskies (2009) agrees that we do not need a one-to-one mapping for reverse
inference to increase the likelihood that a cognitive process is involved. She
meets Coltheart’s challenge (2006) by stating that we can safely assume a
systematic structure-function mapping, in which a cognitive process activates
the same neural structures in similar contexts. This should at least allow us
to say that “activation of the same structures is evidence for operation of the
same functions, and activation of di↵erent structures is evidence for operation
of di↵erent functions” even if it does not give us conclusive evidence (Roskies,
2009, p. 933).
Machery (2014) extends Poldrack’s (2006) criticism of reverse inference. He
argues that we do not know the prior probability that other cognitive processes
activate the same neural structures, and hence that observation of the pattern
cannot provide evidence. So, observing a certain neural activation pattern in
the ACC cannot support the hypothesis that the participant engages in a cogni-
tive control process, because we do not know the probability of other cognitive
processes activating the ACC. Not only is cognitive control not the only cog-
nitive process that might activate the ACC, neuroscientists often do not know
the probability that it is cognitive control, compared to some other process. He
does, however, see some way forward for reverse inference, if we look at it as
a “likelihoodist” enterprise. Rather than providing evidence for or against one
hypothesis, he thinks neuroimaging can increase the likelihood of one hypothesis
being true as compared to another hypothesis. Reverse inference cannot support
the hypothesis that bilinguals use cognitive control mechanisms for language
switching, but it could increase the likelihood that they use cognitive control
mechanisms rather than specific language control mechanisms.
Glymour and Hanson (2015), subsequently, take a stance against both
Poldrack and Machery. They propose that reverse inference can favour one
among many cognitive hypotheses if we look at the specific causal patterns
between neural areas. The probability that another cognitive process activates
exactly the same causal pattern is low, which means that observing a particular
pattern can narrow down the possible cognitive hypotheses substantially.
So, according to the Defenders, neuroimaging can tell us whether general
control processes are used for language switching or at least can increase the
likelihood of one hypothesis over the other. They hold this position because
they can counter the challenges that have been put forward by others in the
debate.
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1.4 Summary and way forward
What can functional neuroimaging tell us about cognition? In this chapter, I
introduced this question by looking at previous debates, and by giving a short
explanation about the most commonly used functional neuroimaging techniques.
It is important to investigate these matters with an eye to the experimental
practice of cognitive neuroscience. This is why I also discussed the field of
bilingual language processing, which I will draw on for the rest of the thesis.
The Sceptics, Moderates, and Defenders have di↵erent ideas about how
useful neuroimaging is. This debate centres around the question whether
functional neuroimaging methods can help us understand cognition by localisa-
tion or reverse inference. While the Sceptics doubt whether neuroimaging can
tell us anything about cognition, the Moderates see some way forward: neuro-
imaging can increase the likelihood of some cognitive theory over another or can
confirm that there are di↵erent cognitive processes going on. The Defenders are
the most optimistic group and defend neuroimaging from the criticism voiced
by the Sceptics and Moderates.
Which camp has the right answer: the Sceptics, the Moderates, or the
Defenders? I think the Sceptics are too dismissive, and the Defenders are too
positive about what neuroimaging can do. Certainly, I agree with the Sceptics
that we need to acknowledge that the activation in most brain areas can be
mapped to multiple cognitive processes, and that we need to problematise the
assumption of modularity of cognitive processes. But that does not mean neuro-
imaging is useless. Brain and cognition are intimately related, and I think
neuroimaging can give us information about that relation. At the same time,
we need to be critical and re-evaluate what exactly these methods can tell us.
I do not align myself with the Moderates either, because in fact I think
the central question of the debate is misguided, in two ways. First, the debate
about the value of functional neuroimaging for cognition has been focused on
the practices of localisation and reverse inference. But experimental reality
is more diverse than this. Focussing only on reverse inference and localisa-
tion does not do justice to the variety of theories and goals of cognitive neu-
roscience. Neuroscientists are also interested in investigating the influence that
cognitive processes have on neural mechanisms, and vice versa. Furthermore,
they sometimes want to investigate whether we have used the right cognitive
concepts by means of neuroimaging.
For example, Garbin et al. want to explain why bilinguals seem to be
better at general switching tasks and conclude that it is because “bilinguals’
early training in switching back and forth between their languages leads to the
recruitment of brain regions involved in language control when performing non-
linguistic cognitive tasks” (Garbin et al., 2010, p. 1272). This type of research
is not easily classified as localisation or reverse inference, because it concerns
a hypothesis about how cognitive processes can influence neural mechanisms,
which can subsequently have an e↵ect on other cognitive processes.
A second example is a study by Hernandez et al. (2000), who investigate
the neural correlates of language switching. They think that because there
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is no exclusive neural area dedicated to only language switching, there is no
such thing as “the language switch”. Again, this type of research cannot
be classified as localisation or reverse inference. Their interest in the neural
correlates of language switching seems to indicate that they want to localise
language switching. But the overlap of neural areas for language switching and
for general control makes them conclude something about the existence of a
cognitive process. This practice, as I will show in chapter 2 is part of cognitive
ontology building.
Neuroscientists, then, are not only interested in localising cognitive processes,
or proving cognitive hypotheses by means of neuroimaging data. This leads me
to the second way in which I think the central question of the debate—what
can functional neuroimaging tell us about cognition?—is flawed. Neuroimaging
is not merely used to say something about cognition, more broadly it is used to
say something about the relationship between cognition and the brain.
Taking all the projects that neuroscientists engage in seriously requires a
systematic story of how cognitive neuroscience connects mind and brain. In the
rest of this thesis, I will develop a framework that is less concerned with the
divide between cognitive theory and neuroimaging data, and instead does justice
to the complex interactions between cognition and the brain in neuroscientific
explanations. In the end, this framework will yield a systematic story about
what imaging can do and what it cannot do with respect to uncovering the
relation between cognition and the brain.
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Chapter 2
Cognitive ontology and the mapping norm

Chapter 2
Cognitive ontology and the
mapping norm
How should we categorise the mind? What concepts should we use to describe
behaviour, thoughts, and cognitive processes? What would be a good cognitive
ontology, listing the building blocks for our theories of cognition? Throughout
history, psychological techniques ranging from introspection to behavioural
measures have been used to try to answer these questions. When neuroimaging
techniques were developed, the most promising source of information for cog-
nitive categorisation seemed to be the brain. Perhaps the organisation of the
brain can tell us more about how to organise the mind.
Ideally, functional neuroimaging tells us whether the cognitive categories
that we use to describe the mind are accurate. This is no small task, considering
there are innumerable ways to categorise the mind. Not only are there vast
cultural di↵erences (Danziger, 1997; Lillard, 1998), but even in the Western
world, classifying cognitive processes as memory, consciousness or attention is
not a straightforward task (Hacking, 1986; Macdonald, 2003, 2005; Uttal, 2001;
Wittgenstein, 1980).
The hope that neuroimaging can tell us anything about cognitive categorisa-
tion rests on the assumption that neural and cognitive taxonomies are related.
But how closely interconnected are they? Some think they should be very
closely related and hope to find one-to-one mappings between neural structure
and cognitive functions. This means that reverse inference—predicting cognitive
function from neural structure—could be carried out unproblematically.
However, at the current stage of neuroimaging research, it appears that
there is a many-to-many mapping of neural structures to functional categories.
In other words, we find empirically that at least some brain areas appear to
support multiple mental functions (also called “pluripotency”, see for example
Anderson (2014), Price and Friston (2005) and Poldrack (2006)), and that
some mental functions can be performed by multiple brain structures (called
“degeneracy”, see Price and Friston (2002)). As Pessoa describes this empirical
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finding: “disregarding for now the thorny issue of what precisely is meant by
‘area’ and ‘function’, it is readily apparent that brain regions participate in many
functions, and that many functions are carried out by many regions” (Pessoa,
2014, p. 401). This in turn creates a problem for reverse inference. Now, when
we see a region light up on a scanner, there could be numerous functions that
the person is performing.
There are three possible responses to this “many-to-many problem” (Mc-
Ca↵rey and Machery, 2016), which are not mutually exclusive: 1. make reverse
inference relative to psychological processes or tasks or limit the inferences in
some other way, 2. revise the brain ontology, or 3. revise the cognitive ontology.
The first response is the route taken by the authors I discussed in chapter 1: the
Moderates (and to some degree, the Defenders) all proposed di↵erent ways to
make reverse inference context-dependent or tried to save at least some limited
version of reverse inference.
The other two responses are part of an emerging discussion about the
ontology of cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps the many-to-many problem is just a
result of using the wrong ontology, which we can fix by adjusting the categories
of the brain and/or the mind. This debate is the main topic of this chapter and
forms the background for my own position in chapters 3 and 4.
I will start by explaining what a cognitive ontology is and what its scope
is. Then, in section 2.2 I flesh out two ways of revising a cognitive ontology:
revising neural categories and cognitive categories, respectively. In section 2.3 I
state that we should categorise the debate rather in terms of the kind of mapping
that the theories aim for. In section 2.4 I argue that all strategies base their
revision on what I call “the mapping norm”: that is, taking a certain structure-
function mapping relation between cognitive and neural concepts as a normative
guide when building a cognitive ontology. I use the term “structure” to refer to
neural categories, and “function” to refer to cognitive categories. I will argue
that the mapping norm is problematic, because it comes with unscientific a
priori assumptions about the relation between cognition and the brain.
In this chapter and the rest of this thesis, I will not talk about psychiatric
ontologies. Categories of psychiatric disorders such as autism, anxiety disorders,
or delusions will not fall within the scope of this thesis. While these ontologies
are also the subject of a lively debate (see for example (Bluhm, 2017), (Murphy,
2017), and (Weiskopf, 2017) for recent analyses), these ontologies come with
their own challenges and it would be too much ground to cover in this thesis.
2.1 Cognitive ontology
Improving the accuracy of reverse inference is one driving force for adapting
our cognitive ontology. The other driving force is that there is no widespread
agreement between cognitive neuroscientists about the concepts that should be
taken up in our cognitive ontology. Cognitive terminology is often ambiguous,
in the sense that one cognitive term can describe multiple processes, and that
one processes can be described by di↵erent terms (Poldrack et al., 2011). This
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amount of ambiguity even leads Poldrack and Yarkoni to state that “[b]y
comparison [to molecular biology], cognitive neuroscience is awash in a sea of
conflicting terms and concepts” (2016, p. 588). A cognitive ontology can anchor
the relevant concepts that cognitive scientists work with to make sure that the
meaning of these concepts is shared across the research community.
However, sometimes authors even disagree about what a cognitive ontology
is. It can be a set of standardised terms, a set of entities, or a set of basic
metaphysical categories. In this section, I discuss these three di↵erent senses of
a cognitive ontology and explain which sense and scope I will be using in this
chapter.
2.1.1 Three senses of ontology
The term “cognitive ontology” was introduced to contemporary debate by Price
and Friston (2005). Multiple disciplines have since contributed to the debate,
and this has led, ironically, to the term being used in several di↵erent ways.
The term “cognitive ontology” can have at least three meanings.
First, a cognitive ontology could be a nomenclature: that is, a set of
standardised terms which researchers intend to use in a systematic way in order
to promote mutual understanding. The people who started this debate in cog-
nitive ontology were encouraged by work on gene ontologies (Ashburner et al.,
2000). The point of gene ontologies was to make sure that di↵erent research-
ers use the same names for genes, avoiding ine cient duplication. The gene
ontology project has been quite successful in achieving this goal.
More broadly, “ontology” in this sense stems from work in informatics
(Gruber, 1995), where it is important to use a consistent set of terms and
relations, set out in a formal language. In informatics, an ontology is essentially
a formal list of entities in a domain, possibly along with their interrelations.
An example of an ontology in informatics is the Friend of a Friend (FOAF)
ontology1. This ontology can be used to describe people and their social rela-
tions with each other. Classes used to define people are for example “name”
and “mbox” (email address), and classes for relations can be “knows” (between
two people) or “member” (between a person and a group).
In cognitive neuroscience, researchers have also started to develop online
databases for standardising cognitive terms (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016). Some
are focussed on cognitive terms, while others also contain neuroimaging data.
In appendix A I will discuss these online databases in detail.
Second, a cognitive ontology could refer to a domain: that is, a set of
entities that a cognitive theory refers to, rather than a set of terms. Debates
within the domain-sense of cognitive ontology concern questions about whether
working memory is unified or modality-specific, whether schizophrenia is really
an appropriate taxonomic category, or whether spelling-to-sound conversion
goes by a single route or a dual route.
1See: http://www.foaf-project.org (accessed 03/01/2017).
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Proponents of the domain-sense of cognitive ontology (Price and Friston,
2005) argue that positing new terms (and securing their standardised use) is
not enough to make sense of the findings of neuroimaging studies. Rather than
new terminology for existing processes, they argue that what we need is to
propose new psychological processes, new ways of carving up or structuring
cognitive systems.
Third, a cognitive ontology could be a set of basic metaphysical categories :
when we carve up or structure cognitive systems, what kind of entities make
up that structure? What kinds of entities make up the cognitive domain? This
is the sense of “ontology” primarily used by metaphysicians. In metaphysics,
ontology is “the study of basic categories of existence (object, relation, event)”
(Figdor, 2011, p. 223). Questions that come up in this sense of ontology are
the metaphysical status of the entities in the ontology, their properties and
interrelations in the world, and how this relates to metaphysical theories of
being.
For example, we might debate whether a good cognitive theory should refer
to mechanisms (Craver, 2007) or dynamic processes (Chemero and Silberstein,
2008). Furthermore, the cognitive domain is usually stratified in levels. A
cognitive ontology in this third sense should indicate whether the relationship
between levels is one of composition, constitution, causation or something else.
These questions in turn a↵ect how you think cognitive theories ought to be
developed and verified.
These three senses of cognitive ontology are not independent. For starters, a
consistent nomenclature is probably only possible if you have consensus about
the referents of the terms—that is, what the domain of inquiry ought to be.
This is a marked contrast between gene ontology and cognitive ontologies. In
the case of gene ontologies there are procedures for delineating genes and their
products, and this occurs against a background of rough agreement about how
genetics works. Some debates like this do occur in cognitive neuroscience—for
example about which brain atlas to use or how to delineate cyto-architectural
areas. However, most debates in cognitive neuroscience run deeper. Theoretical
disputes are often not just about what particular neural areas do, but about
what the domain of the theory is in the first place. The metaphysical sense and
the domain sense are also related. The question whether joint attention is an
appropriate category depends on whether (or how) we incorporate embodied
processes in a cognitive ontology.
The questions I will be talking about in this chapter span these three senses
of ontology. Yes, we want to end up with a consistent nomenclature. But we
also need to know what the concepts refer to exactly, and how do they relate to
one another.
I do not want to get too metaphysical, however. This is not a thesis of
metaphysics, and I do not wish to get deeply involved in the realist/anti-realist
debate or the various theories of being. I do think it is important to be very
precise about the properties and interrelations of the entities in an ontology, and
I also think this has been lacking in recent developments of cognitive ontology.
The questions that will come up in this regard are for example: do the entities in
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the ontology have causal properties? And: if we say that one entity is “part-of”
another, what does this relation really mean?
Instead of taking the metaphysical route, my way into this debate is via
the epistemic/procedural/practical question: how do we find out what the right
categories for the mind and brain are? What can a cognitive ontology do for
cognitive neuroscience, and in particular for neuroimaging studies? What do
we really care about when we construct a cognitive ontology for cognitive neu-
roscience? The route that I will take is less about what the “real” categories
of the mind are, but is firmly rooted in scientific practice: how do we construct
the best explanations in cognitive neuroscience? Throughout this chapter and
the rest of this thesis, these questions will become more clear and more specific.
2.1.2 The scope of a cognitive ontology
A cognitive ontology contains cognitive processes or tasks. Entities such
as “episodic memory”, “language switching”, and “cognitive control” are
uncontroversially part of a cognitive ontology. But what about computational
categories such as “edge detection” or “feature extraction”, or embodied
categories such as “joint attention”; are they also part of a cognitive ontology?
I take the group of cognitive categories to be quite broad. Cognitive
categories include our familiar folk psychological categories, but could also
include computational categories, embodied and embedded categories, and cog-
nitive categories that emerge from dynamical systems theory. The main reason
for this broad inclusion of cognitive categories is that I do not want to restrict
the scope of cognitive science from the outset. I follow Allen here, when he
argues for a relaxed pluralism about cognition, which “allows multiple targets
and lines of enquiry while insisting on rigour where it can be provided” (2017,
p. 4241).
I do not think it serves cognitive scientists to define cognition. But we do
not want to end up with a situation in which garden gnomes are part of a
cognitive ontology. My response is that whether a category’s membership of
the cognitive ontology deserves to be considered depends on whether the field
of cognitive neuroscience is interested in it. This is a guideline that will bar
the obviously unqualified cases from being taken up in a cognitive ontology: no
cognitive scientist will propose to study garden gnomes.
But then there are grey areas. Should “love of o↵spring” be part of a cogni-
tive ontology? At the time of the phrenologists, this was a genuinely interesting
category to study. I will develop the guidelines that tell us whether these border
cases belong in a cognitive ontology in chapter 3. There, I will argue for a view
in which ontology membership depends on whether the category has causal
relevance. This theory is very liberal about the types of categories that can
have causal relevance, which means that in the end, many types of categories can
be included in neuroscientific explanations. However, the theory does require
precision in defining the categories and their interrelations.
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2.2 Cognitive ontology revision
The two strategies for ontology-revision are adjusting the neural categories
and/or adjusting the cognitive categories, which I will discuss in sections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2, respectively. In section 2.3 I argue that the debate about cogni-
tive ontology should rather be structured in terms of the mapping strategy that
authors employ. Then I will explain why I think aiming for a specific mapping
is misguided (section 2.4).
2.2.1 Revising the neural categories
Neural categories refer to everything that has to do with the brain. They can be
brain areas, the extent of activation in a certain brain area, connectivity of two
or more brain regions with each other, network properties, etc. Traditionally,
neural categories refer to neural areas. The “Brodmann areas” for example
(Brodmann, 1909), divide the brain into 52 areas, based mainly on the density
of the di↵erent types of neurons that can be found in the brain (histological
information). Brodmann thought that a uniform structure would indicate a
uniform function, and thus that this structural decomposition would align with
the functional decomposition of the brain (1909).
While it may seem that neural categories are relatively easy to define—
all we need to do is look at the brain—in fact it is a complex task. Neural
areas can be defined by structural features such as the types of neurons, and/or
by their position in a coordinate system such as the MNI standard brain—a
standard brain space onto which many imaging studies map their results. But
they can also be defined by functional features. The Fusiform Face area, for
example, was initially defined by its functional specificity: it only responds
to face stimuli. Later on, it turned out that the area was also implicated
when experts recognised types of cars and birds (Gauthier et al., 2000), but the
boundaries of the Fusiform Face area are still based on these initial functional
attributions.
We could also divide up the brain in networks. Networks can be defined
by their structural or functional connectivity. Structural connectivity looks at
how intimate the connections between certain regions are, whereas functional
connectivity is based on how closely the activations of these regions are
correlated during certain cognitive tasks. A further question then arises about
which cognitive tasks should be used to divide the brain up into networks.
A revision of neural categories could be done in two principal ways: by
changing the type or the grain of the category. Changing the types of neural
categories is what Pessoa proposes when he wants to change the main neural
unit from neural areas to neural networks: “thus, the network itself is the unit,
not the brain region” (2014, p. 406). Similarly, Barrett and Satpute propose that
the appropriate structure-function relationship is from domain general processes
to brain networks instead of brain regions (2013). Instead of mapping cognitive
functions to regions, we should map them to structural networks of regions.
Another manner of moving away from areas is to conceive of neural categories
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as dynamic, rather than static. This adds a dimension of time to the categories.
Pessoa, for example, argues that the structure-function mapping is dynamic:
at one moment a certain cognitive function might map onto one set of regions,
while at another it might map onto another set. Similarly, Viola and Zanin
argue that we should speak of “neural events” rather than neural structures,
because the former is metaphysically more in line with the inherent dynamical
nature of cognitive processes (2017).
The other way of revising neural categories is to change their grain, also
called the “subdivide-and-conquer strategy” (McCa↵rey, 2015, p. 1013). So,
while many cognitive functions may be attributed to a certain Brodmann area,
it might be that di↵erent parts of that area implement di↵erent functions. For
example, while the insula might be important for many cognitive processes, it
can be subdivided into distinct regions for core a↵ect, motivation, and pain
(Wager and Barrett, 2004). Thus, on a finer grain level, there may be a one-to-
one mapping between regions and cognitive processes.
Revising the type or grain of neural categories on the basis of their cognitive
functions is sometimes called the “top-down approach”. Top-down revision
means revising the neural categories “at the bottom” on the basis of cognitive
concepts “at the top”. Usually, top-down strategies will not allow for much
revision of our familiar cognitive concepts.
2.2.2 Revising the cognitive categories
Revising the cognitive categories is the second strategy for solving the many-
to-many mapping problem. This strategy is sometimes called the bottom-up
approach, because the cognitive categories at the top are revised based on the
neural categories at the bottom. This group of researchers has the common aim
to “explore the brain’s native ontology—the categories that it uses to interpret
the world—and to use these explorations to motivate revisions to the basic
categories of psychology” (Anderson, 2015, p. 69). They think that the current
cognitive categories are unsatisfactory for neuroscientific research and that they
should be changed on the basis of neural evidence.
How exactly should these cognitive categories be amended? Some suggest
that we should change the grain of cognitive functions. Price and Friston, for
example, do so by trying to look at the di↵erent functions that one brain area
performs (2005). They note that while on some level these appear to be di↵erent
functions, perhaps we can find an underlying functional label that explains how
this area responds in various contexts. They take the Posterior Lateral Fusiform
area (PLF) as an example. While this area is involved in mental functions as
diverse as visual word form identification and naming colour patches, at another
level of description, this area could be assigned a single function: the PLF
functions as a sensorimotor integration area.
Others move away from familiar cognitive terms altogether. The categories
that Poldrack et al. map onto brain activation are “dimensions”, numbered 1
through 6 (2009). For Barrett and Satpute, the cognitive categories are domain-
general processes (2013), for Rathkopf they are low-level signal-processing
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computations (2013), and for Anderson they are “dispositions” (2014).2
2.3 An overview of mapping strategies
Dividing up cognitive ontology revision into the top-down and bottom-up
strategy as I have done in the previous section is actually not as easy in
practice. That is because changing neural categories often goes hand in hand
with changing cognitive categories, and vice versa. Some authors may focus
more on one or the other, but very few allow for only neural revision or only
cognitive revision. This makes it hard in practice to have a clear division between
bottom-up and top-down theorists. A good example here is Pessoa (2014). He
proposes to change the neural categories from areas to networks, but because
he has a specific type of network in mind (intrinsic networks), this subsequently
restricts the cognitive categories. He thus combines a top-down and a bottom-up
approach.
A more useful division, I propose, is to group theorists according to the
mapping that they aim for. The first strategy is to end up with a many-to-
one structure-function mapping. This means that while one function can be
supported by many regions or networks (degeneracy), each region or network can
only have one cognitive function. The one-to-many structure-function mapping
strategy reverses this pattern: it allows for regions or networks to have multiple
functions (pluripotency), but each function needs to be implemented by only
one region or network. The one-to-one mapping strategy does not allow for
pluripotency or degeneracy. A many-to-many mapping of structure to function
reflects the current situation in cognitive neuroscience. See figure 2.1 for a
schematic representation of the four di↵erent mappings.
2.3.1 Many-to-one structure-function mapping
Price and Friston’s theory as discussed in the previous section is an example
of a strategy that aims for a many-to-one structure-function mapping: there
are many structures for one function, but each structure only has one function.
This strategy tries to solve a situation of pluripotency, in which one brain area
has many functions. By assigning each brain area a function at the appropriate
descriptive level, the researchers end up with one function per neural area,
such as “sensorimotor integration” for the PLF. This subsequently enables them
to predict mental function from information about neural activation (reverse
inference).
In fact, I believe Price and Friston were aiming for a stronger mapping
relation: a one-to-one structure-function mapping. But, as Anderson points
out, functional labels such as “sensorimotor integration” are such general
descriptions that we can expect that many neural areas would have this function
(2015). As Klein puts it pointedly: “at some level of abstraction, that is what
2Although in this book he also describes neural dispositions as a way of finding out which
psychological functions are useful, thereby reintroducing (some) familiar terms.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of mapping strategies
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nearly all of the cortex does” (2012, p. 955). So while in Price and Friston’s view
every neural area only has one function, cognitive functions can be implemented
by many neural regions.
Another group of authors that employs the many-to-one strategy is Lenarto-
wicz et al. (2010). Lenartowicz et al. investigate whether the components of
cognitive control that Sabb et al. (2008) propose can be distinguished on a
neural level. Sabb et al. argue that cognitive control has four components:
response inhibition, response selection, task switching (or set shifting), and
working memory.
Lenartowicz et al. subsequently engage in meta-analysis of neuroimaging
data to investigate whether the components of cognitive control have ontological
reality. In their view, evidence for their ontological reality would be their
discriminability on a neural level. They maintain that mental concepts should
be eliminated, merged, or split if they are not neurally distinguishable from
each other: “how these functions correspond to distinct indicators of brain
activity will determine whether they are truly distinct componential entities or
whether they emerge from the interactions of various systems in the brain and
are therefore manifest only in the minds of cognitive scientists” (2010, p. 690).
This does not mean that each mental concept should be allocated to a specific
region, network, or other pattern of activity, but that the activation patterns
connected to these mental concepts are more similar to each other than to
activation patterns connected to other mental concepts.
If cognitive concepts need to be neurally distinguishable, there can be only
one cognitive function for each neural activation pattern. This means that there
is no pluripotency in the brain. Lenartowicz et al. do not, however, say that
each cognitive function can only be mapped to one particular neural activation
pattern. In other words, each cognitive function might be implemented by many
di↵erent neural activation patterns.
An important remark here, is that what it means for cognitive categories
to be “neurally distinguishable” is not so easy to define. Because the brain
is so causally dense, there will always be some di↵erential activation between
two tasks: a null-e↵ect is very unlikely” (Klein, 2010a). Anderson adds: “what
remains to be fleshed out is exactly what kind or degree of selectivity and neural
segregation is su cient for establishing the ‘ontological reality’ of a cognitive
construct; there is currently little agreement on these questions, even across
di↵erent papers coming from the same researchers (e.g. Poldrack et al. (2009);
Poldrack (2010))”(Anderson, 2015, p. 73).
Other authors that belong in the many-to-one structure-function mapping
category are Poldrack (2010) and Penner-Wilger and Anderson (2011). They
think that specific regions of the brain implement component operations, and
that these domain-general components are combined to perform certain tasks.
By adjusting our cognitive ontology to these basic operations, we can make
use of reverse inference: a certain neural region will have only one component
function. The basic operations, on the other hand, could be performed by
more than one neural region. Hence they end up with a many-to-one structure-
function mapping.
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2.3.2 One-to-many structure-function mapping
Not many people in the cognitive ontology debate explicitly hold that we should
aim for a one-to-many structure-function mapping. But it does happen in neuro-
scientific practice that neuroscientists aim for only one neural structure per
cognitive function, while neural structures could have many cognitive functions.
The general strategy here is to broaden the grain of neural categories to networks
and/or to narrow the grain of cognitive categories to context-specific functions.
An example is linking the dorsal stream to the “where” of sensory processing.
When studying visual perception, Milner and Goodale (1992) discovered two
main pathways in the brain: the ventral pathway was linked to object
recognition, while the dorsal pathway was involved in assessing the object’s
location. Since the model was proposed, it has been criticised and revised
(McIntosh and Schenk, 2009), but the central idea is a good example of the
one-to-many structure-function mapping strategy.
The neural category “dorsal stream” is very wide here: it involves areas
in the occipital lobe and parietal lobe. The “where of visual processing” is a
very narrowly specified cognitive function. This makes sure that there is only
one type of neural structure that supports the cognitive category. Every time
someone is processing the spatial location of visual information, it will be in the
dorsal stream. A one-to-many structure-function mapping thus does away with
degeneracy: the idea that a function can be implemented in di↵erent neural
areas. But the dorsal stream might have other cognitive functions in other
contexts. Hence, we end up with a one-to-many mapping, in which there is still
pluripotency.
2.3.3 One-to-one structure-function mapping
Third, there is the one-to-one structure-function mapping strategy. The re-
searchers with this strategy want to uncover the language of the brain itself,
which might give us an ontology that looks very di↵erent from our current
psychological vocabulary. The goal of these revisions is to end up with a one-
to-one mapping of neural activation and domain-general basic functions of the
brain. These basic functions subsequently operate as building blocks which
work together to perform a certain mental task. Barrett and Satpute (2013);
Lindquist and Barrett (2012); Lindquist et al. (2012); Yeo et al. (2014) and
the methods used in (Poldrack et al., 2009) uphold this one-to-one mapping
strategy.
Many of the authors that employ this strategy rely on machine learning
algorithms to find the brain’s basic functions. Poldrack et al. (2009), for
example, start with trying to di↵erentiate between the neural activation
connected to eight di↵erent cognitive tasks: risk taking, classification, rhyme
judgements, working memory, gambling decisions, semantic judgements, reading
aloud, and response inhibition. They find out that a 6-dimensional model can
successfully distinguish between them. In more detail, with six neural dimen-
sions, classification accuracy was 72%, and adding more dimensions did little to
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improve that accuracy. These dimensions do not correspond to particular brain
areas or networks. They are just a computational way of condensing a lot of
neural activation data.
Then, Poldrack et al. made a unique “dimensional loading” for every cogni-
tive task, which represents how much the task draws on each of the six dimen-
sions. This makes it possible to connect these neural categories to the cognitive
tasks in a one-to-one fashion. Every cognitive task only has one pattern of
dimensional loadings. And vice versa, every pattern of dimensional loadings
has only one of these cognitive tasks attached to it. This makes it possible to
connect these neural categories to the cognitive tasks in a one-to-one fashion.
There is also a second way in which they aim for the one-to-one mapping.
They try to characterise each of the six dimensions in terms of the tasks that
are most associated with them. They end up with a weighted set of words,
represented by a word cloud. Each dimension has a unique word cloud, and
each word cloud is connected to a specific dimension. This is the second way
in which Poldrack et al. adjust the categories to end up with a one-to-one
structure-function mapping.
Penner-Wilger and Anderson (2011) perform similar data-driven analyses of
the functions of the brain. They start with 20 task domains from BrainMap
(an online collaborative ontology, see appendix A for more information), which
include “execution-action”, “working memory-cognition”, and “anger-emotion”.
Drawing on a large amount of neuroimaging studies, they analyse to what extent
brain regions and networks are engaged in these task domains. They end up
with a “fingerprint” for each region or network. For example, the dorsal Anterior
Cingulate Cortex is most often engaged in the task domain “inhibition-action”
and least often by “anger-emotion”.
Through this method, they can calculate the functional diversity of brain
regions. Some brain regions are very diverse, in that they are activated in many
di↵erent task domains, and others are more specific. Similarly, they calculate
the functional assortativity of whole networks: the degree to which they are
composed of regions with a similar functional fingerprint.
In some sense, this study employs the one-to-one mapping strategy, because
it ends up with one unique functional fingerprint for each region. But perhaps
that characterisation is unfair. One of the aims of their study is to show the
functional diversity of brain regions and networks. And in contrast to Poldrack
et al. (2009), they do not propose new categories (dimensions 1 through 6).
Similarly, Anderson is hard to categorise in terms of his mapping strategy.
In his early work (2007), he emphasises that there is no one-to-one mapping
between brain structures and cognitive functions. But while every brain region
participates in many cognitive functions, he thinks they “add” the same every
time. Thus, there is an underlying role for each neural area, such as “inhibition
for area Y”, which describes what that piece of brain matter does. But the
mapping between those roles and actual functions—be it component functions
like signal transformation, or our familiar cognitive functions—is many-to-many.
In his later work (2014), Anderson changes the interpretation of these
underlying functions. He then calls them Neural Reuse Psychological factors
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(NRP factors). These primitive psychological factors “or ‘ingredients’ (. . . )
capture the underlying functional contributions of regions and networks to
overall behaviour” (2014, p. 129). These NRP factors, he maintains, map onto
brain regions or networks in a many-to-many fashion.
While in some sense Anderson is looking for underlying factors or roles, he
keeps emphasising the many-to-many mapping of these factors/roles to cognitive
functions. So I think in the end he probably accepts a many-to-many mapping.
In the next section I will come back to Anderson’s views.
A similar ambiguity surrounds the two authors below, Rathkopf and Klein.
Rathkopf (2013), unlike the authors above, does not use machine learning
methods, but instead urges us to “think of neural function in terms of the
proximal e↵ects a brain area has on the circuit of which it forms a part”
(Rathkopf, 2013, p. 18). Rather than the functional hypotheses that are
traditionally part of our cognitive ontology, we should assign neural regions
a signal transformation-function: “the function of brain area A is to transform
signal S in manner   ”(2013, p. 18).
Klein (2012) works towards one-to-one mappings as well, albeit in a much
more subtle way. He thinks that mapping cognitive functions to brain regions
is premature. Rather, we should focus our investigations on networks to see if
we can characterise these networks in terms of their domain general function.
These networks do not map onto their functions in a one-to-one fashion. But
in the end, this analysis could facilitate mappings between brain regions and
context-dependent functions. This would work as follows: a particular brain
region has many di↵erent kinds of cognitive functions, but if we specify the
neural context in which the activation takes place, perhaps we can determine
the function that this brain region has. For example, when the brain region is
active within a network that we have characterised as moral reasoning, then in
that situation, this brain region can be mapped to a particular sub-function of
moral reasoning. Those sub-functions are most likely computational functions,
rather than cognitive functions3.
For both Rathkopf and Klein, it is unclear whether the signal-transforming
or computational functions that each brain region has are unique to that brain
region. If they are unique functions, then these researchers employ the one-to-
one mapping strategy, and otherwise they uphold the one-to-many structure-
function mapping strategy. In the next section I will explain why I think it
matters less which strategy exactly each author employs than that they employ
some mapping strategy.
2.4 The mapping norm
The two main reasons for building or adapting a cognitive ontology for the
authors discussed in section 2.3 are to anchor the meaning of the concepts that
cognitive scientists use, and to be able to predict structure from function, and
function from structure. I think everyone would agree with the first reason to
3Personal communication
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some degree: we need some cleaning up of our concepts and an ontology would
be a good way to do so. A norm for cognitive ontology building that flows
from this reason is that the ontologies should help to structure and standardise
the landscape of the concepts that cognitive scientists use. Opinions about the
extent to which this is necessary can vary—some might argue that we need a
formal list of concepts and their interrelations, while others might think pointing
out conflicting definitions would be su cient. I think anchoring the meaning
of cognitive concepts and their interrelations with each other and with neural
concepts is very important.
The second reason—being able to predict structure from function and vice
versa—can lead to a norm for cognitive ontology building, which I call the
mapping norm. The mapping norm can have three specific forms: the one-
to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one structure-function norms. Employing the
mapping norm means to strive for a certain structure-function mapping relation
between cognitive and neural concepts when building a cognitive ontology. This
means that choosing the right mapping relation is logically prior to adapting
the concepts in a cognitive ontology.
As I have shown in the previous section, both top-down and bottom-up
revisionist strategists have a certain mapping (one-to-one, one-to-many, or
many-to-one) as their main desideratum. The authors that want to revise cog-
nitive and/or neural categories substantially do so because they implicitly adopt
the mapping norm. They want to improve the current many-to-many mapping
relations between neural and cognitive categories.
The mapping norm comes with substantial metaphysical assumptions: it is
not neutral about the relation between mind and brain. Employing the map-
ping norm is an a priori stance on the relation between neural and cognitive
categories. Price and Friston (2005), for example, first decide that structure
maps onto function in a many-to-one fashion, and then decide to change our cog-
nitive categories accordingly. But how would we know a priori whether function
maps onto structure in a one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one fashion?
In chapter 3 I will argue that employing the mapping norm for ontology
revision or ontology building is mistaken— it will not give us a good cognitive
ontology, and more importantly, it will not give us good neuroscientific expla-
nations. Instead, I will propose a causal norm for ontology building and neuro-
scientific explanations, which is based on causal relations rather than mapping
relations.
2.4.1 Defending the mapping analysis
Before arguing for the causal norm, I want to elaborate on my position on the
mapping norm. First, is it true that all the authors in the debate that I discussed
adhere to the mapping norm?
Some might note that the authors in the cognitive ontology debate aim for
di↵erent mapping strategies between di↵erent levels. That is, an author might
hold that there is a many-to-many mapping between neural areas and specific
functions, but that there is a one-to-one mapping between networks and domain-
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general functions. As Henson puts it: “the question of whether there is a one-
to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one mapping then depends on which levels of
the two hierarchies—functional and structural—are being compared” (2005, p.
218).
Furthermore, authors such as Anderson, Rathkopf and Klein in section 2.3.3
were di cult to pigeon-hole as belonging to a certain mapping camp. Does this
mean that grouping theories according to their mapping strategy is confused?
Or even worse, that in fact they do not take mapping relations as a normative
guide for cognitive ontology building?
The short answer is no. First, while the authors I group might allow for
di↵erent mappings between di↵erent sets of levels, they usually revise the cog-
nitive ontology only according to one type of mapping. Poldrack et al. (2009),
for example, think there is a many-to-many mapping between neural regions and
cognitive tasks, but then revise the categories to end up with a one-to-one map-
ping between neural dimensions and the “word cloud” of tasks, and between
a combination of the di↵erential loadings of the dimensions and a particular
cognitive task.
Even when authors are not interested in eliminating the categories that do
not fit their mapping, or when they do not aim for only one type of mapping
relation, the fact remains that it is the structure-function mapping that interests
them. All the authors I have discussed find the current many-to-many mapping
a real problem, and try to solve it by proposing di↵erent kinds of categories
for the mind or brain. All of these authors employ the mapping norm: they
first take a stance on what the mapping relation should be between neural and
cognitive categories, and then revise or refocus those categories accordingly.
2.4.2 Many-to-many is not a problem
I think a many-to-many mapping is not a problem. We should not concern
ourselves with the mapping relation between neural and cognitive categories. It
might seem as though this places me in the “autonomy of psychology” camp.
This group of people think that for various reasons our cognitive categories and
cognitive explanations should not have to be influenced by the brain (see section
1.3.1).
I agree with the autonomy of psychology camp that our cognitive categories
should not necessarily have to be amended on the basis of their mapping
relation with the brain. But the explanations in the cognitive sciences should
be fundamentally influenced by the brain. We cannot ignore the fact that the
brain plays a fundamental role in human cognition. Subsequently, categorisa-
tion of our cognitive concepts could potentially change on the basis of these
explanations. As I will explain in the next chapter, if it turns out for example
that “moral reasoning” has a limited causal role to play in neuroscientific ex-
planations, then we should probably eliminate it.
Cognitive ontology building should not depend on the mapping norm. The
mapping between structure and function is too dynamic to be captured by a
static cognitive ontology. In this sense, my view is in line with De Brigard’s
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(2017), Hutto et al.’s (2017), and Khalidi’s (2017). De Brigard states that
“brains are diachronically dynamic but functionally stable” (2017, p. 237). That
is, the brain is able to perform the same functions over time (such as finding one’s
way to a museum), but the exact neural mechanism by which it achieves these
functions are fundamentally dynamic. Not only can di↵erent people achieve the
same behaviour through di↵erent neural mechanisms, even within a person the
neural mechanisms can change fundamentally over time.
Khalidi also thinks there is a mismatch between neural and cognitive
categories. He advocates an “environmental-etiological contextualism”. Cog-
nitive functions are individuated in a way that is sensitive to environmental and
etiological factors, while neural categories are not. For example, the distinction
between the cognitive categories “remembering” and “misremembering” needs
reference to causal factors in the environment , and to a causal history. It
is important to know whether the memory represents something that actually
happened in the past, or whether it is just a false memory. This environmental-
etiological contextualism results in “crosscutting taxonomies”: a many-to-many
mapping between cognitive and neural taxonomies.
Just like Khalidi, Hutto et al. want to go beyond Klein’s neuro-contextualism
and call brains “protean”. While Klein (2012) emphasises that the function
of a particular area depends on its wider neural context, Hutto et al. think
that individuating cognitive functions needs to depend on non-neural contexts,
which include bodily and environmental resources. We cannot carve up the
brain into stable functions, because the cognitive functions are performed by
“neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance
and context” (2017, p. 210).
These authors emphasise the many-to-many mapping between structure and
function, which I agree with. But I think it is important not to stop there. We
need a positive story about cognitive ontology and neuroscientific explanations
if we are going to find out what neuroimaging can do. In the next chapter, I will
argue that if we want to know what a brain region or network does, we need to
look at its causal profile, rather than what cognitive functions it co-varies with.
In order to achieve this, I want to substitute the causal norm for the mapping
norm in cognitive ontology building and for neuroscientific explanations.
2.5 Conclusion
The problem of the many-to-many mapping between neural structure and cog-
nitive function is often stated as one of the main reasons for building a cogni-
tive ontology, along with aiming for more clarity of both neural and cognitive
categories. In this chapter I have argued that the former is in fact, not a real
problem and that “solving” it should not guide our cognitive ontologies.
I use the term “ontology” in a way that spans its three possible senses: as
a nomenclature, as domains, and as deeper metaphysical investigations. My
approach is epistemological/procedural/practical and engages with all three
senses of ontology. The scope of a cognitive ontology in this thesis is very broad:
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it includes our familiar folk-psychological categories, but also computational,
embodied and embedded, and dynamic categories.
In what way have authors tried to revise our cognitive ontology so far?
I first discussed two main approaches: the top-down and bottom-up revision
strategies. I then argued that it is better to classify the debate in terms of the
kind of structure-function mapping that the authors want to end up with. I
distinguished the many-to-one, one-to-many, and one-to-one structure-function
mapping strategy.
All of these, I argued, are unsatisfactory because they hold on to the so-called
“mapping norm”: these theories aim for a certain structure-function mapping
and let that aim normatively constrain the search for a good ontology. The map-
ping norm is problematic because it is an a priori position about the relation
between cognition and the brain: it comes with unscientific metaphysical
assumptions.
I think a many-to-many structure-function mapping is not a problem. But
we do need a positive story about cognitive ontology building and neuroscientific
explanations. This is why in the next chapter I will introduce the causal norm.
The causal norm takes seriously the idea that neuroscientific explanations are
built from causal information. Our cognitive ontology should fundamentally
depend on these neuroscientific explanations. In the end this view will be much
more informative and align better with neuroscientific practice.
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Chapter 3
Cognitive ontology and the causal norm

Chapter 3
Cognitive ontology and the
causal norm
Why is the mapping norm so problematic and what should we substitute in its
place? In chapter 2 I argued that most authors in the cognitive ontology debate
propose to refine neural and/or cognitive variables on the basis of their mapping
relations to each other. In this chapter I elaborate on my statement that the
mapping norm is problematic and present an alternative.
My alternative is based on the intuition that causation is what we are after
in neuroscientific explanations. Though not completely uncontroversial, many
accept that “causality is vital in understanding” (Pearl, 2009, p. 345). I will
not give an elaborate justification of this claim here. Instead, throughout this
chapter and the rest of the thesis, it will become clear that causation is vital in
constructing good ontologies and good neuroscientific explanations.
In section 3.1 I discuss what I call the causal norm: categories belong in a cog-
nitive ontology based on their causal relevance. Causal relevance is understood
in a di↵erence-making framework: something is causally relevant if manipulating
it makes a di↵erence to something else. In this section, I explain in more detail
what the causal norm entails and how it can be used for cognitive ontology
building.
Section 3.2 contrasts the mapping norm and the causal norm and argues
that the latter is superior. I explain that the mapping norm is a close relative
of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, which centres on derivation
and prediction. This, however, is not what we want from neuroscientific ex-
planations. Rather, good neuroscientific explanations are built from causal
information about neural structure and cognitive function. The causal norm
gives us more elaborate, satisfactory explanations than the mapping norm.
Section 3.2.3 addresses the worry that perhaps the mapping norm is just a
preliminary step in forming explanations, and for this preliminary step, map-
ping relations are crucial. Here I argue that the practice of cognitive ontology
building is inextricably linked to forming explanations in cognitive neuroscience.
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If the norms of these two practices do not align, it can lead to problems: the
mapping norm might eliminate or change the categories that turn out to be
causally relevant.
Another potential worry is that it is prediction that we are after in cognitive
neuroscience, which is what the mapping relations can give us? Prediction is
only a goal in limited circumstances, as I will argue in section 3.2.4. Also, in
most of these circumstances, it is causal information that turns out to be more
important.
I conclude by tackling the “explosion problem”—the worry that the causal
norm does not constrain our cognitive ontology enough, or at all. I outline a
number of guidelines that will help decide which causal relations are better than
others.
3.1 The causal norm
Instead of following the mapping norm, we should care about what entities are
causally relevant, and make that a criterion for membership of the ontology.
What does “causally relevant” mean and how do we test which entities are
causally relevant? The theory of di↵erence-making as developed by Woodward
(2003) provides a good way to do this. Di↵erence-making tests can be applied
to find the causal relations between di↵erent variables. The framework has been
successfully applied in the philosophy of biology, to characterise the relations
between genes and their functional products. Godfrey-Smith (2013, chapter 6)
for example, uses di↵erence-making to compare the kind of causal influence that
genes and environmental factors have on phenotypic traits. Similarly, Sterelny
and Kitcher use a di↵erence-making framework in order to avoid “any Mendelian
theses about one-one mappings between genes and phenotypic traits” (1988, p.
351).
In cognitive neuroscience, the idea of using di↵erence-making has only just
been developed (Klein, 2017). Klein thinks that there are problems with using
neuroimaging to localise cognitive functions in the brain. Instead, he argues,
contrastive neuroimaging can show us which brain regions make a di↵erence to
our cognitive functions, and how they do so. In this chapter and the rest of this
thesis, I extend Klein’s view.
In the rest of this section, I will spell out how we can use the theory of
di↵erence-making as a guide for building a good cognitive ontology. First, I
outline why di↵erence-making (or interventionism, or manipulation theory) is a
plausible candidate and what the main tenets of the theory are. Then, I discuss
a basic way of finding causal relations in the di↵erence-making framework by
applying it to the case of bilingual language switching. Subsequently I will go
into more detail about what kind of interventions are allowed and about how
to characterise the explanandum and explananda. I will end this section with a
note on the metaphysical underpinnings of the framework.
51
3.1.1 The general picture
Di↵erence-making is one of the theories that “captures the idea that a successful
explanation should identify conditions that are explanatory or causally relevant
to the explanandum” (Woodward, 2017a, p. 6). With its emphasis on causation
for successful explanations, di↵erence-making departs from the Deductive-
Nomological model. The DN model focuses on derivation instead of causation,
as I explained in section 3.2.1.
The notion of causation can be analysed in several ways. Other theories
of causation are for example the Mark Transmission account (Salmon, 1984),
the Conserved Quantity account (Dowe, 1992; Skyrms, 1980), and Lewis’
counterfactual theory of causation. The Mark Transmission account conceives
of causation as spatio-temporal continuous processes that has the capacity
to transmit a “mark”, or information. The Conserved Quantity account,
which Salmon later adopts instead of the Mark Transmission account, takes
causal processes to transmit a conserved quantity (of energy for example).
Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation is similar to the di↵erence-making
interpretation, but below I will explain how they di↵er. Why do I take the
di↵erence-making interpretation?
The main di↵erence between the Mark Transmission account and the
Conserved Quantity account on the one hand and di↵erence-making on the
other, is that di↵erence-making allows for “causation at a distance”. In other
words: categories that are not contiguous in space and time can still stand
in a causal relation to each other. Two entities can be causally related
even when they do not transmit energy or “bump up against each other”.
This is especially important for cognitive neuroscience, because there is no
spatiotemporal contiguity between cognitive entities and neural entities, while
there can be genuinely causal relations between them (as I will argue). The
hippocampus is not spatiotemporally “next to” memory, but lesioning the
hippocampus would still have an e↵ect on memory.
A central notion in the di↵erence-making account is that “causally expla-
natory information is information that is in principle exploitable for manipula-
tion and control” (Woodward, 2017a, p. 7). In the same vein, causal relations
can be discovered by manipulation: we know that C causes E if through the
right manipulation or intervention on C, E changes as well. For example, the
atmospheric pressure A is a cause of storms (S), if by changing A, the incidence
of S changes. This is a good way of sorting causes of S (like atmospheric
pressure) from correlations with S (like barometer reading), because we will see
that indeed, the incidence of S will change through manipulation of A, but in
contrast, changing the reading of barometer B will not lead to a change in S.
The manipulation relations on a di↵erence-making account are often stated
in the form of “what if things had been di↵erent” questions, which makes it a
version of a counterfactual account of causation. If we want to know whether the
short circuit caused the fire, we can ask the question: “if the short circuit had
not occurred, would the fire have occurred?”. This is in line with Woodward’s
views on explanation: “we have at least the beginnings of an explanation when
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we have identified factors or conditions such that manipulations or changes
in those factors or conditions will produce changes in the outcome being
explained.”(2003, p. 10). The key in finding causation is manipulation: “the
sorts of counterfactuals that matter for purposes of causation and explanation
are just such counterfactuals that describe how the value of one variable would
change under interventions that change the value of another” (2003, p. 15).
Another famous counterfactual theory of causation was advocated by Lewis
(1974). Lewis’ and Woodward’s account di↵er on some substantial points,
however. Lewis’ account only targets token causation, while di↵erence-making
focuses on type-level claims. Furthermore, Lewis purports to reduce causation
to counterfactual dependencies, whereas Woodward’s counterfactual claims
between two variables depend on other causal facts about the larger system
in which these variables occur. This di↵erence subsequently entails more
technical di↵erences in the two systems: di↵erence-making does not rely
on Lewis’ “alternative world” scenarios, and does not assume transitivity
of causation. I agree with Woodward that Lewis’ theory can lead to the
wrong judgements about some counterfactual claims. But more importantly,
Woodward’s framework aligns very well with scientific practice. The archetype
of a scientific experiment is one in which a scientist manipulates some condition
and checks what it does to another phenomenon, not one that relies on consi-
derations about alternative worlds.
3.1.2 Finding causal relations with di↵erence-making
How do we go about finding those manipulation relations with di↵erence-
making? Let us go back to a statement from chapter 1 about the neural
representation of second language processing and apply the di↵erence-making
framework. Many authors have investigated whether the age of acquisition of a
bilingual’s second language (L2) has an influence on the neural representation
of that second language. The hypothesis in this regard is that the higher the
age of acquisition, the more the neural representation for L2 and L1 (the first
language) di↵er. This is essentially a causal statement between two variables:
age of L2 acquisition (A) causally influences the neural divergence between L1
and L2 processing (N). Recasting this hypothesis in di↵erence-making terms
yields: does an intervention (I) on A make a di↵erence to N? An intervention
I on A essentially means to experimentally manipulate A.
It is rather unlikely that an experiment in which we actually manipulate
the age at which someone learned their second language would pass an ethics
committee. But translating the example to an experimental context would entail
comparing the neural activation of two groups who di↵er only in the age at which
they learned their second language. Because we are unable to actually intervene
on the variable A in this situation, this is a correlational study. The experiment
thus gives us information about what would happen under an intervention on
A.
Abutalebi and Green did a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies which
did exactly this, and concluded that “bilinguals use identical brain areas
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for achieving identical tasks for their two languages and these results are
independent of the age of L2 acquisition (2007, p. 255). This means that N
would not change as a result of an intervention on A, and thus that A is not a
cause of N .
Instead, Abutalebi and Green argue, the level of proficiency leads to changes
in neural divergence between L1 and L2 processing: “there are, as expected,
more extended activations for L2 when it is mastered with a low degree of
proficiency or with a lower exposure” (2007, p. 258). In other words, lowering
proficiency (P ) by experimental intervention would lead to an increased neural
divergence N , and thus P has a causal influence on N .
While lowering someone’s proficiency is hard in practice, increasing someone’s
proficiency is possible. This is what Grant et al. did in their study (2015). They
recruited English speaking participants who were taking a Spanish course, and
tested whether their increased proficiency had an influence on cognitive control.
I will elaborate on this study in chapter 5, but in any case this shows that
studies with proficiency do not need to be correlational—we can test the causal
influence of proficiency directly.
The theory of di↵erence-making has two features that make it attractive as
a model for cognitive neuroscience. First, we can easily add other variables to
the model. For example, we can add language switching task A and ask whether
neural divergence causes diverging performance on language switching. Or, we
can add other variables that are causally influenced by L2 proficiency, variables
that also cause neural divergence, etc.
In addition, di↵erence-making allows for more specific questions about
the causal relationship between two (or more) variables: “we can spell
out the content of a causal claim more precisely by describing the range
or domain of interventions and background circumstances over which it is
invariant”(Woodward, 2003, p. 70). In the case of the relationship between
proficiency P and neural divergence N , we can specify the extent of decrease in
P that would have an influence on N . Is there a threshold value of P necessary
for any e↵ect on N? Is the relationship between P and N linear? Similarly,
the extent of N is important. Is neural divergence an on-o↵ variable (either the
neural activations converge or they diverge) or is it a graded variable in which
there can be more or less neural divergence? Specifying background conditions
in this context would for example be to say that proficiency only has a causal
influence on neural divergence in healthy bilinguals (as opposed to for example
bilinguals with brain damage).1
These two features just mentioned are very useful in the context of cognitive
neuroscience, because we want to know how many variables interact with each
other in a certain context, and also, we are interested in characterising the causal
relations in more detail.
1In section 3.4 I explain how various guidelines can give us this kind of information, and
distinguish between causes and background conditions.
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3.1.3 Conditions for interventions
In order to find out if manipulating one variable will have an e↵ect on the
other, we need to do an intervention on that first variable. But not all kinds of
interventions are appropriate in the di↵erence-making framework. Woodward
describes a number of conditions for the kinds of proper interventions we can
do. He lists the criteria for “intervention variable I” with respect to a system
in which X putatively causes Y as follows:
“1. I causes X.
2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That
is, certain values of I are such that when I attains those values,
X ceases to depend on the values of other variables that cause
X and instead depends only on the value taken by I.
3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I
does not directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y
that are distinct from X except, of course, for those causes of
Y , if any, that are built into the I   X   Y connection itself;
that is, except for (a) any causes of Y that are e↵ects of X
(i.e., variables that are causally between X and Y ) and (b) any
causes of Y that are between I and X and have no e↵ect on Y
independently of X.
4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y
and that is on a directed path that does not go through X.”
(Woodward, 2003, p. 98)
I will explain these criteria by applying them to the central question
for language switching in chapter 1: do bilinguals rely on general control
mechanisms to complete language switching tasks? In the di↵erence-making
framework, this hypothesis is best stated in its reverse form: would an
intervention I on the cognitive variable of task switching T cause variation
in activation of control network C? In figure 3.1, this hypothesis is drawn
schematically. The intervention variable I is able to manipulate the cognitive
process T by giving participants either a general switching task or a linguistic
switching task. For our current purposes, I will assume that we know exactly
what the control network (variable C) is and also the extent of variation that
would be considered su cient to call it a di↵erent activation pattern.
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For I to be a valid intervention, it must stand in a causal relation to
T . In other words, it must be true that when participants are given the
general switching task, they will engage in the cognitive process of general task
switching, and that if they are doing the linguistic switching task, they are
engaged in the cognitive process of linguistic task switching.
Second, intervention I must sever all other causal paths that lead into T .
Thereby I would prevent other possible variables from having causal influence
over the cognitive process.The tasks that are given to the participants should
prevent them from engaging in other processes at the same time. For example,
it should not be the case that participants’ thoughts wander o↵ to what they
will have for dinner, because then the variable W for “wandering thoughts”
influence their cognitive process T (see figure 3.2 for a representation of this
scenario).
Third, any causal influence that I would have on C must go through T . If the
intervention to change the type of switching task is going to have an influence
on C, it cannot do so directly or via another variable that stands in between I
and T or between T and C. For example, I would not be a good intervention if
by the process of task manipulation, it would also alter another variable which
subsequently causally influences C. In this case the experimenter’s manipulation
directly influences the resulting neural activation, without it depending on the
cognitive process. Suppose that the linguistic task switching task is preceded by
very hasty and erratic instructions and thus incurs anxiety in the participants.
This means that the intervention variable I will introduce a variable A for
anxiety, which is caused by I and subsequently influences C independently of
T , see figure 3.3.
The fourth condition states that I cannot be correlated with any other
variable that causally influences C, and that lies on a di↵erent path than T . This
could happen if the researcher is (unconsciously) biased to give bilinguals who
have su↵ered from a stroke the language switching task rather than the general
task switching task. This means that a variable for the previous existence of a
stroke (S) is a common cause of I and another variable B for brain structure,
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and that B has a causal influence on C without going through T , see figure 3.4.
It is important to know that interventions do not need to be physically
possible for us humans to perform. We cannot move the moon, and yet its
distance to the earth has a causal influence on the tides on earth. On the
di↵erence-making account, the tides would change if the position of the moon
changed. Whether or not we can actually perform this manipulation is not
relevant. What is relevant, however, is that the interventions must at least be lo-
gically possible and well-defined, conceptually and metaphysically (Woodward,
2003). In our example, this means that it must be logically possible to change
a task from a general switching task to a linguistic switching task and that it is
clear to us what that entails. In addition, “we have a clear conception of what
it would be to remove or think away the influence of confounding influences”
(Woodward, 2003, p. 131). In this case for example, we know what it would
mean to eliminate confounding factors such as anxiety or brain damage on neural
activation C.
3.1.4 Characterising the explanandum and explanans
As might have become clear already, causal relations in the di↵erence-making
framework exist between variables. As Woodward explains:
A manipulability account implies that for something to be a cause
we must be able to say what it would be like to change or manipulate
it. This in turn suggests (. . . ) that it is most natural or perspicuous
to think of causes and e↵ects not as properties, but as variables, or
more precisely, as changes in the values of variables, where one of
the characteristics of a variable is that it is capable of taking two
or more values and of being changed from one of these values to
another (2003, p. 112).
Consequently, the explanandum and explanans in the di↵erence-making
account are spelled out in terms of variables. The conditions for variables are
that i) they can take on more than one value and that ii) it is clear how one
value can be changed to another. In the case of the variable T , it qualifies as a
proper variable because it can take on two values (t1 for the general switching
process and t2 for the linguistic switching process), and it is conceptually and
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metaphysically clear how to change t1 to t2 and vice versa (by changing the task
parameters). Not all variables meet these requirements. The statement “no
physical object can travel faster than the speed of light” cannot be translated
into a causal claim, because physical object cannot be a variable. That is, it
would not be clear at all what the values of that variable would be, apart from
“being present” and “not being present”. But there is no logical or metaphysical
conception of what it would be like for a physical object “not to be present”.
As a second example, the variable animal with values [kangaroo, cat, butterfly]
does not qualify, because it is logically and metaphysically unclear how to change
an animal from a kangaroo into a butterfly.
Seeing the causal relata as variables has a number of advantages. First,
conceiving of the explanandum as a variable with at least two values captures
that our causal questions usually have a contrastive focus. That is, we are not
just interested in knowing that a task causes some neural activation, we want
to know whether that particular general control structure was activated, rather
than some other pattern of neural activation. This is not just an accidental
feature of the account, because as Woodward puts it: “to causally explain an
outcome is always to explain why it rather than some alternative occurred”
(2003, p. 146).
Choosing the right kind of contrast is essential. The variable bilingualism,
for example, is actually a contrast between people that speak more than
one language and those that speak only one language. The wrong kind of
contrast can yield the wrong kind of variable, however. Comparing bilinguals
with macaque monkeys in a task switching study gives us a variable (H for
“humanness”) that is not conceptually clear and which is not easily manipulable.
Not only is it impossible to turn humans into monkeys in a practical (and ethical)
sense, but it is also conceptually unclear how we would go about it.
The di↵erence-making account is a good fit for functional neuroimaging
in particular (Klein, 2017). In functional neuroimaging studies, one pattern
of activation is compared to another—a process which gives rise to some
conclusions about the di↵erence. This initial contrast is important, because
“hiding the contrastive nature of the study—by simply saying, for example,
that ‘FFA is active when subjects look at faces’—is to omit information crucial
for situating the dispute (Klein, 2017). This is because there could be other
experimental contexts in which the FFA is not di↵erentially activated, which
might be the case if looking at faces is compared to looking at other familiar
objects.2.
Second, seeing causal relata as variables aligns with the intuition that
omissions and prevention can also figure in good explanations. In cognitive
neuroscience this is especially important, because it allows us to include in
our explanations that some neural activations will prevent cognitive processes
from occurring. This happens in a go/no-go task in which a participant needs to
suppress their response to a certain stimulus. The neural pattern associated with
these tasks can be said to cause the prevention of the response. Another example
2As suggested by for example (Gauthier et al., 2000)
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is that omitting to give the medicine L-dopa to someone with Parkinson’s disease
will cause an increase in the disease’s symptoms.
3.1.5 A note on metaphysics
Are the variables and causal relations on a di↵erence-making account “real”?
In other words: what exactly is the metaphysical status of variables that
are causally relevant in di↵erence-making? Investigating the relation between
causation and “being” (or natural kinds) to the full extent would require a thesis
in itself. In this section, I will argue for the plausibility that both the variables
and causal relations between them are “real” in a pragmatic sense. I will expand
on the relation between my view and the natural kinds debate in appendix B.
By arguing that when variables have causal powers, they are thereby real, I
follow philosophers like Kim, Khalidi, and Hacking. Kim, for example, proposes
something he calls “Alexander’s Dictum”, which states that “to be real is to have
causal powers” (1993). Khalidi connects this to the debate about natural kinds
by equating natural kinds with clusters of causal properties (2015). Hacking
thinks certain constructed categories like “multiple personality disorder” become
real because they have a causal influence on social behaviour that forms the
clusters of traits that the category is based on (1986).
One could argue that variables are “merely instrumental”. There seems
to be some arbitrariness in the way we construct the variable T and assign
it the two possible values “general switching” and “linguistic switching”. The
variable T certainly does not resemble things like trees, brains, and atoms. But
T is not completely arbitrary. We could cook up a variable C for “the colour of
a unicorn”, with values u1 for pink and u2 for silver. But there is no conceivable
scientific context in which C has causal powers or is manipulated by something
else. T might be instrumental, but that does not take away from the fact that
it does genuinely causally manipulate something. We may not know the exact
metaphysical status of T , but if it can manipulate something, it is real enough
for me.
Even if we accept that the variables in the di↵erence-making account are
real, there is a further question about whether the causal relations it discovers
are real. As Woodward explains, there is a sense in which the explanations we
find with di↵erence-making are dependent on our interests. Once our interests
are fixed, however, the causal relations themselves are also fixed: “to the extent
that subjectivity or interest relativity enters into causal judgements, it enters
because it influences our judgements about which possibilities are to be taken
seriously. However, once the set of serious possibilities is fixed, there is no further
element of arbitrariness or subjectivity in our causal judgements: relative to a
set of serious possibilities or alternatives, which causal claims are true or false
is determined by objective patterns of counterfactual dependence” (Woodward,
2003, p. 90).
How do our interests constrain the set of possible variables that should
feature in an explanation? First, the contrastive nature of the explanandum
can constrain what explanations we should give. Consider event E in which
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bilinguals have a very good score on a general switching task. The di↵erence-
making framework requires a contrast, such as: bilinguals have a better score on
general switching tasks than monolinguals. This contrastive interpretation of
E makes sure that we consider the plausible di↵erences between bilinguals and
monolinguals: perhaps the frequent exposure to task-switching that bilinguals
experience also enhances their performance on general task switching? Because
of this contrast, we think other explanations such as “bilinguals have a better
score because they took performance enhancers” are less likely (unless there are
reasons to believe bilinguals take significantly more performance enhancers than
monolinguals).
Second, the level of detail or abstractness of the explanandum will often also
constrain that of the explanans. As Woodward puts it: “What sort of factors
and generalisations it is appropriate to cite in an explanans (and in particular,
the level of detail that is appropriate) depends on the explananda E that we
want to account for, where this will be characterisation at a certain level of detail
or abstractness”(2017a, p. 9). This is because in an “important and interesting
kind of case, the grain or level at which theorizing takes place fixes or at least
constrains the w-questions that are of interest” (2003, p. 231).
Consider the case of explaining why bilinguals are better than monolinguals
at doing general switching tasks. The rather high level of abstraction of
this explanandum entails that what-if-things-were-di↵erent questions on a very
detailed level will not be relevant. In this context, we would never ask the
question “what if one particular neuron in the frontal cortex had not fired?”.
Rather, an appropriate w-question would be: “what if monolinguals had also
been exposed to frequent task-switching in their life?”
Di↵erence-making thus introduces exactly the right amount of interest-
relativity in explanations.3 The explanandum is fundamentally interest-relative,
but once the explanandum is fixed, both the validity and the level of the
explanans are properly constrained. In section 3.4 I will expand on other
constraints on causal relations in the di↵erence-making framework.
3.2 Norms and explanations
Why is the causal norm to be preferred to the mapping norm? In this section,
I will argue that the causal norm is better because it serves as a basis for good
explanations in cognitive neuroscience. As the primary reason for making a
good ontology in the first place is to support these explanations, the norms for
ontology building and for neuroscientific explanations cannot be separated.
I am deliberately being unspecific about the meaning of “neuroscientific
explanations”. Essentially, I take neuroscientific explanations to refer to expla-
nations in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Those include neural explanations
3Thereby abiding by Grice’s Maxim of Relevance, which states that we should give just
enough information that is relevant in this specific context (1991). See also (Klein, 2013)
for connecting this Maxim to the Multiple Realisability debate and what constitutes good
explanations.
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of behaviour, but also explanations of neural activity, for example.
First, I argue that the mapping norm is a close relative of the Deductive-
Nomological model, which faces many problems. Second, I elaborate on the
advantages of the causal norm as compared to the mapping norm. Third, I
argue that building a cognitive ontology based on the mapping norm could
distort the categories that should be in neuroscientific explanations. Last, I
counter the argument that the mapping norm gives us prediction and that this
is in itself a central aim for cognitive neuroscience.
3.2.1 Mapping and the DN-model
In this section I will explain that employing the mapping norm for cogni-
tive ontology follows the deductive-nomological model of explanation (the DN-
model). I argue that the mapping norm focuses on deriving information, which
is not enough to build satisfactory neuroscientific explanations. Instead, we
need causal information.4
The DN model as developed by Hempel and Oppenheim (Hempel, 1942;
Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel et al., 1965) was the dominant positivist
approach in philosophy of science. On this model, a successful explanation
allows for deduction of instances by subsuming them under a law. The
explanandum phenomenon is properly explained when it can be logically
deduced from a number of premises, and one of the premises is a natural law.
The truth of the premises thus entails the truth of the conclusion.
On the Deductive-Nomological model of explanation, the occurrence of
expanding helium in a balloon for example is explained by deriving it from the
law: “all gases expand when heated under constant pressure” combined with the
premise “the balloon was heated under constant pressure”. Another example is
the question of why beams of light refract—i.e. change their direction—when
passing from one medium to the next. The DN-model explains this by saying
that light is a wave with a single frequency, combined with the law that waves
with a single frequency refract when passing from one medium to the next.
In neuroscience, reverse inference follows the deductive-nomological model
of explanation.5 With reverse inference, we could for example look at an fMRI
image, see that the hippocampus is active, and know that someone is memorising
something. In other words: it would enable us to deduce the instance “this
person is engaged in a memory process” from the law that “whenever the
hippocampus is active, someone is engaged in a memory process” combined
4The proponents of the DN-model did not think that causation was unimportant; it was
just not fundamental. They integrated causation into their models by relying on a Humean
account of causation, in which causation is tightly related to regularities, or laws. But there
are many alternative theories of causation, like interventionism, in which laws and causation
come apart.
5Some would say that reverse inference does not provide full explanations, but is only used
as evidence for an explanation (Poldrack, 2006). This might be true, but reverse inference is
still based on similar intuitions as the DN-model: it focuses on derivation as the main way of
explaining something. See also section 3.2.3 for an argument why cognitive ontology building
cannot be seen as separate from building explanations.
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with the observation of hippocampal activity on a scanner. The laws that allow
for these deductions are the one-to-one or many-to-one structure-function map-
ping relations.
The mapping norm—taking a certain structure-function mapping as a
normative guide for cognitive ontology building—is thus a close relative of the
DN-model. Upholding a one-to-one mapping norm can even lead to a reductive
version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation. Good explanations
on this reductive model are formed by “constructing identity statements (or
partial identity statements) between the kind-terms of the higher-level theory
and those of the lower-level theory and then deriving the laws of the higher-
level theory from the laws of the lower-level theory”(Craver, 2007, p. 108).
For example, if neuroscientific research shows that the visual cortex and the
hippocampus are heavily interconnected, and that the visual cortex is identical
with visual processing and the hippocampus with memory, then that shows that
visual processing and memory are tightly linked.
As Craver has convincingly argued, however, the DN-model is not a good
model for explanations in cognitive neuroscience (2007, Chapter 2), see also
Salmon (2006). The reductive version, specifically, is unsatisfactory because i)
at the moment we cannot find a one-to-one mapping between neural and cogni-
tive kinds, ii) these reductive explanations do not accord with the explanations
that are found in actual neuroscientific practice, and iii) the derivation is not
specific about the mapping relation between the categories: it can refer to “mere
correlations, temporal sequences, e↵ect-to-cause generalisations, and incomplete
explanations” (Craver, 2007, p. 108–109).
I agree with the reasons that Craver gives. The third argument is very
important, and it is general to all versions of the mapping norm, not only the
reductive one. A good explanation should be able to tell us what the relation
between neural and cognitive categories is, beyond saying that there is some
kind of mapping relation. The mapping norm gives us very limited expla-
nations: mapping relations can range from mere correlations to e↵ect-to-cause
generalisations. So, if we find a mapping relation between the ACC and language
switching, it could just be a correlation between neural activity in the ACC and
performing language switching tasks.
3.2.2 Advantages of the causal norm compared to the
mapping norm
The causal norm on the other hand, allows us to construct more elaborate,
satisfactory explanations than the mapping norm would. Suppose we are
interested in memory, and how it depends on the hippocampus. If we follow
the mapping norm, we can derive the occurrence of memory from the mapping
relation between memory and the hippocampus. The participant in the scanner
was engaged in a memory process, because there is a mapping relation between
memory and the hippocampus, and we observed that the hippocampus was
active.
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But with the causal norm, instead of deriving the event, we are able to
characterise the relationship between memory and the hippocampus in much
more detail. More specifically, the causal norm allows us to distinguish between
deterministic and probabilistic causal relations. With the former, the e↵ect
“always changes in the same way under the same kind of manipulation of [the
cause] C”(Woodward, 2003, p. 42). The latter means that the probability of
the e↵ect is raised in a certain (predictable) way by manipulating the cause.
Probabilistic causal relationships are useful for cognitive neuroscience, because
no two brains are exactly the same. And, even within one brain, the same
cognitive task will not cause exactly the same neural response every time it is
performed. A causal relation between a neural variable and a cognitive variable
is hardly ever perfectly deterministic. The causal norm then, fits well with
neuroscientific experiments, which average over several participants and thus
usually establish a probabilistic relationship between variables.
Furthermore, the causal norm allows for investigation of manipulation
relations between multiple entities. This contrasts sharply with trying to
establishing mapping relations between neural and cognitive variables. These
mapping relations can only be established between a limited number of
variables (two, in the case of one-to-one mappings). Mapping memory to the
hippocampus answers only one question: “if there were no hippocampus, we
could not perform memory processes”. Thus, mapping relations only allow for
one way to control something, in an on-o↵ manner.
The causal norm, on the other hand, can explain why multiple variables
can exert control and how they interact with each other. As Klein explains:
“di↵erence-makers are usually assumed to operate against a causal background.
They do not compete with each other for the title of the thing responsible
for the outcome”(2017, p. 6). With the causal norm, we do not just map the
hippocampus to memory, we can actually investigate much more: like how the
hippocampus interacts with other parts of the brain, how memory interacts with
say, stressful environments, hormone levels, and sleep deprivation. This leads
to an important advantage of the causal norm over the mapping norm.
A possible counterargument is that we can specify the mapping more
precisely, by making it very detailed. For example, we could specify a map-
ping relation that states: “when the hippocampus is active, and the rest of
the brain is in state  , and the environment of the person is X, then someone
is engaged in a memory process”. This way, we end up with precise, detailed
explanations after all.
But the content of these so-called ceteris paribus clauses is hard to
systematise. Suppose we are faced with a situation in which someone’s
hippocampus is active, the environment of the person is X, and the rest of
the brain is in state  , where  and   di↵er only in the extent of activation in
the amygdala. Ideally we would like to know how these two situations compare.
Does the activation in the amygdala influence memory, and if so, how? Mapping
relations do not easily allow for such systematic comparisons.
The di↵erence-making framework on the other hand, deals with these ceteris
paribus clauses by externalising them as variables. We can easily add activation
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in the amygdala as a variable, and test how this variable impacts the causal
relations in the system. Similarly, the di↵erence-making framework allows us
to specify the causal distribution within the system: is the activation of the
hippocampus most important, or is it the environment? And what is the range
of neural activation that we are talking about? What are the variables and how
do we characterise their interplay? The causal norm based on the di↵erence-
making model thus accommodates the questions that researchers in neuroscience
have. I will give more detailed examples of these explanations in chapter 6.
3.2.3 Distorting the relevant categories
Those upholding the mapping strategy might actually agree that the mapping
norm does not give us good explanations. They would reply that the map-
ping norm is merely a good initial strategy, but that to form full explanations,
we need more (see for example Bechtel and McCauley (1999)). This possible
counterargument states that the mapping in itself is not scientifically interesting,
but looking for structure-function mappings is a good way to figure out which
kind of cognitive functions can be found in the brain in the first place. The next
step is then to find out more about how and why these functions are performed.
Another way of looking at this two-step process is that this counterargument
separates ontology-building from explanation-building. First we need to use the
mapping norm to find a good cognitive ontology, and then we can start focussing
on building good explanations with that cognitive ontology.
But why should these processes be separated? Categories belong in a cog-
nitive ontology because they can be used in good explanations. The norms for
ontology building should ultimately derive from norms for good explanations,
because an ontology’s raison d’eˆtre is to be useful for explanations. Creating an
ontology with categories that cannot be used in cognitive explanations is useless.
Therefore, the norms for good explanations should not contrast with those of
ontology building. In this section, I argue that the mapping norm potentially
clashes with the norms for good explanations and therefore might distort the
categories that are causally relevant.
As we have seen, there is good theoretical and empirical evidence that
without adjusting cognitive and/or neural categories, there will not be a one-
to-one, many-to-one, or one-to-many mapping between structure and function.
Therefore, in order to obtain the desired mapping, there needs to be some kind
of adjustment by a combination of changing the kind or grain size (of cogni-
tive functions, neural categories, or both) and by eliminating certain types of
categories.
For example, those that want to keep the cognitive functions (inspired by
folk-psychology) as they are, might adjust the grain-size of neural categories so
that “episodic memory” corresponds one-to-one to a widespread neural pattern
of the brain, thereby eliminating at least some structurally inspired neural
areas and networks. Vice versa, the position that Price and Friston (2005)
hold enlarges the grain size of cognitive functions to “sensorimotor integration”
and eliminates the traditional cognitive categories (naming colour patches and
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visual word form identification). These examples show that if we uphold the
mapping norm for cognitive ontologies, and then use that ontology as a basis
for cognitive explanations, we limit the kinds of categories that can function in
neuroscientific explanations.
But what if the categories that are eliminated turn out to be causally
relevant? The reason for eliminating them is that they do not correlate to
a structural or functional category. But there are plenty of categories that do
not map neatly onto something else and are still causally, and thus explana-
tory relevant. Even though visual word form identification does not map onto
a unique neural structure, arguably it can be causally relevant.
Take genotypes and phenotypes in biological explanations. The mapping
between genotypes and phenotypes turns out to be many-to-many (Gri ths
and Stotz, 2013), but that did not lead biologists to eliminate these categories.
While the exact delineation of both geno- and phenotypes is still a topic of
discussion, their potential elimination is based on their causal relevance, not
on their mapping. I think that restricting the types of categories based on the
mapping norm might single out the wrong categories, and what is worse, we
might not even notice that they are not the right ones.
One possible counterargument is that some authors advocate only a mild
adjustment of both neural and cognitive categories. They do not necessarily
eliminate cognitive or neural categories based on the mapping norm. Barrett
(2009) for example, proposes adding a level of “psychological primitives” such as
salience, categorisation, and attention, which correspond more closely to brain
networks than our usual cognitive categories. She does not, however, want
to eliminate those cognitive categories, but rather thinks they are made up of
these psychological primitives in a way that recipes contain sets of ingredients.
The mapping norm comes into play in the mapping between neural networks
and psychological primitives. Though her account does not yet spell out many
details, it seems to require some adjustment of low-level cognitive categories
based on network properties found in the brain, and also some adjustment of
networks, based on whether they correspond to some psychological primitives.
But even when authors focus on adding cognitive or neural categories, rather
than eliminating them, we run into problems. Anderson’s latest theory is a
good example (2014). In this book, he argues that we should not aim for one-
to-one mapping relations, and that instead, we should try to find the underlying
neuroscientifically relevant psychological factors (NRP factors) that can explain
the brain’s activity in di↵erent circumstances (see chapter 2 for a more elaborate
explanation of his account).
Anderson does not advocate for elimination of existing categories, but he
does shift the focus to these NRP factors. Howeve, it is unclear whether the
NRP factors actually reflect the causal factors that are operative in the brain.
McCa↵rey and Machery (2016) voice this worry most succinctly. They maintain
that Anderson’s NRP factors can only be interpreted as instrumental variables,
and not as psychological entities with a realist interpretation. Anderson makes
the mistake of reifying these mathematically identified items, while they are
merely “convenient ways of summarising high-dimensional data” (2016, p. 8).
65
The problem with the instrumental character of NRP factors, they maintain,
is that they cannot figure in causal explanations. This is because first, the NRP
factors are underdetermined. That is, the way in which the computational
model summarises the data is partly based on the choice that the experimenter
makes (about the amount of resulting dimensions). That choice subsequently
has a profound impact on which NRP’s are taken up in the ontology. Also, it
has not been proven that dimension-reduction techniques identify causal factors
(Glymour, 2001, Chapter 14)—they might just point to accidental correlations.
As I explained in section 3.1.5, I do not think there is a deep or interesting
divide between instrumental variables and “real” variables. I think that
instrumental variables can represent real causal patterns. However, McCa↵rey
and Machery do put forward an important point: why would the NRP factors
be the variables that are causally interesting? In the end, their identification is
based on mapping information that is summarised by a computational model. It
does not follow that these factors are the ones that are responsible for whatever
we want to explain in cognitive neuroscience. And if they are not, then we
should not focus our time and energy on adding these factors to our cognitive
ontology.
3.2.4 Prediction
A second possible counterargument to my view is that the mapping norm
improves the ability to predict structure from function or vice versa, and that
this is in itself an important aim of neuroscientific explanations.
The exact relation between prediction, causation, and explanation deserves
its own chapter (or even its own thesis). Unfortunately this would distract
from the main topic too much. In this part, I will address the issue by arguing
that we only care about prediction in limited circumstances. Furthermore, in
some other cases in which we seem to care about prediction, what is actually
at stake is finding the causal relations. More importantly, even in those limited
cases, information about mapping relations hardly ever gets us the predictive
information we want.
In general, I follow Salmon and Craver when they argue that mere predictions
are not enough for explanations. Salmon explains: “from the barometric
reading, the storm can be predicted, but the barometric reading does not
explain the storm. From the position and phase of the moon, pre-Newtonians
could predict the behavior of the tides, but they had no explanation of them.
Various kinds of correlations exist that provide excellent bases for prediction,
but because no suitable causal relations exist (or are known), these correlations
do not furnish explanations” (2006, p. 49). Craver agrees, and summarises:
“successful explanations in neuroscience describe the causal structure of the
world” (2007, p. 64).
Again, I do not want to dwell on this rather large issue here, but I do want
to make a small point in favour of Craver’s view. In the real world, we only care
about prediction in very limited circumstances. The circumstances that I can
think of are first, in brain-machine interfaces, where a robotic hand would like
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to know when the brain is sending a signal for “move hand forward”. A second
instance could be to measure whether an unresponsive patient is conscious based
on her brain data (Owen et al., 2006). Third, in the courtroom it could be useful
to predict whether someone was lying based on their fMRI data.
In brain-machine interfaces, I think it is at best ambiguous whether this is
information about mapping relations or causal relations. Perhaps we would be
able to find a neural pattern that maps onto someone’s desire to move her hand
forward in the right way. But I think it is at least equally likely that we would
look for antecedent causes in the brain that would lead to someone moving her
hand forward. So it is not established that we need mapping relations for these
brain-machine interfaces.
In the second case, I think we are dealing with mapping information. Here,
patients in a vegetative state are asked to imagine a game of tennis or walking
around in their house. If they manage to follow these instructions, they show
a certain pattern of neural activation, which consequently means they are
conscious to some extent. The neural activation pattern thus corresponds to
someone being conscious. But while it is possible to use this mapping relation
to see whether someone is conscious, this case does not generalise to many other
cases, and it also does not give us detailed explanations.
Whether it is possible to establish whether someone is lying in the court
room by means of an fMRI scanner is debatable.6 There would have to be a
very clear one-to-one or many-to-one structure-function mapping relation for
this process to be reliable. Considering the ubiquitousness of many-to-many
mappings in the brain (especially with “higher” cognitions such as lying), I
think this is not very probable.
Some other areas of study seem to aim for predictive information, but in fact
aim for causal information. Take for example studies that investigate cortical
maps in the brain, such as the somatotopical map in the postcentral gyrus.
They investigate where sensory information of a certain body part is processed,
and thus seem to want to predict function from structure and vice versa. But
this information is not mainly intended for prediction purposes. Rather, this
information allows us to know what part of the brain to manipulate if we want
to suppress (or incur) sensation in a certain body part. The mapping relations,
then, turn out to be causal relations.
Similarly, there are studies that use mapping relations to redefine or amend
categories in our cognitive ontology. A hypothetical study could claim that
“consciousness and attention are intimately related because they are part of
the same structural network  ”. But the extent to which this explanation is
satisfactory does not stem from information about its mapping or the ability to
predict function from structure. Rather, it stems from the causal information
that it contains.
The appeal of this explanation is that we now know that network  is
causally related to both attention and consciousness. Manipulating network
 could lead to di↵erences in attention, and/or consciousness. The appeal is
6And in my opinion, ethically undesirable.
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not that we can predict that the subject will be both attentive and conscious
when we see that network  is active on a scanner. So sometimes it is causal
information that we are after when we seem to aim for prediction. This could
be construed as a counterargument: prediction does give us causal information.
But if causal information is what we are really after, then we must be explicit
about it, and moreover, we will need a proper framework for finding this causal
information.
This kind of confusion between prediction and causation is actually quite
widespread in cognitive neuroscience, and the above is just a brief sketch of how
the explanations should turn on causal information rather than mapping rela-
tions. In chapters 5 and 6 I will expand on this by showing how the di↵erence-
making framework leads to better interpretations of neuroscientific studies than
a framework based on the mapping norm.
All in all, there are very few situations in which prediction is a goal in itself.
Moreover, most of these situations do not rely on mapping information, but
actually rely on causal information.
3.3 Resulting cognitive ontology
The causal norm, then, is better than the mapping norm for building a cogni-
tive ontology. Rather than basing the cognitive and neural categories on their
correspondence to each other, I argued that categories belong in a cognitive
ontology when they are causally relevant to an explanandum. So what does my
resulting cognitive ontology look like?
I cannot give a detailed list of the cognitive and neural categories that will
end up in a cognitive ontology based on the causal norm. The main reason for
this is that initially, the cognitive ontology is not very constrained. Following
most versions of the mapping norm immediately gives you some idea of what
kind of categories will end up in the ontology. Aiming for a many-to-one
structure-function mapping yields broad cognitive functions, and one-to-many
mappings will give us neural networks.
But with the causal norm, many kinds of categories can be in the cog-
nitive ontology. Many variables can be tested for causal relevance, and the
manipulationist experiments will have to tell us if the variable has enough causal
relevance. For example, language switching is a good ontological category if it
has enough causal influence on other categories that we want to explain and if
it is a phenomenon that can be manipulated by manipulating other categories.
Membership of the cognitive ontology then, depends on the causal relations
that exist between a whole network of variables. Language switching will only
be taken up in the cognitive ontology if it can function in good explanations in
a wider context. Perhaps it is not a good variable in the area of naming visual
objects (it could happen that a bilingual participant accidentally responds in
the “wrong” language, but explaining the results of the study will not include
the variable language switching). But in bilingual studies, language switching
is an essential variable, even if it does not map onto the brain in the right way.
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Another way of describing my position, is that a cognitive ontology in itself
is not so important. The real aim in neuroscience is to construct good ex-
planations, and a cognitive ontology is just a derivative of that process. In
other words, we should be looking for causal relations which make up a good
neuroscientific explanation, and from that web of relations, we could extract the
cognitive and neural variables that make up our cognitive ontology. In chapter 4
I explain how finding relations between variables will satisfy the primary aim of
cognitive ontologies: to standardise terms in the field of cognitive neuroscience.
In chapter 5 I will give more details about how we should go about constructing
those neuroscientific explanations.
If building a cognitive ontology is initially not so constrained, then there
should be appropriate constraints on finding the right causal relations, otherwise
we will end up with a position in which “anything goes”. In section 3.4 I
elaborate on these constraints and on how to compare causal relations to each
other.
3.4 The explosion problem
The causal norm states that variables in a cognitive ontology need to be causally
relevant. But the reader might be left with a pressing issue: wouldn’t the causal
norm lead to an explosion of categories in our cognitive ontology? That is, if
causal relevance is the only constraint, and seeing that virtually anything is in
some way causally relevant to something, what does a causal norm really do?
This issue, which I term the “explosion problem” becomes extra pressing
when we consider one of the main aims of cognitive ontologies: to provide
standardisation of terms and solve ambiguities in the meaning of categories. If
the criteria for including a category in a cognitive ontology are too wide, they
will allow so many concepts to be included that there will be no standardisation,
just multiplication. Even worse, they might allow categories that actually have
a very unclear or ambiguous meaning. A good cognitive ontology should bar
such terms from being included.
In the area of bilingual language studies, for example, there are many factors
that could influence neural divergence for L1 and L2 language processing:
age of L2 acquisition, L2 proficiency, bilinguals’ age, what languages they
speak, whether they have severe memory problems and even whether someone’s
prefrontal cortex is intact and well-functioning. Some of these factors might turn
out not to be causally relevant to neural divergence. That is, when properly
tested, it might turn out that the first and second language that bilinguals speak
does not influence the extent of neural divergence for processing these languages.
Others might have some causal e↵ect, but are not considered relevant, like
whether someone has an intact prefrontal cortex.
More abstractly, many factors will have some causal impact on the
phenomenon of interest. Brains are causally dense, and in such systems it
is very likely that two variables will be significantly correlated (Meehl, 1967).
The same goes for psychological systems: “In psychology, everything is likely to
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be related at least a little bit to everything else, for complex and uninteresting
reasons” (Lykken, 1991, p. 31). As Campbell puts it: “the value of the outcome
will depend on the values of many variables, so that for each value of any one
variable there will be many possible values of the outcome, depending on the
values of the other variables” (2010, p. 21–22).
This is a problem for cognitive ontology building based on the causal norm.
If (almost infinitely) many variables are causally relevant, our cognitive ontology
will explode and will not serve any purpose anymore.
The explosion problem is not solved by looking at the di↵erence-making
literature itself. The di↵erence-making relations are conditional on the set
of included variables. In other words, the di↵erence-making tests will show
what the causal relations between variables are, but will not necessarily tell us
whether the set of variables that the tests were performed on is the right set.
So even if di↵erence-making tests indicate that, say, impairment of cognitive
control functions causes worse performance on a language switching task, it
might be that actually, the impairment of its subcomponent task-switching is
what’s causing the impoverished performance.
This is not to say that the di↵erence-making tests will deliver the wrong
results—in this example there is a causal relation between cognitive control
and performance on a linguistic task. But testing for a causal relation will not
tell us that there might be another variable that we should prefer; it does not
settle the choice of variables to test for.
Rather than giving us the right set of variables is from the outset, di↵erence-
making can compare causal relations between di↵erent variables to each other.
It can tell us which causal relations are better than others in a certain context.7
While many variables have some causal influence on an explanandum, there will
only be a few that make a marked di↵erence. Causal relevance thus becomes
a graded notion. A category can be more or less causally relevant based on
the causal relation it has with its e↵ect. My use of “causal relevance” follows
Craver’s (2007) and is embedded in a di↵erence-making account of causation
(Woodward, 2003). In the rest of this section I tackle the explosion problem by
giving criteria for deciding which causal relations are better than others.
3.4.1 Specificity
Woodward’s basic requirement for causal relationships is that the causes should
have unambiguous rather than ambiguous or heterogeneous e↵ects (2016, p.
1054). This means that minimally, for a variable to be causally relevant is
for it to be conceptually clear what the e↵ects are, and that those e↵ects are
consistent.
7Distinguishing between causal relations has not always been central in philosophy:
“philosophical discussion of causation has tended to focus, understandably enough, on finding
criteria that distinguish causal from non-causal relationships. There is, however, another
important project, also belonging to the philosophy of causation that has received less
attention, at least among philosophers. This is the project of elucidating and understanding
the basis for various distinctions that we (both ordinary folk and scientists) make among
causal relationships” (Woodward, 2010, p. 287).
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For example, hitting my hand against the television to make it work again is
not a good variable. It is not conceptually clear what the e↵ects on the device
are (both on the short-term and long-term). Even if the television starts working
again, we have no idea what part of it got “fixed” by the hitting8. Moreover,
the e↵ects of hitting my hand against the television are quite inconsistent. Even
if we are only interested in whether the television starts working again (rather
than how), the success rate of the slap is very low. More often than not, the
screen will stay blank.
A stronger requirement for causal relevance is formulated by Woodward
when he talks about the “specificity” of a causal relationship (2003; 2016). A
cause is more specific than another when it “has more fine-grained influence
over the e↵ect. In general, a specific relationship between C and E is one where,
by manipulating C into many di↵erent states, we can reliably manipulate E
into many di↵erent states” (Klein, 2017, p. 10). In other words, a variable has
good causal relevance when it has a range of values that reliably correspond to a
range of values of the e↵ect. This specificity constraint is closely related to what
Campbell describes as a “dose-response” relation between two variables (2010).
If we have chosen the right variable as our cause, increasing or decreasing its
“dose” will have a close relationship to the response.
Take for example the volume of a phone when I’m playing music on it. Both
the on-o↵ button and the volume buttons will have a causal e↵ect on the volume
that my phone produces. But the volume buttons will have a much more fine-
tuned relationship with the resulting volume: there is a range of values that the
buttons can take which correspond neatly to the actual volume produced. In
contrast, manipulating the on-o↵ button can only result in two values for the
volume: no sound or some sound.
Hence, in this example, the on-o↵ button is less causally relevant to the
volume than the volume buttons. Similarly, the pumping of the heart is less
causally relevant to language switching than neural activity in the Anterior
Cingulate Cortex (ACC). While our hearts are important preconditions for the
cognitive phenomenon, their functioning is not able to finetune performance of
language switching, while manipulating neural activity in the ACC (supposedly)
could.
3.4.2 Proportionality
Hence, as Woodward maintains, we should look for variables that are able to
reliably manipulate a range of e↵ects on the variable that we are interested in.
But there are also cases in which a variable satisfies this specificity criterion,
and then later we find out that actually the variable was not quite characterised
on the right level. Suppose we find out that the number of begonias we put in
the window display corresponds nicely to the amount of products people buy
8The “part” that I refer to here is broader than a mechanistic part (see also chapter 5). A
part in the interventionist context is basically just any variable. So whereas we would like to
know what variable has a causal influence on the tv getting fixed, the interventionist model
does not suppose this variable needs to be a mechanistic part.
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from the shop. One day, all begonias are sold out, and the shop-keeper decides
to buy roses instead. As it turns out, the relationship between the number of
flowers and the amount of products sold still holds. While both the variable
number of begonias and number of flowers have the desired specificity with
respect to amount of products sold, intuitively the latter is the better causal
relationship.
In order to establish this, we need a proportionality constraint. As
Woodward (2010) describes this constraint, the variable should contain enough
information for reliable manipulation, but not too much. We know that we
have characterised the variable at the right level if it does not contain spurious
information—or “gratuitous redundancy” (Campbell, 2010, p. 24)—such as
what particular type of flowers should be put on the window display.
To better understand this proportionality constraint, let us look at a counter-
argument by Franklin-Hall (2014). She maintains that the proportionality
constraint that Woodward and others have proposed is empty. The argument
is that the interventionists have no way to distinguish between “flowers” and
“begonias” as the cause of the amount of products bought. This is because
flowers as opposed to non-flowers, and begonias as opposed to roses contain the
same amount of information, and both correspond to the same manipulation of
products bought.
But here I would argue against Franklin-Hall that we cannot just equate
flowers versus non-flowers with begonias versus roses. The latter variable is
actually types of flowers which has values such as “begonia”, “rose”, but also
“lily”, “daisy” etc. This means that we need a lot more information to specify
that variable than we do for specifying just any flower.9 So even if two variables
are equal in terms of specificity, the proportionality constraint can tell us which
one is better.
3.4.3 Quantitative relations: determinacy and systemati-
city
The specificity constraint, in which variables should have unambiguous and
consistent e↵ects, does not imply that the causal relations cannot be probabilistic.
Probabilistic relationships, such as when the amount of flowers increases the
probability of sold items by a set amount, are admissible in the di↵erence-
making framework. If we are talking about causal relevance as a graded notion,
however, it must be said that deterministic causal relations are more relevant
than probabilistic ones: we want variables “that allow for the formulation of
cause-e↵ect relations that are as close to deterministic as possible or at least
relations that exhibit strong correlations between cause and e↵ect” (Woodward,
2016, p. 1055). This is because deterministic relations will make sure that ma-
nipulation of the cause will yield a certain e↵ect, whereas probabilistic relations
will (only) raise the probability of the e↵ect. That being said, I do not think it
9A quantitative way of measuring this amount of information is the entropy of the variable.
See (Gri ths et al., 2015) for a good explanation of proportionality, specificity, and stability.
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is realistic to find a great many deterministic causal relations in cognitive neuro-
science. Causal relations with a high probability would already be satisfactory.
What about the specific quantitative shape of the relation between two
variables? Here Klein proposes the notion of systematicity, which is “a measure
of the relationship between changes in the cause and corresponding changes in
the e↵ect. That is, C and E are related systematically just in case information
about how much C changes carries information about how much E will change”
(2017, p. 15). As an example, consider the relation between the “next song”-
button on a phone and the musical genre of the song, given a very eclectic
play list. This relation satisfies the specificity criterion: every button-click will
correspond to some musical genre of the song that will start playing. But the
relation is far from systematic. No information about how much the causal
variable (the number of clicks) changes will tell you anything about how much
the genre of the song changes. This contrasts with the relation between the
volume buttons and the volume of the songs played. Here, the amount of button
clicks will tell you exactly how much the volume will change. So according to
the systematicity principle, the next-song button is not great as a di↵erence-
maker for the musical genre variable, whereas the volume button is a good
di↵erence-maker for the volume variable.
Of course, there are many varieties of systematic causal relationships. The
simplest are linear systematic relationships, such as between the volume buttons
and the volume. Each button press will correspond to exactly the same change
in volume. But there can also be more complicated relationships, such as those
between the tension of a string (T) and its frequency (f). These variables are
related by f = 12L
q
T
m , in which m refers to the string’s mass per unit length
and L to its length. Another example of a more complex causal relation is that
between radio frequency and radio stations. This is a stepwise function, in the
sense that changing the frequency up to a certain extent might not result in any
chance of station, until it reaches a point where it “steps” to the next station.
3.4.4 In context: stability and proliferation
Finally, causal relations are more relevant when they fit well into a wider
context. Woodward formulates the concept of stability here. Causal relations
are stable if they “continue to hold under changes in background conditions, in
new populations or data sets etc.” (2016, p. 1055). In other words, the more
stable a causal relation is, the more often it will hold. The relation between
flowers and the amount of products bought would be more stable if it does not
only hold for this particular shop, but also for other shops. Similarly, it would
be more stable if the relation continues to hold in the future, and under other
changes such as a change of decorations and the time of year.
Another guideline is that good causal variables should be specific, and
causally sparse. The former means that variables should have an e↵ect on
relatively few other variables. This is why for example, causal relations between
the occurrence of a stroke and performance on a specific cognitive task are not
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always ideal. Having a stroke will have an impact on many other cognitive
tasks, which makes the relation between the occurrence of the stroke and that
particular cognitive task less “special”. Of course, being more specific about
the exact location of the stroke will improve the causal relevance, because per-
formance on less cognitive tasks will be a↵ected.
Similarly, sparsity refers to the number of causal relations in a causal model.
A causal model is sparse when it “postulate[s] relatively few causal relations
among variables, rather than many” (Woodward, 2016, p. 1055). Sparsity thus
refers not only to one particular causal variable, but to the whole causal model.
If the number of arrows between the variables in the model is low, then the
causal model is said to be sparse.
Specificity and sparsity as defined here are di↵erent from the specificity
principle in section 3.4.1. Woodward discusses the the two interpretations of
specificity, and explains that one interpretation is adapted from Lewis’ “causal
influence” (2000), while the other derives from Hill (1965). The former concerns
the amount of fine-tuning of the e↵ect that a causal variable can manage,
where more fine-tuning means more causal relevance.10 This interpretation
corresponds to the specificity principle in section 3.4.1.
The latter interpretation essentially says that for a causal relation to be more
relevant, it should approach the “one cause one e↵ect” principle. That is, that
type of cause should have only one type of e↵ect, and the type of e↵ect should
only be caused by one type of cause. This interpretation corresponds to the
specificity/sparsity principle that I just explained.
It should be noted here that in neuroscience, there will be very little one-
cause-one-e↵ect relations. In fact, in this context I want to argue for almost
the exact opposite of specificity/sparsity as a guideline for causal relevance:
proliferation. When we are dealing with causation in the cognitive realm, a
variable is a good variable when it is a cause of many di↵erent things. Working
memory is a good variable because manipulating it will have an e↵ect on
many other variables. A certain neural region is demarcated as such, because
manipulating it will have an e↵ect on many cognitive (or neural) variables.
Consequently, a causal system as a whole is better when we find many arrows
pointing out from a certain cause. This corresponds to Campbell’s notion of
robustness: when a variable is robust, it comes up in many di↵erent causal
processes (2007, p. 65).
An important precondition for proliferation, however, is that these causal
relations are still specific and stable. When a variable has an e↵ect on many
other variables, sometimes this means that it will not be able to fine-tune the
e↵ects on them very well. Suppose a marten (which is a kind of rodent) crawls
into a car engine, and starts biting various bits. It will have an e↵ect on many
functions of the car: the biting marten is very prolific as a cause. But those
causal relations are not specific or stable. The biting does not fine-tune perfor-
mance of the car. So it does not fit the specificity criterion. It is also not a stable
10The di↵erence between Lewis’ and Woodward’s account is that Lewis considers “influence”
a precondition for causation, while Woodward uses it to choose between causes.
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Stability
Specificity, proportionality
Determinacy
Proliferation, systematicity
Figure 3.5: Ranking guidelines
cause. It would be stable if for example, every time the marten crawls into the
car and starts biting things, it is the brakes that stop working. But rodents are
usually not that consistent. So only when the specificity and stability criteria are
met is proliferation a good guideline for identifying important causal variables.
It is interesting to note the correspondence of the specificity/sparsity
principle and the one-to-one structure-function mapping norm. One could say
that one-to-one structure-function mappings are desirable, because the causal
relation that it involves is very specific/sparse. My argument against the
specificity/sparsity principle then, is also an argument against the one-to-one
mappings norm. First, there will be very few one-cause-one-e↵ect relations in
cognitive neuroscience, and second, it is actually desirable that a cause will have
more than one (specific and stable) e↵ect.
3.4.5 Comparing guidelines
In conclusion, specificity, proportionality, determinacy, systematicity, stability,
and proliferation are all guidelines which help to establish which variables are
more causally relevant than others. But as might have become clear, there are
no “hard and fast” rules for placing variables on a causal relevance ladder. Nor
does causal relevance have a “cut-o↵”’ point below which causes do not count
as relevant at all. But perhaps we could compare these guidelines, to see which
ones are more important than others?
To some degree, we can rank the guidelines in order of importance. Starting
with most important at the top, I think the ranking looks roughly as indicated
in figure 3.5. Some level of stability—causal relations should continue to hold
in multiple contexts—is required for a cause to be relevant. If a causal relation
beween the ACC and cognitive control can only be found for one person, then
generally we would not consider it to be scientifically interesting. Also, a causal
relation that only works a few times, or that is absent in contexts which are
only slightly di↵erent, is not relevant. Causal relations have to be stable in the
sense that they need to range over a substantial amount of people, a substantial
amount of time, and in situations that are only mildly di↵erent from each other.
Specificity and proportionality are important because they are able to
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distinguish between causes in the same situation that seem to be causally
relevant to the e↵ect. Specificity entails that the cause is able to finetune the
e↵ect. Proportionality means that the cause does not contain too much spurious
information. They rank lower than stability, because stability is a precondition
for the cause to be considered at all. The on-o↵ button and volume buttons
(which rank di↵erently in terms of specificity) would not even be considered if
they only worked to change the resulting volume for one phone, or only once.
Similarly, begonias or flowers (in which begonias are more proportional than
flowers) would not have any causal relevance if they only bumped up the sales
of the shop once. But they are both important in order to distinguish which
causes are more causally relevant in those situations.
The determinacy guideline needs to be taken into account because deter-
ministic causes are better than causal relations that have a low probability.
In neuroscience, this guideline ranks lower than the others because most
causal relations will only be probabilistic. They will not work in every single
instance, without knowing exactly why, due to the complex nature of brain (and
cognition).
Proliferation (in which variables are also causally relevant in other contexts)
only works if causes are stable and specific. This guideline is meant to determine
which variables are relevant across contexts, rather than deciding which variable
is more causally relevant within a situation. This is why it ranks on the lower
end of the scale. Similarly, systematicity is a “bonus” feature of a causal variable
in cognitive neuroscience. Systematicity means that there is a regularity in the
change of the cause and the change in the e↵ect. It would be great if, say,
every increase of neural activity in the hippocampus corresponds to the same
increase in memory capacity. But I do not think this is very likely, at least with
causal relations between neural and cognitive variables. This is because cogni-
tive variables are hardly ever quantitative, and neural variables could also be
quantified in di↵erent ways (a higher probability of di↵erential neural activity
versus a more widespread neural activity for example). Finding causal rela-
tions that are stable, specific and proportional (and a good probability) would
already be quite an achievement in cognitive neuroscience. Displaying a form
of quantitative regularity between the variables would mean we have hit upon
a strong causal relation, but systematicity is not necessary.
The ranking that I have proposed is subject to context-dependent conside-
rations. In some contexts, a cause that scores relatively low on stability, but
high on determinacy is very important. Suppose that we find a cure for a rare
illness. Administering the medicine only works for a small group, and hence
is not stable across a wider population. But it works every time, which means
that it is a determinate cause. The causal relation between the cure and the
illness in this case is very relevant.
The ranking then, is not absolute. Furthermore, this ranking is specific
to cognitive neuroscience. I can imagine that for physicists, a causal relation
that does not hold in a broad range of background conditions is not considered
causally relevant, while in neuroscience, even causal relations that only hold in
the context of one particular cognitive task can be relevant. And even within
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scientific fields, particular questions will favour some guidelines over others.
The fact that we cannot identify strict rules for causal relevance across
contexts, does not mean that applying the guidelines is a fuzzy process or
that the guidelines cannot distinguish between causes. In fact, very often it
is exactly the context which will supply the information about what guideline is
more relevant than another for this particular question. Because the guidelines
will show which variables can be most causally relevant, they will help solve the
explosion problem as identified in the beginning of this chapter. The number
of categories in our cognitive ontology will not explode, because the guidelines
will be able to help us select variables that can go into the cognitive ontology.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued that rather than applying the mapping norm, we should
find out which entities are causally relevant and try to find the appropriate
causal relations between them. The theory of di↵erence-making can be a good
tool for this. By interpreting causality on a manipulationist account, we can
find out how some variables manipulate others. Applying di↵erence-making to
the questions about bilingual language switching posed in chapter 1 shows that
it can be used to make the causal relations between the relevant variables very
clear and precise. The causal norm takes seriously the idea that neuroscientific
explanations are built from causal information, and it aligns much better with
neuroscientific practice.
Cognitive ontology building and constructing explanations are inextricably
linked. This means that the norms that guide cognitive ontology building must
align with those for explanations. By claiming that explanations are built on
causal information, I follow a tradition that moves away from the Deductive-
Nomological model of explanation towards models in which causation takes
centre stage (Cartwright, 2004). The causal norm does not only constrain ex-
planations but also our cognitive ontology: applying the mapping norm can
potentially distort the categories that are causally relevant.
Mapping relations can sometimes give us predictive information. But
prediction is only relevant in a few contexts. Moreover, in most of those contexts,
it is actually causal information that turns out to be most relevant.
Last, I drew attention to a problem that could arise when applying the
causal norm instead of the mapping norm to cognitive ontology building: the
explosion problem. The explosion problem refers to the worry that the causal
norm is too lax, and that the number of categories that will enter into my cog-
nitive ontology will explode. I proposed to solve this problem by introducing
causal relevance as a graded notion. Not all causal relations are equally
relevant. Specificity, proportionality, determinacy, systematicity, stability, and
proliferation are guidelines that can tell us which causal relations are relevant
in a particular context.
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The causal norm for cognitive ontology building aligns well with what we want
from neuroscientific explanations. Furthermore, it turns out that the explosion
problem can be solved by looking at the guidelines for causal relevance. But
there is another worry. There seem to be many categories that are (partly)
dependent on each other. Will the causal norm be able to identify those rela-
tions, and can it compare these dependent categories in terms of their causal
relevance?
For example, both cognitive control and response inhibition seem to be
causally relevant to other variables. But they are not independent. Some might
say they are just synonyms and refer to the same process. Or perhaps response
inhibition is a component of cognitive control. If so, impairment of either
of these functions might have a causal impact on performance of a linguistic
switching task. But one of the two will be more causally relevant than the
other. How will the causal norm yield that result?
One of the main reasons for building a cognitive ontology in the first place
was to remove confusion over the meaning and ambiguity of certain constructs.
If the causal norm is to become the guiding principle, then it should help reduce
confusion, ideally by showing us whether variables are dependent on each other,
and if so, how.
Dependent variables can lead to profound confusion when applying di↵erence-
making to sort out the causal relations. The first problem that can arise
happens when we try to find out whether there is a causal relation between
two constructs, and they actually turn out to be dependent on each other: “the
chosen variables are involved in dependency relationships that are not causally
interpretable. This might happen if, for example, the chosen variables stand in
logical or conceptual relations, as in the case of variables representing whether
someone says ‘hello’ and whether that person says ‘hello’ loudly” (Woodward,
2016, p. 1052).
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Dependent variables cannot be causally related: “causal variables cannot be
analytically related, e.g. x and 2x cannot stand in a causal relation” (Eberhardt,
2016, p. 1031)1. There will be some dependency relations between the two that
might obstruct a clear view of whether they are causally related. If we intervene
on saying hello by saying it in a thick German accent, then that will also
result in an intervention on saying hello loudly. This might make it seem as
though they are causally related, while in fact these variables are conceptually
dependent on each other.
A second problem arises when we find out that there is a causal relation
between construct A and construct B, but there is also a causal arrow from
a variable that is dependent on construct A to construct B. Which causal
relation will be more relevant in this context? Suppose saying hello causes
the conversation partner to say hello back, but saying hello loudly also has
the same e↵ect. Which of the two variables should we point to as causing the
response?
I elaborate on these problems in section 4.1 by analysing the ways in which
categories can be dependent on each other. For example, are terms synonymous,
or are they components of each other? In section 4.2, I propose a way in which
di↵erence-making can tell us i) that there is a dependency relation between two
concepts, and ii) what exactly this dependency relationship is.
In section 4.3 I extend the framework to cognitive variables specifically. I
explain how we can get a more detailed grip on cognitive variables by using
Funkhouser’s idea of specifying determinate-determinable relations (2006). In
this section I also go into the relation between cognitive variables and experi-
mental tasks, and comment on the interest-relativity of cognitive variables and
their metaphysics.
In section 4.4 I apply the di↵erence-making framework to the supposed sub-
constructs of cognitive control (Sabb et al., 2008). My analysis will be able to
show what the di↵erent dependency relations are that exist between the alleged
sub-constructs and cognitive control.
Section 4.5 then takes on the second kind of the problem with dependent
variables: which dependent construct is most causally relevant? The guidelines
developed in section 3.4 will turn out to be of key importance here.
4.1 Introduction to dependency relations
What is a dependency relation and what types of dependency relations are
there? Broadly, a dependency relation exists between two cognitive concepts
that are somehow dependent on each other. Memory and working memory, for
example, are not completely separate from each other—they are dependent. As
I will explain in the next section, there is a dependency relation if we cannot
1Eberhardt uses the term “analytically related” here, while I use “dependent”. In this
context we point to the same phenomenon. I do not want to imply, however, that depen-
dency relations and analytic relations are always the same, because they come with di↵erent
philosophical traditions and metaphysical implications.
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manipulate one variable without thereby manipulating the other, in at least one
direction. Section 4.3.4 will elaborate on what this means for the metaphysics
of the dependency relation that I use. But first I want to introduce an intuitive
notion of dependency.
I put forward three kinds of dependency relations—synonymity, kind-of, and
component-of. There are many variations of dependency relations, but I focus on
these three relations because they seem to capture the most important depen-
dency relations that exist between cognitive constructs. Distinguishing these
will go a long way towards further specifying a cognitive ontology, without
getting stuck in too much detail.
The clearest example of a dependent relation is synonymity. The terms
“working memory” and “short-term memory” for example, refer to the same
construct: “the term ‘working memory’ evolved from the earlier concept of
short-term memory (STM), and the two are still on occasion used interchangeably”
(Baddeley, 2012, p. 4). This means that the cognitive processes we refer to as
working memory and the cognitive processes we refer to as short-term memory
will co-refer. So whatever cognitive process we refer to as working memory, is
the same cognitive process that we refer to as short-term memory. This also
means that the tasks we use to measure working memory will generally be the
same tasks we use to measure short-term memory.
A second type of dependency relation is the “kind-of” relation, such as
the relation between working memory and memory, and between linguistic
task switching and task switching: working memory is a kind-of memory and
linguistic task switching is a kind-of task switching. The kind-of relation is
a relation between a higher-level, coarse-grained construct (memory, or task
switching) and a lower-level, more fine-grained construct (working memory, or
linguistic task switching).
There are a few di↵erent versions of kind-of relations. First, it could be a
disjunctive kind-of relation, in which two or more lower-level properties are a
kind-of higher property, and where the lower-level properties are not mutually
exclusive. An example of this is the relation between the higher-level LGBTIQ
property and its lower-level categories: someone can be both gay and queer, or
both trans and bisexual.
The second is a conjunctive relation in which the lower-level constructs are
mutually exclusive. This type of relation is quite common, and includes for
example the relation between succulents, ferns, and plants. The lower-level
terms succulent and fern are a kind-of plant, and there is no object that can be
both a succulent and a fern. Working memory, long-term memory and memory
are arguably of the same type: working memory and long-term memory are
kinds-of memory and a type of cognitive process is usually not referred to by
both these terms at the same time.
A third type of kind-of relation is the determinable-determinate relation,
such as between scarlet, crimson and red. Here, scarlet and crimson are more
fine-grained ways of being red. Scarlet and crimson are said to determine the
determinable red because they are specific ways of being red. The determinate-
determinable relation can be said to be a specific version of the conjunctive
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relation, because for both relations, the lower-level categories exclude each
other. An object cannot be both (uniformly) scarlet and crimson. An extra
requirement for calling a relation a determinate-determinable relationship is that
the lower-level categories share a determination space. I will come back to this
notion of determination space in section 4.3.1. An intuitive explanation is that
the lower-level categories are similar ways of being the higher-level category.
Scarlet and crimson are very similar ways of being red, while succulents and
ferns are less similar.
The next type of dependency relation is the component-of relation. There
are a few ways of taking the component-of relation. The one that is used for
cognitive constructs is a functionalist interpretation, in which a concept breaks
down into several functional components. As Cummins puts it: “functional
analysis consists in analyzing a disposition into a number of less problematic
dispositions such that programmed manifestation of these analyzing dispositions
amounts to a manifestation of the analyzed disposition” (1975, p. 125). For
example, memory is often thought to break down into three steps: encoding,
storing, retrieving2. These three “dispositions” would amount to a manifesta-
tion of memory.
This functional understanding of the componency relation should be con-
trasted with a spatiotemporal understanding, which breaks down into spatial
components and/or temporal components. A spatial understanding of the
componency relation is in play when we say that neurons are part of the brain:
they are spatially located in the brain. Temporal componency happens when
a moment is temporally part of a bigger moment, such as when the event of
cutting a cake is part of the event of a birthday party.
What about constitutive relations? These relations are proposed by those
who think that explanations are or should be mechanistic.3 A constitu-
tive relation exists between lower-level entities, which by operating together
mechanistically, constitute the higher-level entity. Take for example a neuron’s
action potential, which is constituted by lower-level elements, including ion
channels and ion pumps, which operate together mecanistically. I will talk
about mechanistic models of explanation in much more detail in chapter 5, but
for now I want to include constitutive relations in my category of component-of
relations. It will become clear in section 4.2.1 why this is so.
4.2 Sorting out dependency relations with dif-
ference-making
How can we find the dependency relations? To some degree, we can be guided
by our intuitions. That working memory is a kind-of memory is clear from our
intuitions about how the terms are used (and reflected by their names). But
2This way of breaking down memory function has been part of the literature of memory
for a long time (Tulving, 1995), but is also contested, for example by enactivists who believe
it relies heavily on a representational model of the mind (Hutto, 2016).
3See for example (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010; Craver, 2007).
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mere intuitions will not su ce. Di↵erent scientists will have di↵erent intuitions
about the nature of cognitive processes. It is crucial that everyone in the field
operates with the same understanding of cognitive categories. This is because
conflicting definitions often lead to the use of di↵erent task contrasts for the same
concept, which means that di↵erent researchers will measure di↵erent processes.
In section 4.3.2 I will elaborate on this problem.
It is also not enough to have discussions about the definitions of cognitive
constructs, like the ones that the Cognitive Atlas facilitates (Poldrack et al.,
2011), see also appendix A. I propose that we need a proper framework to fine-
tune the interpretation of di↵erent cognitive constructs. Comparing di↵erent
definitions does not necessarily lead to a precise consensus. Instead, we need
to know exactly where our interpretations di↵er and what that means for
measuring the cognitive processes. By the end of this chapter, I will have
outlined a framework in which we can do this.
I propose that we should use di↵erence-making to sort out dependency rela-
tions between variables. First, we should find out whether there is a dependency
relation between two variables. Then, if it is a dependency relation, which one
is it?
How do we know whether two variables are dependent on each other, as
opposed to unrelated, or causally related? In short: if two variables are
dependent on each other, it will not be possible to intervene on one without
thereby intervening on the other, in at least one direction.
Suppose an inexperienced ecologist is given the assignment to reduce the
number of goannas in a national park. She decides to tell the park rangers to
halve the population of lizards in the park, to see if perhaps this has an e↵ect
on the number of goannas. Indeed, it turns out that this intervention of halving
the population of lizards leads to a 50 percent decrease of goannas in the park.
The ecologist then comes up with the hypothesis that lizards are an important
food source for goannas, which means that the decrease in lizard population
caused a decrease in the goanna population.
Over time, however, more interventions are made on the lizard population.
The park rangers put a chip in every lizard in the park, and the ecologist finds
out that also, all goannas are chipped. Similarly, cutting every lizard’s toe nails
leads to every goanna’s toe nails being cut. The ecologist then realises that
goannas are a kind of lizard.
This scenario (be it unlikely that this ecologist is allowed to make such
important decisions) shows us an important way in which di↵erence-making
can sort causal relations from dependency relations. With dependency relations
such as the kind-of relation, every possible intervention on lizards would also
be an intervention on goannas. In the cognitive domain, an example would be
that every intervention on memory would also be an intervention on working
memory.
This contrasts with causal relations, in which there are only some ways
of intervening on one variable to change another. Changing the amount of
cigarettes that a population smokes will have an impact on the incidence of
cancer, but changing the colour of cigarettes will not. And of course it also
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contrasts with there being no relation between variables. In that case, there are
no possible ways of intervening on one variable to change another. For example,
there is no possible manipulation of the notebook in front of me that will lead
to a manipulation of the sun.
The basic idea of using di↵erence-making to identify dependency relations is
thus as follows: when all interventions on one of the variables necessarily lead to4
di↵erences of the other (in either direction), we are dealing with a dependency
relation. Another way of putting this is in terms of separate manipulability.
Woodward links the idea of separate manipulability to logical relatedness: “the
logically connected variables are just those that we cannot separately intervene
on via a single ‘local’ intervention” (2016, p. 1061).5
When only some interventions on one variable lead to di↵erences of the other,
then that means there is a causal relation between the two. Lastly, when there
are no interventions of the first construct that lead to a di↵erence in the second,
then there is no relation between the two constructs. I will fill in the details of
these basic distinctions in the rest of this section.
4.2.1 Pattern of manipulation relations
The pattern of manipulation relations between two variables can show us more. I
will argue in this section that we can also use the manipulation relations between
two variables to find out what kind of dependency relation (synonymity, kind-
of, component-of) exists. See table 4.1 for an overview of the di↵erent kinds of
dependency (and causal) relations, and their associated manipulation relations.
Let us return to the goannas. While all manipulations of lizards led to the
same manipulations of goannas, the reverse is not the case. Eliminating the
population of goannas does not lead to an elimination of the population of lizards
(assuming there are other kinds of lizards than goannas in the population).
This asymmetry, I propose, is characteristic of all the kind-of dependency re-
lations, as well as of the component-of relations. The determinate-determinable
4Throughout this chapter, I use terminology such as “lead to”, “means”, “entails” when
an intervention on one construct would also be an intervention on the other. With this
terminology I do not mean to say that these interventions are temporally spaced out. It is
not the case that there is a time t1 at which we intervene on memory, and that this leads
to an intervention on working memory at time t2. Essentially, interventions on dependent
variables happen at the same time. However, we usually find out about the intervention on
the second variable at a later time. And that is fine for this di↵erence-making approach.
Nothing hangs on finding out about the synchronicity or diachronicity of interventions. It is
merely the pattern of manipulations that will tell us how the two variables are related, see
section 4.2.1.
5A single local intervention here means that there is only one act of intervening, rather
than say two acts of intervening. Someone might argue against Woodward that the ecologist
could have given the park rangers the following instructions: replace the population of goannas
with frill-necked lizards. This would have been a manipulation of the population of goannas,
but would have kept the population of lizards the same. Hence, goannas and lizards are not
dependent on each other. But “replacing the population of goannas with frill-necked lizards”
is not a single local intervention. These instructions constitute two interventions: one to
remove the goannas and another to bring in frill-necked lizards. So this type of intervention
does not prove that goannas and lizards are independent.
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Synonymity
8 Xˆ ! Yˆ
8 Yˆ ! Xˆ
Kind-of
8 ˆhigh ! ˆlow
9 ˆlow ! ˆhigh
Component-of
9 ˆhigh ! ˆlow
9 ˆlow ! ˆhigh
8 ˆhigh ! 9 ˆlow
Causes
9 Xˆ ! Yˆ
@ Yˆ ! Xˆ
Bidirectional causation
9 Xˆ ! Yˆ
9 Yˆ ! Xˆ
Table 4.1: This table gives an overview of the dependency relations between
constructs and their associated ways of manipulation. The first equation, for
example, reads: all manipulations of X entail manipulations of Y . The ˆ refers
to “manipulations of”, and 8, 9, and @ are logical operators that mean “all”,
“some” and “no”, respectively. The words high and low refer to high-level
coarse-grained concepts, and low-level, more specific concepts, as the kind-of
and component-of are hierarchical relations.
84
relationship, for example, is asymmetrical. Every intervention on red will change
scarlet as well. But the reverse is not true. That is, there are ways of intervening
on scarlet without thereby intervening on red, for example if we only change
the shade of scarlet so slightly that it does not constitute a change on the value
of red. The variable red has a scale of values that is more coarse-grained than
the scale of values for scarlet. So while technically, adding a touch of blue to a
bucket of scarlet paint also entails adding a touch of blue to the bucket if we call
it red paint, the intervention in this case is so subtle that it will not be picked
up on by the scale of values of red.
Disjunctive and conjunctive relations are also asymmetrical. With a
disjunctive relation, there are some ways to intervene on one of the lower-
level variable without thereby intervening on the higher-level variable, but not
vice versa. If we change something about the LGBTIQ category, like adding
five years to everyone’s age, we thereby also change the age of the people in
the Intersex category. In contrast, manipulating the age of bisexuals will not
influence the age of all the people in the LGBTIQ category.The same goes for the
conjunctive relation: intervening on the higher-level category plant (by painting
all plants blue), will change the colour of its conjunct fern. But if we paint all
ferns, not all plants will change their colour. Similar to the red/scarlet example,
technically there is some change to the set of plants, because some of the plants
will now be blue. But the change is too slight for it to constitute a real change
of the variable plant, especially compared to the manipulations that happen the
other way around (all ferns will be blue if we paint the set of plants blue).
This asymmetry of manipulation relations contrasts with the synonymity
relation, which is symmetric. If two terms are synonymous, intervening on one
without thereby intervening on the other is impossible in both ways. Intervening
on working memory is impossible without thereby intervening on short  term
memory, and vice versa.
With the component-of relation, we see that some changes to the lower level
variable result in changes in the higher level variable, and that some changes
to the higher level variable will change the lower level variable. Adding flour
is a component of baking a cake. Some manipulations of adding the flour will
have an impact on the cake making process: adding too little or too much can
change the cake-making process profoundly. But not all manipulations have
such an e↵ect: adding the flour slowly rather than quickly, or some changes in
the order of adding flour and other ingredients will not substantially change the
cake-making process.
Vice versa, there are also some manipulations of the cake-making process
that have an e↵ect on adding the flour. Eliminating adding the dry ingredients
means that adding the flour will also be omitted. But baking the cake at a
di↵erent temperature will not influence the adding of flour, which means that
not all manipulations of the higher-level variable imply a change in the lower-
level variable.
This analysis of the component-of relation also aligns with Craver’s mutual
manipulability criteria for the componency relation, or what he calls: “consti-
tutive relevance”. He takes a rough account of mutual manipulability to be as
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follows: “a component is relevant to the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole
when one can wiggle the behaviour of the whole by wiggling the behaviour of
the component and one can wiggle the behaviour of the component by wiggling
the behaviour as a whole” (2007, p. 153).
However, I want to propose that there is another criterion for the componency
relation: all manipulations of the higher-level variable result in some manipu-
lation of at least one of the lower-level variables. Changing the cake-making
process must have an e↵ect on at least one of its components, be it adding the
flour or changing the baking temperature or one of the others.
Adding this third criterion solves theoretical problems with the mecha-
nistic model and di↵erence-making, as we will see in chapter 5. But it also
shows why the component-of relation is indeed a dependency relation that can
be distinguished from normal causal relations, more specifically from causal
feedback relations. Just like the synonymity relation, and the kind-of relation,
at least one of the manipulation relations states that all manipulations of one
variable lead to a change in the other.6 This distinguishes them from causal
relations, in which there are only some manipulations that change the other
variable.
Furthermore, without this third criterion, the component-of relation would
look too much like causal feedback, in which X causes Y , but Y subsequently
also has a causal influence on X. A heating system connected to a thermostat
for example, has a causal influence on the temperature in the room, but the
temperature also has a causal influence on the heating system (if it is hot enough,
the heating system stops).
4.2.2 Extra information about manipulation relations
Now that we know the basics of the kind-of, synonymous-with, and component-
of relation, there are some extra things to note about these dependency relations.
I explained that the synonymous-with relation is symmetrical, and that kind-of
and component-of are asymmetrical. What about transitivity and reflexivity?
The kind-of relation is transitive. If A is a kind-of B, and B is a kind-of C,
then A is a kind-of C. Translated to the goanna example: a goanna is a kind-of
lizard, and a lizard is a kind-of reptile. This means that we can conclude that
a goanna is a kind-of reptile. Kind-of is irreflexive: something can not be a
kind-of itself. Goannas are not a kind-of goannas.
Synonymous-with is transitive and reflexive. If A is synonymous with B
and B is synonymous with C, then A is also synonymous with C. If there was
another synonym to working memory (X) then the synonymity of working
memory and X, and the synonymity of working memory and short   term
memory would entail that X and short  term memory are also synonymous.
6I prefer this way of distinguishing dependency relations from causal relations compared to
Woodward’s formulation in terms of separate manipulability, because of the asymmetry of the
manipulation relations for kind-of and component-of relations. It is possible to manipulate the
lower-level variable without manipulating the higher-level variable in the kind-of relation—just
not the other way around.
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Reflexivity is also a property of synonymity: every term is synonymous with
itself.
The component-of relation is also transitive and reflexive. If A is a
component-of B, and B is a component-of C, then A is also a component-of
C. Addingflour is a component-of baking a cake, and baking a cake is a
component-of the preparation of a birthday party. This means that adding
flour is a component-of the preparation of a birthday party. I do want to
note that the manipulation relations that relate A to B and A to C might be
di↵erent. There is a stronger relation between A and B because not adding
flour will impede the whole cake-making enterprise, while not adding flour will
not impede all the birthday preparations.
Last, causal relations are asymmetric, not transitive, and not reflexive. If A
causes B then B cannot cause A. What about bidirectional causation then? On
the di↵erence-making framework, causation can be symmetric, for example in
the case of the heating system and the temperature in the room. But technically,
the two manipulation relations concern variables at a di↵erent point in time,
which means that they are not really symmetric. The heating system at t1 has
an influence on the temperature at t2, and the temperature at time t2 has an
influence on the heating system at t3.
Causation is not transitive. Though this statement might be contentious,
I follow Woodward when he says that “it is a mistake to assume that either
type or token causation is transitive”(2003, p. 139). An example adapted from
McDermott (1995) illustrates why this is so. Suppose I have injured my right
hand during rock climbing, which causes me to turn on the light with my left
hand. The injury I causes me using my left hand (H), and my left hand
causes the light to go on (L). But the injury does not cause the light to go
on. Woodward explains that transitivity fails in this case because the value of
H that is caused by I, that is, using the left hand, is a di↵erent value from
the one that would make a di↵erence to L, namely using no hand to turn on
the light. This example shows that we cannot assume transitivity, even though
often, causal relations will be transitive. For example: smoking causes a higher
incidence of lung cancer, which subsequently causes a higher incidence of deaths,
which means that smoking causes a higher incidence of deaths. Last, causation
is not reflexive because something cannot cause itself.
The second main point I want to make in this section is that sometimes we
can know more about the dependency relations by looking more closely at the
shape that the manipulation relations take. With the kind-of relation, the type
of manipulation of one construct will be the same as the type of the resulting
manipulation of the other. Reducing the population of lizards by 50 percent
also leads to a reduction of the population of goannas by 50 percent. Putting
a chip in lizards leads to putting a chip in goannas. This might seem obvious,
but especially in the cognitive domain, this is going to be important. As I
will elaborate on in section 4.3 and 4.4, changing the performance of memory
in terms of reaction time or number of errors, will have an influence on the
performance of working memory, also in terms of the reaction time or number
of errors.
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This is the same for the synonymous-with relation for obvious reasons. But
it is di↵erent for the component-of relation. Eliminating the step of adding
flour to the mix does not lead to an elimination of the cake-making. It just
results in a very liquid form of a cake. Lowering a bicycle’s saddle does not
entail a “lowering of the bicycle”. It results in the fact that taller people will
have a harder time riding the bicycle. It can be the same change, for example
in the situation in which taking a longer time to swim entails a longer time to
complete the triathlon. But with the component-of relation, the intervention of
one variable does not need to entail the same kind of intervention of the other.
Last, with the component-of relation, there is a range of how necessary a
component is. Disabling the brakes of a bicycle does not impede riding the
bicycle completely, whereas removing the bike chain will. There always has
to be some e↵ect of some manipulations of the components for us to call it a
componency relation—spray painting a bicycle does not have an e↵ect on riding
the bicycle, which means the paint is not a component of the bicycle. But
the extent to which the manipulations of the components have an e↵ect on the
whole can vary. From this information about the pattern of manipulations, we
can say something about how important the component is for the process as a
whole.
Furthermore, there are variations in the specificity of the component to the
whole (see section 3.4.1). The pressure of a bicycle’s tyres has a specific influence
on the time in which someone completes a ride: more pressure entails a faster
time. The availability of a bicycle frame also has an influence on the total time:
without a bicycle frame, there is no ride. But this manipulation relation is not
specific: it is an on/o↵ relation. This means that the presence of a bicycle
frame is a background component of riding a bicycle, while the air pressure
of the tyres is a more central component. The specificity of the manipulation
relation from the lower-level component to the higher-level variable can thus tell
us something important: the lower-level component might be important, but can
still be a background component rather than a more “central” component.
4.3 Cognitive variables
Goannas, lizards, and cake  making are not cognitive variables. With cog-
nitive variables, determining the dependency and causal relations is going to
be more di cult. There are two explanations for this. First, goannas and
lizards are more clear-cut variables than cognitive processes are. Save a few
disagreements between biologists, it is clear which animals belong to the goanna
kind. Furthermore, goannas are material things that are easily discernible by
the human eye.
Cognitive processes on the other hand, are not directly visible. We cannot
“see” an instance of working memory directly. Second, and related, cogni-
tive processes need to be manipulated indirectly. We can intervene directly
on the population of goannas by catching them, or cutting their toenails. But
we cannot manipulate cognitive control directly. Instead, manipulations can
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happen through tasks, or through manipulations of the brain. For example, by
changing some parameters of a cognitive control task, we manipulate someone’s
cognitive control processing. Or alternatively, we could intervene on cognitive
control by manipulating a neural structure that we know to have an influence
on cognitive control processing.
This means it is also harder to determine what the relationship is between
bilingual language switching and cognitive control than it is to know how
goannas and lizards relate. It is not impossible, however. In this section, I
will explain how we need to define cognitive variables and what their available
manipulations are, and how they relate to tasks. Furthermore, I comment on
the interest-relativity of specifying cognitive constructs in more detail, and talk
briefly about the metaphysics of manipulating cognitive variables.
4.3.1 The basics
Cognitive variables are not easy to define or manipulate. Does this mean using
interventionism to sort out dependency relations is not appropriate for cognitive
variables? I propose that interventionism is very applicable, because it actually
points to something very important: if we want to know what relationship exists
between two constructs, we need to properly define them. This requirement of
specification goes much further than just giving a good description of a cognitive
concept—for example, defining cognitive control as “the set of processes that
underlie the ability to initiate, flexibly shape and constrain thoughts and actions
in accord with goals” (Sabb et al., 2008, p. 351).
Because in an interventionist framework, a causal (or dependency) relation
exists between variables (see chapter 3), specifying a construct consists of
defining the variable and its possible values. Defining these values will also
prove to be the key to defining what manipulations are allowed: “in many cases
choosing variables and deciding what counts as single interventions are part of
the same package—we choose or adopt both together” (Woodward, 2016, p.
1062). Manipulations, in other words, are just changes from one value of the
variable to another value of the same variable. Because variables can (arguably)
be defined by the set of possible values, choosing variables and their possible
interventions are just two sides of the same coin.
What exactly is this relation between variables, and their manipulations
and values? I want to follow Woodward’s idea here that it can be understood
as the relation between determinables and determinates, where variables are
determinables and values are their determinates (2003, p. 39).
As explained above, determinates are specific ways of being the determinable,
where the determinates of a determinable are mutually exclusive. The
determinate-determinable relation has sparked its own debate about how exactly
to interpret it—see for example (Searle, 1959) and (Yablo, 1992). The details
of this debate are not relevant here. The intuitions that are shared among the
participants in the debate are similar enough for our present purposes.
So how are the variable-value and determinable-determinate relation the
same? First of all, values are also specific ways of being a variable. 175
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centimetres is a specific way of being a certain height. Also, the values of a
variable are mutually exclusive (one cannot be 175 centimetres and 180 at the
same time). Moreover, all the values stand in a similar logical or conceptual
relation to their variable: the relation between 175 and height is the same as
180 and height.7
Now that I have indicated the similarity between the two types of relations,
I want to apply Funkhouser’s interpretation of the determinate-determinable
relation to the value-variable relation (2006). As I will argue, his interpretation
of determination in terms of multidimensional property spaces is useful for
understanding and constraining manipulation.
Funkhouser distinguishes between simple determinables and complex deter-
minables. Height is a simple determinable, because it can only be determined
along one dimension. Although we can apply di↵erent scales of height (feet
versus centimetres for example), it can only be varied along that single
dimension—there are no other ways of manipulating height. Colour, on the
other hand is a complex determinable, because it can be varied along its hue,
brightness, and saturation scales. Funkhouser calls these scales the determina-
tion dimensions of the determinable.
Cognitive constructs are often complex determinables. Even relatively
specific constructs like visual pattern recognition can be varied along multiple
dimensions, such as accuracy and speed. More complex constructs such as
cognitive control, working memory, or bilingual language switching will
probably have more than two determination dimensions.
Along with determination dimensions, a determinable will also have di-
mensions, or properties, that are not variable. Funkhouser calls these “non-
determinable necessities” (2006). For example, we cannot change the number
of sides of a triangle, because then it will no longer be a triangle. Likewise, cog-
nitive constructs will have those non-determinable necessities. Task switching
cannot be varied from involving two tasks to one task. In this case it will no
longer be task switching.
Conceiving of cognitive constructs in Funkhouser’s framework now allows
us to make the endeavour of finding and constraining possible manipulations
for a cognitive construct much more precise. It now becomes: what are the
determination dimensions of a cognitive construct? Thus, if we want to know
whether cognitive control and working memory are dependent on each other
(or causally related), we must first determine the determination dimensions of
both these constructs. In section 4.4 I will show how this works.
4.3.2 Cognitive variables and tasks
What actually gets manipulated in cognitive neuroscience, is the set-up of the
experiments, not the cognitive constructs themselves. We do not manipulate
bilingualism directly; we compare a group of monolinguals that do an
7See (Funkhouser, 2006) for a list of other criteria for the determinate-determinable
relation, all of which I propose are also satisfied by the variable-value relation.
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experiment with a group of bilinguals that do the same experiment. Similarly,
the contrast between working memory and not-working memory is technically
between a working memory task and the resting state. Does this mean that the
determination dimensions of cognitive constructs are actually the experimental
manipulations? And that we thereby conflate cognitive constructs and the tasks
that are supposed to measure them?
I think it is uncontested that there is in fact a di↵erence between cognitive
constructs and tasks (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). A number of authors argue
that confusion of the two categories leads to problems for neuroscience research,
and for cognitive ontology building in particular (Figdor, 2011; Francken and
Slors, 2014; Poldrack et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2016). For practical reasons, it might
seem like a good idea to equate a construct and the task that is used to measure
it. But the underlying assumption, namely that the task will always and only
measure that cognitive construct, is substantial and often untrue.
Poldrack et al. (2011) argue that only particular contrasts within a certain
task will measure a construct, while other contrasts might measure another
(or nothing). Consider the Stroop task, in which a participant is presented
with a list of words and asked to name the colour of the ink. In congruent
trials, the words name colours that do not correspond to the ink colour; in
incongruent trials, ink and words do correspond, and in neutral trials the words
do not name colours. Contrasting incongruent trials with neutral trials on
the Stroop task measures conflict detection, while incongruent trials versus
congruent trials measure the conflict adaptation e↵ect8. So even if the right
cognitive construct can be measured by a particular task, it does not follow
that the task only measures that construct. Di↵erent contrasts within the task
can measure di↵erent cognitive constructs.
Furthermore, “any link between tasks and constructs reflects a particular
theory about how the task is performed; thus, equating tasks with con-
structs makes theoretical assumptions that may not be shared throughout the
community” (Poldrack et al., 2011, p. 2). Researchers might di↵er in opinion
about what a certain task measures exactly, or worse, they might just be wrong
about what the task measures. In addition, a task might only measure part
of a construct. The Sternberg item recognition task, in which a participant is
asked to remember a list of items and respond to probes, is sometimes taken
to measure working memory, while actually it measures (among other things)
“active maintenance”, which can be said to be a subcomponent of working
memory (Francken and Slors, 2014). Taken together, these criticisms show
that tasks are hardly ever unambiguously “process-pure”: they do not measure
precisely one construct or cognitive process.
The distinction between tasks and cognitive constructs then, is very
important, and we should take it seriously in the di↵erence-making framework.
I propose that the way to integrate this distinction between tasks and cogni-
tive constructs is to be aware that what actually gets manipulated in cognitive
8See http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/task/id/tsk_4a57abb949e27/, accessed on
24/08/2018
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neuroscience are the parameters of the experiment. The link between the ex-
perimental set-up and the cognitive construct might often be correct, but it is
still a theoretical assumption. We could say that the experimental contrasts are
the “anchors” of the cognitive construct. What gets manipulated in the expe-
rimental set-up deserves close scrutiny so that we are aware of what aspects of
the cognitive construct are supposed to get manipulated.
For example, the question of what kind of neural areas get activated
by language switching is not answered by manipulating language switching
directly. Instead, language switching is supposed to be manipulated in the
naming paradigm. In this paradigm, switching trials are contrasted with non-
switching trials. Bilingual participants are presented with pictures in blue or
green. Blue indicates that they should name the picture in Italian, while green
indicates that they should name the picture in German. A switching trial means
that the participants had to switch from German to Italian or vice versa. A
non-switching trial means that they could use the same language as for the
previous picture. The idea here is that the succession of naming pictures in
di↵erent languages manipulates language switching (see chapter 6 for a detailed
analysis of this study by Grant et al. (2015)).
Why are the details of the experimental set-up important to note? I think
it allows us to be precise about the determination dimensions and the non-
determinable necessities of language switching. For example, we see from the
experimental set-up that the contrast is not between language switching and
doing nothing. The contrast lies between language switching while naming
pictures and staying with the same language while naming pictures. The de-
termination dimension, then, has two values: staying and switching. Some
of the non-determinable necessities are picture-naming and the capacity of
bilingualism (because in the experiment, all participants were bilinguals).
In this example, the experimental contrast lies within the naming task. But
whether the contrast lies within the task, across tasks, or across participants—
in all cases, the contrasting parameters of the experiment are the anchors of the
cognitive construct. It is the changing parameters that give us a hold on what
we think gets manipulated about the cognitive construct.
This proposal for integrating the di↵erence between tasks and cognitive
constructs in the di↵erence-making framework does not solve the problem of
determining which task contrasts should be used for which cognitive construct.
It does not tell us whether the naming paradigm is the right experimental set-up
for manipulating language switching.
However, it provides a good framework for making it explicit what exactly
is supposed to get manipulated, and for discussion about what contrast should
be used to measure a particular cognitive construct. Furthermore, it makes the
normative claim that specifying the experimental parameters in detail is very
important. Recording the details of the tasks and contrasts is vital in finding
out what the determination dimensions and non-determinable necessities are of
the cognitive variable. Last, it emphasises that there is a di↵erence between
tasks and cognitive constructs. We cannot just equate them and need to keep
the discussion going about their connection.
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4.3.3 Interest-relativity
Choosing a good set of determination dimensions is key in defining variables
and their relations with each other. Determination dimensions are constrained
on two sides: by our interests and by the resulting causal relations. Note that
these constraints are similar to those that I expounded on in chapter 3 with
reference to choosing a variable set. With the framework I have developed in
this chapter, we can now see that we define our variables by ascertaining our
determination dimensions. With this framework in place, I can be more specific
about how our empirical interests and the resulting causal relations constrain
the determination dimensions of our variables.
Searching for a good set of determination dimensions is an empirical matter,
tied up with our empirical practices. Task switching will probably turn out
to have determination dimensions like speed, accuracy and the type of tasks.
This is because these are the possibilities of variation that empirical researchers
take to be important. The interests of the field of research are reflected by the
tasks that researchers have designed over the years. The variation that we are
interested in will be shown by the task design, both in terms of its set-up and
instructions, and also by the kinds of responses that are recorded. In this sense,
the manipulations that we choose will align with practically possible and actual
manipulations.
How then, do we know what range of these determination dimensions we
should take into account? As Woodward puts it: “we (. . . ) want our variables
to take a range of values corresponding to the full range of genuine or serious
possibilities that can be exhibited by the system of interest” (2016, p. 1064).
The speed of task switching does not need to be counted in terms of hours,
because we know that the subjects we test will (hopefully) not take hours to
switch tasks. Rather, the speed will be counted in milliseconds, and there will
also be a lower limit of how fast someone can switch tasks.
Waters (2007) takes this constraint a step further, stating that we are most
interested in the actual variation that occurs. This di↵ers fromWoodward’s idea
in that Woodward is also interested in variation that might not have actually
happened in the world, but that is still a genuine and serious possibility. For
example, participants might have never been able to switch tasks in less than 2
milliseconds, but according to Woodward we should still include the value of 1
millisecond, because it is genuinely possible that someone might be faster than 2
milliseconds. I prefer Woodward’s approach because I think it cannot do harm
to include a few more values to make sure that we can capture the variation
that might happen. But whether we choose Water’s or Woodward’s approach,
the main point is that choosing the range of the determination dimensions is
constrained (by actual, or genuinely possible variation).
I am not arguing that the determination dimensions of a construct are fixed,
and that we are now stuck with the tasks that have been designed so far. I just
propose that task design and determining variables and their values are part
of the same empirical enterprise, and that the same norms that constrain task
design will also constrain the manipulations that we think a cognitive construct
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has.
The second side of constraint for determination dimensions comes from
the resulting causal relations. In chapter 3, I have explained that specificity,
proportionality, determinacy, systematicity, stability, and proliferation are
guidelines for finding good causal relations. These guidelines can also serve as
norms for defining variables, their values, and thus their possible manipulations.
Mass, for example, is a good variable because by manipulating its (only) de-
termination dimension, we can manipulate other variables like acceleration in a
neat way.
This might seem like a circular argument: we need to define the determi-
nation dimensions in order to find the causal and determinacy relations, and
we need those relations to find the right determination dimensions. But it is a
back-and-forth optimisation process, rather than a circular argument. We start
by defining the determination dimensions of cognitive variables, in accordance
with the interests of the field and in line with the kinds of experiments
that have been used in the past. Then, we can check what the causal and
determinacy relations are between those variables. Subsequently, if we find out
that the resulting set of relations between variables can be optimised—in terms
of their specificity, proportionality, determinacy, systematicity, stability, and
proliferation—we adjust the variables.
4.3.4 Another note on metaphysics
What are dependency relations, metaphysically speaking? Is there a deep
metaphysical dependency between cognitive constructs or are we talking about
a linguistic or mind-dependency? The framework that I described in this section
allows us to take a pragmatic position in the middle of these extremes.
A metaphysical dependency exists between two objects (broadly construed)
in virtue of their metaphysical being. Colour and hue are related, because
colour is metaphysically dependent on hue. It is because of the “being” of
colour and hue that they are related, and their relation is independent of any
human agency. In contrast, linguistic or mind dependency is mediated by our
linguistic practices and/or minds. Colour and hue are related, because they are
related in our linguistic use of them or more generally: they are dependent on
how we as human thinkers conceive of them.
Another way of framing this di↵erence is to distinguish between realist and
anti-realist interpretations of cognitive concepts. A realist interpretation of
cognitive concepts means that concepts such as memory and emotions are real,
independent of human observers. Anti-realist interpretations state the opposite:
cognitive concepts depend on the human mind (see (Sprevak, 2018) for a non-
trivial version of this statement).
I try not to go into these long-standing debates between realists and anti-
realists too much. Instead, I want to propose a pragmatic middle view in line
with the framework in this chapter, which elaborates on my position in section
3.1.5. In short: while we as humans determine what the determination dimen-
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sions and non-determinable necessities of a cognitive variable are, the manipu-
lation relations that exist between them are real.
Categorising the mind is a human a↵air. It depends on our historical and
sociocultural context what categories we use to describe cognitive processes
(Danziger, 1997; Hacking, 1986; Lillard, 1998; Macdonald, 2003, 2005; Uttal,
2001; Wittgenstein, 1980). That people speak more than one language is an
objective feature of the world. But that people love their o↵spring is also
objective, and in contemporary cognitive science, we no longer think of this as
a separate cognitive construct. In Woodwardian terms, we choose the variables
that we want to investigate.
Subsequently, following Funkhouser’s framework, we decide what the non-
determinable necessities, and determination dimensions (and their ranges of
values) are. We have decided that bilingualism is a variable that we want to
investigate, and we determine that speaking more than one language is one of
the non-determinable necessities, and that proficiency and the kind of languages
are determination dimensions.
Once those variables and their interpretations are decided upon, the ma-
nipulation relations between them are objective (or: mind-independent). It
is a feature of nature that bilingualism has a causal influence on our ability
to switch non-linguistic tasks. It is objectively so that memory and working
memory stand in a dependency relation to each other.
Choosing variables and their detailed interpretation is not a random process.
I hope I have shown in this chapter and the previous chapter that there are
procedures that we should follow in figuring out what variables to include in
our cognitive ontology and how to find their interrelations. There will be more
than one set of cognitive constructs that constitute a good cognitive ontology.
But there are now ways to compare them in a structured manner.
4.4 Applying the framework
Sabb et al. (2008) use a text-mining approach to find dependency relations.
They aim to define the meaning of the concept cognitive control using text
mining methods that can check what the components of cognitive control are.
In this section I argue that their methods confuse many types of dependency
relations, and show how the di↵erence-making approach yields a more accurate
picture.
Sabb et al. start out with a general definition of cognitive control as “the
set of processes that underlie the ability to initiate, flexibly shape and constrain
thoughts and actions in accord with goals” (2008, p. 351). The broad aim of their
paper is to initiate a database which can be collectively annotated, containing
information about cognitive constructs that are of interest to psychiatrists.9 In
order to show the power of this initiative, they map out the components and
9As far as I can tell, this database (called phenowiki) has not gained much momentum
since their 2008 paper—when checking the database in March 2017 the server did not respond
to queries.
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scope of cognitive control and propose a number of variables that can be of
interest for such a database.
Specifically, they aim to operationally define the scope of cognitive control.
To do so, they want to find cognitive concepts that are closely associated
with cognitive control. Using partly supervised text-mining methods, they
found four cognitive constructs that co-occurred most frequently with cognitive
control: response inhibition, response selection, task switching (or set
shifting), and working memory. These four constructs make up the compo-
nents of cognitive control. Subsequently, they identified the various behavioural
tasks that were used to measure these components.
Sabb et al. themselves do not clarify what they mean by their conclusion that
the four constructs are the components of cognitive control. But presumably
they have something like the component-of relation in mind that I described in
this chapter.
Based on intuition, it is already doubtful that all the proposed components
have the same relation to cognitive control. Response inhibition and response
selection could be components-of cognitive control in the functionalist sense.
Part of a successful application of cognitive control is that we are able to
inhibit the undesired response and select the appropriate one. Task switching,
however, appears rather to be an e↵ect of cognitive control, in the sense that
proper cognitive control leads to appropriate switching of tasks. Or perhaps
task   switching is even synonymous to cognitive control, because they both
consist of taking your attention o↵ a certain stimulus and engaging with another
one. Furthermore, if working memory is a component of cognitive control,
it seems to be a di↵erent kind of component than response inhibition and
response selection. Working memory is a background condition for many cog-
nitive processes, from auditory tone discrimination to semantic processing,
while response inhibition and response selection are not.
These intuitions indicate that there could be at least some mixture of
di↵erent types of relations between the proposed components of cognitive
control in Sabb et al.’s study, which they do not and cannot distinguish between.
This is not a coincidental “bad” result that Sabb et al. have arrived at. More
principally, it is very doubtful how a method of co-occurrence in scientific papers
would lead to a correct analysis of the components of a cognitive construct. The
fact that the term cognitive control co-occurs frequently with working memory
cannot lead to the conclusion that the latter is a component of the former. Text-
mining methods can be a helpful tool for some aspects of cognitive ontology
building. However, as will become clear in the rest of this section, they do not
su ce to make the dependency relations between cognitive constructs clear.
Let us try to apply the proposed di↵erence-making methods to the supposed
components of cognitive control: task switching, response inhibition, response
selection, and working memory (Sabb et al., 2008). I also want to add bilingual
language processing here, because this is a construct that Lenartowicz et al.
(2010) add as a control condition when they try to validate the components
of cognitive control. So we can ask the question: how, if at all, are cognitive
control and bilingual language processing related?
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It should be noted first that both bilingual language processing and
cognitive control are importantly under-defined. There is no single answer
to the question how they are related, because it is unclear what the determina-
tion dimensions for both constructs are. In the end, determination dimensions
should be decided upon by cognitive scientists, being constrained both by the
interests of the field and the resulting causal relations.
But one important remark can be made already: there can be di↵erences
between a cognitive construct as a capacity and as its performance. Bilingualism
can be thought of as a capacity, in the sense that all bilinguals have the capacity
to speak and understand more than one language. But this is di↵erent from the
performance of bilingual language processing. Bilingualism as a capacity has
determination dimensions such as proficiency and age of acquisition. Bilinguals
can vary in terms of their proficiency in both languages and the age at which
they acquired their second language. The non-determinable necessities of
bilingualism are, for example, that it is a capacity to speak and understand
more than one language. Bilingual language processing on the other hand,
can vary in terms of speed and accuracy, and has the non-determinable necessity
that there is a task that bilinguals have to perform that involves two languages.
Similarly, cognitive control could be interpreted as a capacity or a perfor-
mance. As a capacity, it can vary along the dimension of proficiency, and as
performance along at least two dimensions: speed and accuracy. Of course,
cognitive constructs as capacities and as performances are related. A more
proficient bilingual will generally be faster and more accurate when performing
a bilingual processing task. But the relation is not deterministic, and it is
important to separate the two, because they come with di↵erent determination
dimensions.
In what follows, I am going to suppose that Sabb et al. (2008) want to
investigate the performance of cognitive constructs. Both bilingual language
processing and cognitive control have speed and accuracy as their determi-
nation dimensions. Subsequently, we should check all relations between the
determination dimensions of both cognitive constructs. If there is at least one
relation between the determination dimensions that displays a dependency—i.e.
all manipulations of one will result in a manipulation of the other—, then these
two constructs are dependent on each other.
Let us start with one example: are there ways to manipulate the accuracy
of bilingual language processing without thereby changing the accuracy on cog-
nitive control tasks? While in the end, this is an empirical question, I expect
that the answer will be yes. Training someone to be better at processing their
second language does not necessarily mean that someone is better at cogni-
tive control tasks. Not all manipulations of bilinguals’ accuracy will lead to
changes in their cognitive control accuracy. And also vice versa, I do not
expect that impairing someone’s accuracy of cognitive control (for example by
simultaneously giving participants other tasks which interfere with their cog-
nitive control performance) automatically decreases their accuracy of bilingual
language processing. This indicates that bilingual processing accuracy and cog-
nitive control accuracy are not dependent on each other.
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After having checked this, we should move on to the other determination
dimensions. We should check whether we see the same pattern of manipulation
relations between the speed of bilingual language processing and the speed of
cognitive control. While this might seem like a lengthy and thus impractical
process, in real life this usually goes rather quickly. First of all, in many
experiments, both accuracy and speed of the responses are recorded. So it
is easy to check whether manipulating one will have an impact on the other.
Furthermore, some relations between determination dimensions will not even
be taken seriously. Technically, the colour of my shirt while I am cutting down
a tree could be varied, and it might impact whether I am visible from the
ground, but we would never have to check the relation between that determina-
tion dimension and, say, the speed at which I am cutting the tree down.
For this example of bilingual language processing and cognitive control, let
us suppose that none of the determination dimensions are dependent on each
other. Are they perhaps causally related, however? I expect that opinions
will di↵er about the answer to this question. Some will say that training
someone in bilingual processing tasks will have an impact on their perfor-
mance of cognitive control tasks, while others will disagree. This then, reflects
that it is an empirical question whether there is no relation between bilingual
language processing and cognitive control, or a causal relation. In order to
answer the question, we should manipulate the determination dimensions of
bilingual language processing and check what this does to cognitive control
performance, or by varying cognitive control performance and checking what
this does to bilingual language processing.
I want to emphasise here that the examples of patterns of manipulation rela-
tions between two cognitive constructs in this section are just that: examples. I
am not trying to prove that a certain relation exists between bilingual language
processing and cognitive control. I am merely showcasing the process of finding
out what the relation between two cognitive constructs is (dependency, causal,
or no relation) based on the pattern of manipulation relations between them.
As a second example, what kind of relation (if any) is there between cognitive
control and task switching? To start with a more precise question: is there a
dependency relation between the accuracy of cognitive control and the accuracy
of task switching? Are there ways of manipulating cognitive control accuracy
without thereby manipulating task switching accuracy? I think analyses would
reveal that the answer is no, though this is up to the cognitive scientist to find
out. The two are intimately linked in a way that say, lower cognitive control
accuracy will automatically lead to lower task switching accuracy. This means
that the two constructs are dependent on each other. I also suspect that there
will be more dependency relations between other determination dimensions of
the two constructs.
What about the influence of task switching accuracy on cognitive control
accuracy? Here, I expect there will be ways of manipulating the former without
thereby manipulating the latter. In an important sense, the relation between
the two constructs is asymmetrical. An asymmetrical pattern of manipulation
relations is what we see with the kind-of and component-of dependency rela-
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tions. In this case, the pattern that we find between cognitive control and
task switching is a kind-of dependency relation, because all manipulations of
cognitive control lead to a change of task switching. This would mean that
task switching is a kind-of cognitive control.
How about response inhibition and response selection—do they stand in
a similar relation to cognitive control? I expect that for both of these terms,
some manipulations of them would result in a change in cognitive control.
Changing accuracy or speed of either response inhibition or response selection
will thereby change the accuracy or speed of cognitive control. The other way
around, I suspect that there will be some changes to cognitive control that
result in a change of response inhibition and/or response selection, but not
all of them. Improving someone’s score on cognitive control tasks (if this were
possible) will not necessarily make them better at response inhibition.
This pattern is what we see with a component-of relation or with bidirectional
causation. Distinguishing the two depends on whether all manipulations of the
higher-level construct result in at least some change in one of the lower-level con-
structs. I think manipulating cognitive control would indeed manipulate one of
the lower-level constructs, such as response inhibition or response selection.
This would comply with our intuitions. Response inhibition and response
selection are components of cognitive control: in order to maintain focus on
the main goal, we inhibit competing responses and select the appropriate one.
The last supposed component of cognitive control I want to test is working
memory. Are there ways of intervening on cognitive control without thereby
intervening on working memory? I suspect there are. Changing someone’s per-
formance of cognitive control does not necessarily impact their working memory.
I think there could be some changes in cognitive control that would impact
working memory, however. Training someone’s cognitive control performance
might have a (small) e↵ect on their working memory performance.
What about the other way around? Not all changes in working memory
have an impact on cognitive control. Interfering with someone’s working
memory performance will not necessarily change their accuracy on cognitive
control tasks. The relation between them is less tight than between for example
response inhibition or response selection and cognitive control. On the
other hand, if working memory performance is completely inhibited, they will
probably also do very badly on cognitive control tasks, because they will not
remember what goals they were supposed to fulfil. So some (rather extreme)
manipulations of working memory will have an impact on cognitive control.
This set of manipulation relations between cognitive control and working
memory seems to indicate that working memory is a “background component”
of cognitive control. Without it, cognitive control is not possible, but it is not a
proper component in the sense that response inhibition and response selection
are. The manipulation relation from working memory to cognitive control is
an “on-o↵” relation, rather than a graded relation. In other words, the relation
is not specific, in the way that we have discussed in section 3.4.1.
This background componency relation can be distinguished from a back-
ground cause. For proper causal relations, there is no way of manipulating the
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e↵ect to influence the cause. There is no way to manipulate the occurrence of
the fire to intervene on the type of wood that was burnt. This is di↵erent from
the relation between working memory and cognitive control, because here,
there are some ways to manipulate one construct by manipulating the other in
both directions.
The above reasoning, summarised in table 4.1, shows that di↵erence-making
tests can show us first, whether there is a dependency relation, when it turns out
not to be possible to intervene on one variable without thereby intervening on
the other. Subsequently, it can distinguish between symmetric relations (such
as synonymity) and a few types of asymmetric relations (component-of and
kind-of).
For cognitive ontology building, it is vital to be able to distinguish between
causal relations, no relation, and dependency relations, mostly in order not to
confuse the third for the first. It is important to know that response inhibition
does not stand in a causal relation to cognitive control, because it would skew
our explanations.
Furthermore, the pattern of manipulation relations allows us to distinguish
between synonymity, kind-of, and component-of relations. This is useful because
the idea is that we could see a new pattern, and know what the relation is
between the constructs, without relying on intuitions and definitions of the con-
structs. The pattern of manipulation relations indicates whether the constructs
stand in a hierarchical relation to each other. This is of vital importance when
we try to get an overview of our cognitive ontology.
Note that my view di↵ers slighly from Woodward’s, in that he proposes
to “choose variables that are defined in such a way that we can in principle
manipulate them to any of their possible values independently of the values
taken by other variables” (2016, p. 1054). Because Woodward is mainly
interested in finding out the causal relations between variables, he thinks we
should avoid choosing variables that are dependent on each other. But I think
for cognitive ontology building, these variables will need to be included. We will
want both memory and working memory in our cognitive ontology. So in this
context, we should not exclude variables that are dependent on each other.
4.5 Comparing dependent constructs in terms
of their causal relevance
Applying the di↵erence-making methods above provides a way for recognising
dependent variables, and can also show which dependency relation exists. This
is important for a cognitive ontology, because it will give us a full picture of
the relations between cognitive constructs. But there is another reason why
finding dependency relations is important. Variables that are dependent on
each other do not causally compete: “determinates do not contend with their
determinables for causal influence” (Yablo, 1992, p. 259).
What Yablo means by “causal influence” here is that determinables and
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determinates are not on opposing teams when it comes to choosing which
variables have any causal relevance. If, for example, the fact that an object
is red would make a di↵erence to whether or not the pigeon would peck at it,
then scarlet would also be relevant, and vice versa.
The same goes for the other dependency relations discussed in this chapter.
It goes for synonymity, and also for the conjunctive and disjunctive relations. If
one of the lower-level conjuncts is relevant to an e↵ect, then so will the higher-
level construct be, and vice versa. For the componency relation, the entailment
relation of causal relevance is asymmetric. If one of the lower-level disjuncts is
causally relevant to some e↵ect, then so will the higher-level property, but the
entailment relation does not hold the other way. For example, if the air pressure
in a bicycle’s tires is causally relevant to the speed at which one can ride, then
the bicycle is causally relevant to the speed as well. But not vice versa, if the
bicycle is causally relevant to the speed at which one can ride, it could be the
air pressure in the bicycle’s tires, but it could also be the hight of the saddle
that is causally relevant.
While these dependent variables do not compete over causal influence, our
gut feeling tells us that one is surely better than the other for a certain e↵ect.
If a pigeon only pecks at scarlet objects, then it is scarlet that makes a real
di↵erence, rather than red. So whereas both red and scarlet have some causal
influence over the pigeon pecking or not pecking, whe should prefer scarlet in
this context.
Here, two principles discussed in chapter 3 are relevant: proportionality
and stability. Proportionality tells us that the more proportional a cause is to
its e↵ect, the more causally relevant it is. In other words, the cause should
not contain too much or too little information. How would we know whether
they contain just enough information? For the determinable-determinate,
conjunctive, disjunctive, and componency relations, one of the terms will be
at a higher level than the other. The notion of stability can yield a criterion
for whether we need the more specific lower-level variable or the more general
higher-level variable.
Suppose that we want to know whether memory or working memory is
more causally relevant to bilingual language switching. The first step is to
see whether perhaps either of them stand in a dependency relation to bilingual
language switching. Let us stipulate that they are not. Subsequently, we
can check whether memory and working memory have any causal relevance
to bilingual language switching. Suppose that they both do, and that by
fine-tuning either, we can fine-tune bilingual language switching. In other
words, both causal relations are equally specific. So, how do they rate on
proportionality? Does working memory contain too much information? In
order to find out, we should check how both relations rate on stability. If
the causal relation between memory and bilingual language switching is less
stable than that between working memory and bilingual language switching,
then memory does not contain enough information. But if they are both
equally stable, then we should prefer memory over working memory, because
apparently we do not need the extra information that working memory
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contains.
Last, for synonymous terms, both are equally causally relevant. All we need
here is to find out that they are synonymous and subsequently make a choice
of which term to use in the future (or rename the concept completely).
4.6 Conclusion
Variables that stand in a dependency relation to each other can cause confusion
when applying the causal norm. Also, sorting out dependency relations is
one of the goals of building a cognitive ontology. I have proposed a method
based on the di↵erence-making framework that can distinguish between four
kinds of relations: synonymous, kind-of, component-of, and causal relations.
By conceiving of cognitive constructs as variables with several determination
dimensions, we can be very precise about these constructs, and sort out the
relations accordingly.
It is interesting to note that qua approach, there is no deep divide between
causal and dependency relations. My proposed method is an empirical way of
separating the two, and the result depends on the exact manipulation relations
that exist between two or more variables. Metaphysically, there might be a deep
divide. Dependency and causal relations are di↵erent kinds of relations. But
rather than saying that we should figure out dependency relations by conceptual
analysis, and causal relations by doing experiments, my approach brings the two
together in one empirical framework.
What does the causal norm tell neuroscientists and philosopher to do with
their cognitive ontology? To some degree, the causal norm follows practices that
the neuroscientist has already developed. Neuroscientists already try to define
their constructs clearly, and try to sort out how they relate. But the causal norm
provides a systematic framework to base these investigations and reflections on.
For example, it substantiates the norm to “properly define cognitive constructs”
with stating that we should try to find the non-determinable necessities and
determinable dimensions of a variable. This is a much more systematic way of
going about defining a cognitive construct.
Similarly, the causal norm provides a framework for finding relations between
variables. It yields a more rich framework than the simple correlation versus
causation terminology that most neuroscientists draw on. In some sense, the
causal norm deflates the debate on cognitive ontology. There is no such thing
as first finding out what terms to use, and subsequently finding out what their
relations with other terms are. Instead, the mapping norm proposes that we find
a set of terms which are properly defined and collectively form a suitable web
of relations. Finding out what terms to use and what relations exist between
them is an interdependent enterprise. In this sense, my approach to cognitive
ontology is holistic: the variables that we choose to be part of our ontology face
the tribunal of evidence together, rather than individually.
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Chapter 5
The web model of
explanation
What do good explanations in neuroimaging studies look like? In previous
chapters I have talked about cognitive ontology building and the importance
of establishing causal and dependency relations. I focused on these relations,
rather than mapping relations, because they allow for better explanations in
cognitive neuroscience. In this chapter, I will give an account of these explana-
tions. What explanatory model should they be based on?
In this chapter I present the web model of explanation, which forms a web
of all possible causal and dependency relations between cognitive and neural
variables. This web model of explanation is an improvement of the mechanis-
tic model. The main di↵erence between the web model and the constitutive
mechanistic model is that the web model takes away the mechanistic focus on
the constitutive relation as the cornerstone of a successful explanation. Instead,
the web model includes the relations that allow for the best manipulation and
control of the explanandum phenomenon, even if they are not constitutive.
Throughout this chapter, I will explain what the web model of explanation
entails, and how it di↵ers from the constitutive mechanistic model of explanation.
I start by giving an overview of the central tenets of mechanistic theory as Craver
explains it (2007): it is a hierarchical explanatory framework with constitutive
relations between levels and causal relations within levels.
Then, in section 5.2 I argue that the role of constitutive relations in a good
explanatory model for cognitive neuroscience should be diminished, because
other relations can be at least as explanatory. This argument rests on the
premise that to explain something is to find out how to manipulate and control
it. I explain that what follows from this premise is that we should find the
most stable manipulation relations. In some cases, these stable manipulation
relations are causal relations, not constitutive relations.
Some might think that even if causal relations can be more stable than
constitutive relations, constitutive relations are still more explanatory, because
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we can align functional componency with neural componency. On this view,
we explain a cognitive phenomenon by functionally decomposing it and linking
these cognitive components to neural variables. In section 5.2.2, I argue that for
a successful explanation, cognitive componency often does not align with neural
componency, and also does not need to.
In section 5.3 I discuss a second problem with letting constitutive relations
take centre stage in explanations in cognitive neuroscience. Several authors
(Baumgartner and Gebharter, 2015; Baumgartner and Casini, 2017; Harinen,
2014; Leuridan, 2011; Romero, 2015) argue that there is a fundamental problem
with establishing constitutive relations with interventionism. I give an overview
of this debate on the problem of interventionist constitution in section 5.3.1.
The problem is roughly that it seems impossible to make the pure interventions
on the constituted variable, because the underlying supervenience base will
necessarily co-vary. I discuss several positions in this debate, and argue that
while there is no fundamental problem with establishing constitutive relations
with interventionism, in cognitive neuroscience it is still a challenge to find them,
especially between cognitive and neural variables.
These arguments make the central focus on constitutive relations in an expla-
natory model untenable. The web model, in contrast, takes all possible relations
between cognitive and neural variables seriously. I introduce its basic tenets in
section 5.4.1, and continue by giving an overview of the kinds of relations that
can be captured by the web model (section 5.4.2).
The view that I am about to put forward is quite thoroughly pragmatic.
This is not a chapter with metaphysical arguments about whether constitution
exists. Instead, I want to find an explanatory model that works well for the
practice of cognitive neuroscience.
5.1 Mechanistic explanations
Mechanistic theory supposes that many explanations in science are and should
be mechanistic in nature: they should show how the explanandum phenomenon
is produced by a hierarchical mechanism of components and their functions.
The workings of the heart is a good example of a mechanistic explanation
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005). We can explain how the heart pumps blood
by recognising that the four chambers are its components that have the function
to contract and relax. The heart in turn, is part of a larger mechanism: together
with veins, arteries, and blood it forms the circulatory system.
Originally, mechanistic theories of explanation were developed (Bechtel and
Richardson, 2010; Glennan, 1996; Machamer et al., 2000; Craver, 2001; Craver
and Darden, 2001) as an alternative to the prevailing deductive-nomological
model. In the deductive-nomological model, the explanandum must be derivable
from law-like premises (see also section 3.2.1). For example, the explanandum
“someone is engaged in a memory process” is derivable from the law that
whenever the hippocampus is active, someone is engaged in a memory process,
combined with observations about hippocampal activity.
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Figure 5.1: Mechanistic model, adapted from (Craver, 2007).
Instead, mechanistic explanations are formed by hierarchies of entities and
their activities: “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they
are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination
conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). So, in order to explain a certain
phenomenon, we should find out what the components are and how their
collective behaviour gives rise to the phenomenon.
The mechanistic explanation will contain components on di↵erent levels and
“are conceived to have both a ‘vertical’ (constitutive) and ‘horizontal’ (causal)
dimension” (Glennan and Illari, 2017b, p. 1). On the same level, the components
interact causally to produce a certain behaviour. The ion channels of a neuron
interact causally to produce an action potential. Between the levels, there exists
a constitutive relationship: the ion channels are part of the neuron and their
workings constitute the neuron’s action potential. One level lower, the ion
channels will consist of physical components that allow it to function as an ion
channel.
For a visual representation, let us look at the picture (figure 5.1), adapted
from Craver’s (2007, p. 121) sketch of mechanistic models—a picture which has
become quite standard in the mechanistic literature. This shows a mechanism
which consists of two levels: S’s  -ing, which is partly constituted by Xn’s
 n’ing. The arrows between the components at the lower level are causal, and
the dotted lines indicate a constitutive relation.
This constitutive relation between the levels forms the cornerstone of the
mechanistic account of explanation. As I also mentioned in the previous chapter,
a constitutive relation can be established via mutual manipulation: “a part is a
component in a mechanism if one can change the behaviour of the mechanism
as a whole by intervening to change the component and one can change the
behaviour of the component by intervening to change the behaviour of the
mechanism as a whole” (Craver, 2007, p. 141).
For something to be a component of a mechanism, it needs to be part of
it (in a spatio-temporal sense) and the component and the mechanism must
be constitutively related. More formally: “X’s  -ing is a component in the
mechanism for S’s  -ing if and only if: 1. X is part of S, and 2. X’s  -ing and
S’s  -ing are mutually manipulable”(Craver, 2007, p. 153).
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The constitutive relation is explicitly not a causal relation, for three
reasons: first, the mutual manipulation is supposedly symmetric, while causal
manipulations are not. We can manipulate the ion channels by manipulating the
neuron they are a part of, and we can manipulate the neuron by manipulating
the ion channels. This is a symmetric relation, according to Craver. As I
mentioned in chapter 4, I do not agree fully, because there is an additional
criterion for mutual manipulation: manipulating the neuron must result in
manipulating some of its constituents. This criterion is not symmetric. But
regardless of this added criterion, the shape of the manipulation relations in a
constitutive relation are di↵erent than for a causal relation.
Second, there is a di↵erence between causal and constitutive relations,
because the variables that stand in constitutive relations are not independent
from each other. The occurrence of the ion channel is not independent from
the occurrence of the neuron. This contrasts with causation: “at least since
Hume, many philosophers have held that causes and e↵ects must be logically
independent” (Craver, 2007, p. 153). In chapter 4 I have elaborated on this
di↵erence between causal and constitutive (and other dependency) relations:
with dependency relations, there is no way to intervene on one variable without
intervening on the other. In the case of constitutive, or “component-of” rela-
tions as I call them, every intervention on the mechanism has some e↵ect on
one of its components.
Third, constitutive relations are synchronic, while causation is diachronic.
The opening of the ion channels does not happen prior to the action potential:
these two events happen synchronically. Causation, on the other hand, is a
diachronic relation: the cause happens before the e↵ect. I will come back to
these features of constitutive relations (and the debates surrounding them) in
section 5.2.
The mechanistic model of explanation is partly descriptive and partly
normative. It is descriptive in the sense that the model describes a lot of the
practice of science, in particular the life sciences. But it is also normative in
that the philosophers claim that mechanistic explanations are often better than
other types of explanations: “models that describe mechanisms are more useful
for the purposes of manipulation and control than are scientific models that do
not describe mechanisms (Robins and Craver, 2009, p. 42).
While these features comprise the basics of mechanistic explanations, new
mechanists have di↵erent interpretations about their specifics. While Bechtel
and Richardson (2010) are agnostic about the specific ontology of mechanisms,
Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) consider the components in mechanisms
to be entities which perform activities (Andersen, 2014). Furthermore, the
interpretation of causation in mechanisms can also be very di↵erent: Glennan
(1996) analyses causal relations in terms of interacting parts of the mechanism,
while Craver (2007) uses Woodward’s interventionism (Levy, 2013).
In this chapter, I will mainly draw on Craver’s version (2007). This version
has been quite popular recently, especially in the neurosciences. But also,
because it relies on Woodward’s account of causation, Craver’s theory is closest
to mine. Therefore, his theory is the easiest to compare (and the hardest to
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refute).
5.2 The explanatory (dis)advantage of constitu-
tive relations
The mechanistic model as Craver develops it (2007) focuses on constitutive
mechanisms, for which the constitutive relation between variables at di↵erent
levels is key. While Craver also recognises the importance of etiological
mechanisms, in which a phenomenon is explained by its antecedent causes, he
does not elaborate on this type of mechanism. The main aim in this section
(and this chapter) is to remove this focus on the constitutive relation as the
main explanatory relation: in cognitive neuroscience, causal relations can be
just as explanatory when we focus on manipulation and control.
Another way of spelling out my main point is that the supervenience base of a
phenomenon is not always the same as the explanatory base. The supervenience
base contains all the variables that the explanandum phenomenon supervenes
on. Supervenience can be defined as: “a set of properties A supervenes upon
another set B just in case no two things can di↵er with respect to A-properties
without also di↵ering with respect to their B-properties” (McLaughlin and
Bennett, 2005). In other words, every change of the mental is accompanied by
some change of the physical. This means that if the supervening phenomenon
changes, necessarily the supervenience base changes.
The explanatory base on the other hand, is the set of variables that explain
the explanandum phenomenon by providing the handles for controlling it. These
are variables whose manipulation explain something about the explanandum.
In section 5.4 I will elaborate on what this might look like.1
Centring the constitutive relation in explanations dictates that we should
explain a phenomenon by finding the variables in the supervenience base
that constitute the phenomenon. The ulterior motivation for this is that
these variables will provide good tools for manipulation and control. Craver
follows Woodward here, who says that di↵erence-making “captures the idea
that a successful explanation should identify conditions that are explanatory or
causally relevant to the explanandum” (Woodward, 2017a, p. 6). But what if
it turns out that the variables that provide the best tools for manipulation and
control turn out to be not in the supervenience base, but are causally related
to the explanandum phenomenon?
If the goal of explaining a phenomenon is to find the most stable manipu-
lation relations, then there is no reason to prefer those relations to be with
variables in the supervenience base. In fact, with the pervasiveness of many-to-
many mappings in cognitive neuroscience, I propose, it is often not the super-
venience base that will form the strongest relations. Rather than focusing on
constitutive mechanisms, instead we should concentrate on the relations that
1The explanatory base is not a subset of the supervenience base: the explanatory base can
contain variables that are not part of the supervenience base.
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give us the best handles on manipulation and control, whether they are consti-
tutive, or causal.
My target in this chapter is the centrality/prominence/importance of the
constitutive relation for explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and neuro-
imaging studies in particular. This view can be called anti-mechanistic if the
mechanisms that New Mechanists identify are taken to be mainly constitutive—
as I think Craver does (2007). On the other hand, if the shape of mechanisms is
taken more liberally,2 and can include a causal mechanism, then my view is still
mechanistic. I think it is best to characterise my position as a substantial shift
of focus from (Craver-style) mechanistic theory. What remains of mechanis-
tic explanation is its focus on manipulation and control and the interventionist
causation that it draws on.
Below, I will first make the case that causal relations can be more expla-
natory than constitutive relations by giving a few examples, and by explaining
how generally, the supervenience base can be distinct from the explanatory
base. Then, I expound what I think is a problematic assumption underlying
the attraction of constitutive mechanisms: the assumption that neural and
functional componency align.
5.2.1 Separating the supervenience base and the explana-
tory base
To explain what I mean by separating the supervenience base and the explana-
tory base, I want to start with the example of a storm, which is a disturbed state
of the environment which comes with severe weather. The constitutive mecha-
nistic model proposes that in order to explain the occurrence of storms, we
look at the constitutive elements in its supervenience base. These can include
variables like rain, hail, lightening etc. But these variables do not have to
occur every time there is a storm. This means that the manipulation relations
that occur between the storm and for example rain are not perfectly stable.
Sometimes, there are ways to intervene on the storm by intervening on the rain,
but not all the time.
Contrast this with the cause of a storm: a centre of low pressure with high
pressure surrounding it. This causal relation is very stable, because it holds in
almost all contexts. This example shows that at least for some phenomena, the
variables that provide the best source of control can be its causes, and not its
constitutive elements.
Recall from section 3.4 that stability is one of the most important guidelines
for finding the best relations for manipulation and control. As Woodward
puts it: causal relations are stable if they “continue to hold under changes
in background conditions, in new populations or data sets etc.” (2016, p. 1055).
Because the relation between the cause of the storm and the occurrence of the
storm will hold in almost all circumstances, it is very stable.
2Take for example Glennan and Illari’s definition of a Minimal mechanism: “a mechanism
for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are organized
so as to be responsible for the phenomenon” (2017a, p. 2).
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The explanatory advantage of causes over constituents happens predomi-
nantly with phenomena that are multiply realised (or in the case of cogni-
tive neuroscience: mapped to di↵erent neural structures).3 This is because
the variables that constitute such a phenomenon will not be the constitu-
tive elements every time the phenomenon happens. Hence they will not form
perfectly stable manipulation relations. Suppose cognitive phenomenon C is
realised by a set of constitutive elements N1 for 30 percent of the time, and by
set N2 for 20 percent of the time, and by set N3 for the remaining 50 percent.
Then even the strongest constitutive set N3 only obtains half of the time. So, if
we find a cause P (or set of causal variables) that can manipulate C more than
half of the time, the cause will be preferred over the constitutive elements.
Note that this view does not focus on finding single instances. In an
individual case, N1 might be a better control for C than P . I do not take
issue with that here. I am interested in the general relation between N1 and
C and between P and C. This view aligns with the general focus of di↵erence-
making accounts: “DM [di↵erence-making] accounts seem to apply most directly
to the characterization of so-called type-causal relationships—claims that some
repeatable type of property or magnitude (variable) is causally relevant to
another. It is of course possible to provide di↵erence- making accounts of
token-causal relationships, as in Lewis’ well-known account, but in my view
such theories rely, explicitly or tacitly, on type-level di↵erence-making claims”
(Woodward, 2011, p. 411).
In some cases, the supervenience base of the explanandum does not even
break down into real variables. As Baker puts it: “SS [strong supervenience]
does not require that [the supervenience base] G be a ‘well behaved’ micro-
physical property. G might be hideously complex. So there is no assumption
that the supervenience base G is a natural kind” (1993, p. 81). Baker’s use of
“natural kind” here is not the terminology I am using (see appendix B for an
explanation of how the debate on natural kinds relates to my thesis). But I
think she makes a similar point to Woodward when he discusses the guidelines
for formulating good variables: only when interventions are suitably specific,
proportional, determinate, systematic, stable, or prolific do we have to take
them seriously as variables.
Take deep brain simulation. Neuroscientists have found that inserting a
neurosimulator in appropriate parts of the brain is an e↵ective treatment of
disorders such as Parkinson’s disease. This neurosimulator emits electrical
signals, which are thought to disturb neural networks that involve the neurons
around the stimulator (Ku¨hn and Volkmann, 2017). The e↵ects on the neural
level are very dispersed, however, and the mechanisms by which this happens are
3Polger and Shapiro (2016) have argued that multiple realisation is not as common as we
might think, see also (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). This argument does not apply to my
appeal to many-to-many mappings in cognitive neuroscience. First of all, multiple realisation
usually concerns realisation over multiple species, whereas I am only interested in humans, but
second, many-to-many mappings would be the “right kind” of multiple realisation on Polger
and Shapiro’s view, because they concern genuinely di↵erent categories in the taxonomy of
psychology and/or neuroscience.
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still subject to further research. Moreover, connecting these neural changes to
the improvement of symptoms in a constitutive fashion seems very far o↵. What
happens at the level of symptoms of the disease, however, is quite clear: deep
brain stimulation reduces motor symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, like sti↵ness,
slowness and tremor.
In this case, then, the e↵ect of the deep brain stimulation on the level of
symptoms is not very well explained by looking for constitutive elements on
the neural level. The neural e↵ects are so erratic and unstable that they do
not form proper variables: they will not be specific, proportional, determinate,
systematic, stable, or prolific with respect to the higher-level variable(s).
For the examples of the storm and deep brain stimulation, there are more
stable physical causes than stable physical constitutive elements. There are
also cases in which cognitive causes of a cognitive phenomenon are more stable
than its physical constitutive elements. Consider, for example, the analogy of
a malfunction of my internet browser: if we want to explain why the internet
browser malfunctions, the causal relations with other non-physical variables are
more suitable than the underlying physical structure of my computer. When
doing the mutual manipulation tests for the browser and the underlying physical
structure, we will find that the e↵ects of manipulating the browser program are
very dispersed: they will include changes in almost all parts of my computer.
On top of that, the e↵ects will be unstable: they will be a bit di↵erent every time
I manipulate the browser. And also vice versa, it is unclear how to manipulate
the physical structure of my computer in a way that forms a good control over
the workings of the browser.
Causal relations with other non-physical variables, on the other hand, can
be explanatory in this case, because they do allow for good manipulation and
control. Changing the firewall settings, for example, can causally influence
the functioning of my browser. Or perhaps clearing the cache or cookies can
influence it. These causal relations can tell us more about the malfunctioning
of my browser than the underlying physical structure.
A decrease in ability to switch languages is a neuroscientific example in
which causes (both cognitive and neural) can be more explanatory than consti-
tutive elements (or at least as explanatory). Language switching is connected
to multiple areas of the brain: the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
bilateral supramarginal gyri (SMG), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the
caudate nucleus (Abutalebi and Green, 2008). Research has not confirmed what
the exact relationship is between these areas, and how they are related to the
higher-level phenomenon, but it could be that these areas are constitutively
related to language switching. A decrease in the ability to switch languages,
however, cannot easily be explained by looking at this (possible) constitutive
base. So far, the available evidence on the relationship between the neural
areas and language switching does not allow us to construct good manipulation
relations between the two.
Perhaps this is a matter of time. But contrast this with the causal relations
between cognitive variables and a decrease in the ability to switch languages.
Stress, for example, has a negative causal impact on this ability (Dornic, 1978),
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as well as a higher age of acquisition (Hernandez and Li, 2007). These relations
are relatively stable: they occur in many di↵erent contexts. So it is likely that
these causal relations are at least as explanatory for the decrease of language
switching ability as the constitutive relations with the neural variables.
In this example, the causal relations that seem explanatory are between
cognitive variables. But I do not wish to imply that we should only focus on
cognitive variables. Causal relations with neural variables can be just as expla-
natory. Furthermore, I am not claiming that there are no constitutive relations
between cognitive and neural variables. There will always be a supervenience
base for a cognitive phenomenon and often, the supervenience base will contain
some variables that count as constitutive elements according to Craver’s mutual
manipulability criteria. The occurrence of a storm does supervene on lower-
level physical variables, and there is probably a thermodynamical description
of these which renders this supervenience base intelligible. But this does not
imply that the lower-level constitutive elements are more explanatory than the
causal elements.
This makes my view in this chapter a pragmatic one, rather than a
metaphysical position. Metaphysically, there is always a supervenience base,
and constitutive relations might even abound. But in scientific practice, those
constitutive relations are not always explanatory. If the constitutive relations
allow for less precise manipulation and control, or if we cannot tract them,
then they are not very useful. The examples in this section, combined with the
epistemic challenges of finding constitutive relations (see section 5.3.3) make it
plausible that constitution does not have to be the core explanatory relation in
cognitive neuroscience. In at least some cases (and perhaps in many), causal
relations are more, or just as, explanatory for cognitive phenomena.
5.2.2 Neural and cognitive componency
Those enchanted by constitutive mechanisms might be convinced that causal
relations can be at least as suitable for manipulation and control. But they
still feel that constitutive relations are more explanatory. To really explain
a phenomenon, we need to look at its underlying components. The form
that this takes in cognitive neuroscience is that we try to analyse a cogni-
tive phenomenon in terms of its cognitive (or functional) components and try
to find the corresponding neural variables to those components. For example,
Lenartowicz et al. (2010) take the supposed functional components of cogni-
tive control and subsequently try to distinguish them on a neural level. Aron
et al. (2004) identify “inhibition of task-sets” and “top-down control of task
set” as two components of task switching, and localise these two components in
the right IFG/POp (inferior frontal gyrus/pars opercularis) and the left MFG
(middle frontal gyrus) respectively.
The compatibility of this process with constitutive mechanisms makes them
very appealing. With constitutive mechanisms, we try to find components that
perform activities (Xn’s  -ing) to explain the target phenomenon (S’s  -ing).
This is compatible with the strategy of finding functional components and map-
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ping them to neural activation. This strategy, however, rests on the assumption
that cognitive componency and neural componency align. The idea is that the
separate cognitive activities (the phi-ings) are performed by separate neural
structures (the Xn’s). In this section I argue that relations between cognitive
variables will not necessarily align with those between neural variables (in fact,
they often do not).
Cognitive componency, or functional analysis as it is called in the literature,
is most famously described by Cummins as a form of psychological explanation
(2000). As he defines it: “functional analysis consists in analyzing a disposition
into a number of less problematic dispositions such that programmed manifesta-
tion of these analyzing dispositions amounts to a manifestation of the analyzed
disposition” (1975, p. 125). Good examples of these analyses are a production
assembly line or a flow chart, in which there are relatively simple tasks which
together make sure that the whole function is performed. As we have seen
in chapter 4, a psychological example would be breaking down memory into
encoding, storing, and retrieving.
Cummins himself already said: “form-function correlation is certainly absent
in many cases, however, and it is therefore important to keep functional analysis
and componential analysis conceptually distinct” (1983, p. 29). More recently,
Weiskopf has argued that attributing functional components to structural com-
ponents can result in localisation failures: “one possibility is that the posited
function might have no corresponding structural element at all. A second is
that functional assignments may overlap: if several functions are assigned to the
same structural element, the specialization of functional parts that mechanism
requires is violated” (2015, p. 677). Stinson thinks this is the case: “entities or
activities might be multiply realized, realized by di↵use, distributed networks,
their realizers might overlap with one another (brain regions typically perform
many functions and engage in many activities, which needn’t be functionally
related), or they might depend on higher-level properties of brain mechanisms.
There is little reason to believe that cognitive and neural entities and activities
must be similarly organized. In complex systems, what looks stable and robust
at one scale may not be so at another scale” (2016, p. 1603).
Stinson, together with Sullivan, describes a couple of these examples:
Consider, for example, an information-processing mechanism that
explains how an organism learns to respond to stimuli like burning
flames or noxious shocks. That mechanism needs to store the
relationship between stimulus and response in some memory medium.
Reflexes mediated by nerve fibers, as Descartes imagined, can’t do
the whole job, because we can learn not only to pull our foot away
from a flame, but also to do many other things with our limbs in
response to many other kinds of stimuli. The nerve fiber doesn’t have
enough bandwidth to represent all of these learned relationships.
This notion of bandwidth is an abstract concept that doesn’t appeal
specifically to any parts of the stimulus-response system, and yet
it provides a psychological-level, mechanistic explanation of why
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Descartes’s fibers can’t be the whole story (Stinson and Sullivan,
2017, p. 384).
From the perspective of psychology, it seems clear that memory
encoding, storage, and recall are distinct processes, for example.
Yet from the perspective of neuroscience, there do not appear to be
clear distinctions between these memory processes. When you try to
integrate the mechanisms of memory studied in these two sciences,
you do not find a neat relationship where neural mechanisms turn
out to be the parts of psychological mechanisms. At the neural
level, encoding, storage, and recall are all intertwined, so neural
mechanisms of memory don’t turn out to be related to psychological
mechanisms of memory as parts to wholes (Stinson and Sullivan,
2017, p. 384).
The intertwinement of these levels is not an accident. Sullivan argues that
the multiplicity of experimental protocols that we use for the di↵erent levels,
entails we are not investigating exactly the same thing (2009; 2016). This means
integrating the results from di↵erent types of research is di cult.
There is another, more metaphysical version of this argument against
supposing that neural and cognitive componency align. Cognitive components
on Cummins’ view are individuated by their causal profile, i.e. their typical
input and output relations. Memory retrieval is characterised by receiving its
input from memory storage, and its output is typically some behavioural display
of remembering something. Mechanistic components, on the other hand, are not
characterised by such causal relations (Kaiser, 2016). This is because mecha-
nistic phenomena are more complicated and multifaceted than functional com-
ponents. Kaiser and Krickel explain that “Craver argues that in order to fully
characterize a phenomenon, one must also know its precipitating and inhibiting
conditions (that is, the conditions under which the phenomenon occurs and
fails to occur), its di↵erent manifestations (that is, di↵erent instances of the
same phenomenon), and its modulation conditions (that is, the conditions that
change certain features of the phenomenon)” (2016, p. 15).
In their article, Kaiser and Krickel focus on the top-most mechanistic
phenomenon: the explanandum. So while the mechanistic explanandum and
the function-to-be-analysed do not line up, perhaps their respective components
do line up? But this reply will not work. Both the mechanistic components and
the functional components depend inextricably on their respective explanandum
phenomena. So if they do not line up, their components will not either. This
means that there are several arguments why cognitive componency and neural
componency do not necessarily (and often do not) line up.
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5.3 The incoherence challenge for constitutive
relations
In the previous section I have argued that constitutive relations are not
necessarily more explanatory than causal relations. In this section I put
forward another argument for my proposal to shift our focus from constitu-
tive mechanisms as the main shape that an explanation should take. I do this
by discussing a problem with using interventionism to establish constitutive
relations that several authors have identified and tried to solve (Baumgartner
and Gebharter, 2015; Baumgartner and Casini, 2017; Harinen, 2014; Ka¨stner,
2017; Krickel, 2018; Leuridan, 2011; Polger et al., 2018; Romero, 2015). This
“incoherence challenge” states that using interventionism to identify constitu-
tive relations is incoherent: “there is a problem for Craver’s mutual manipula-
bility account: if one wants to uphold the intuition that constitutive relevance
is not a causal relation, constitutive relevance relations are incompatible with
interventionism” (Krickel, 2018, p. 60). As I will explain below, the super-
venience of the mental on the physical makes it hard to perform the kind of
interventions needed to find constitutive relations.
Below I will outline the (fast growing) debate, and formulate my own
position. I propose that while it is possible to establish constitutive relations
with interventionist causation, challenges remain for finding them in experimen-
tal practice. Especially, as I will argue, finding constitutive relations between
neural and cognitive variables is not easy. This is another reason for my position
that the role of constitutive relations in an explanatory framework for cognitive
neuroscience should be diminished.
Some argue that the incoherence challenge has wider implications: it is also a
metaphysical issue about causal relevance of the mental. The same problem with
finding the right kind of interventions for (cognitive) variables that supervene
on the physical entails that these cognitive variables are causally ine cacious.
The epistemic issue of the incoherence of interventionism and constitution
is more relevant to my project than the metaphysical issue, because in my
framework, constitutive relations can still be a part of explanations in cognitive
neuroscience. If it is impossible to establish them with interventionism, then
my framework breaks down. Especially important are the constitutive relations
(or componency relations as I call them, see chapter 4), the ones in which a
cognitive phenomenon breaks down into cognitive components. Without them,
we would be missing an important piece of the puzzle.
I will, however, touch on the metaphysical problem as well. One of the
primary features of interventionism is that it can render cognitive variables
just as causally relevant as physical ones, and if this is taken away, then my
framework’s reliance on interventionism is empty.
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5.3.1 The interventionist constitution problem
Baumgartner and Gebharter (2015) identified the problem with using interven-
tionist causation to establish constitutive relations, partly based on insights in
earlier papers from Baumgartner (2009; 2010; 2013). In a nutshell, Baumgartner
and Gebharter’s problem is that either there cannot be “pure interventions”
on the variables in constitutive relations, i.e. interventions that comply with
Woodward’s four criteria, or alternatively, constitutive relations turn out to be
causal. This means that establishing constitutive relations is incompatible with
interventionism.
Suppose that we want to check whether perhaps X causes Y . With
interventionism, we would intervene on X with intervention variable I to see
whether this in turn manipulates Y . One of Woodward’s requirements is that
intervention variable I must not manipulate Y directly, without going through
X first. If we want to know whether a certain medicine is a remedy against
head aches, we must make sure that the intervention variable giving someone
a pill would not influence the incidence of head aches directly, independently
of the substance of the pill. Which is why in those experiments, the group that
does not receive the medicine receives a placebo pill.
However, as Baumgartner and Gebharter (2015) argue (see also Romero
(2015) and Harinen (2014) for a similar argument), when X and Y are
constitutively related, this pure intervention is not possible. Suppose Y is
constituted by Xn. Because Y also supervenes on Xn, at least one of the Xs
(let’s call it Xi) will have to change whenever Y is changed. If an intervention
I is to manipulate Xi via an intervention on Y , then there are three ways in
which it can do so: I ! Y ! Xi, I ! Xi ! Y or [I as a common cause of Y
and Xi]. The first two options are ruled out, because they render the relation
between Y and Xi causal, and constitution is supposedly not a causal relation.
But in the third option, in which I is a common cause of Y and Xi, entails that
I is not an ideal intervention, because it manipulates Xi on a path that does
not go through Y . Hence interventionism and constitution are incompatible.
Let us look at an example. Suppose that we want to find the constitu-
tive elements of task switching. Because of supervenience, manipulating task
switching is necessarily accompanied by some change in its supervenience base.
Now suppose that it is the ACC that necessarily changes when we manipulate
task switching.
First, we check the first criterion of Craver’s mutual manipulability criterion
and find that it is satisfied: by intervening on the ACC, task switching is
impeded. Then, we turn to the other criterion for constitutive relations. We
find a way to intervene on task switching, which thereby also changes activity
in the ACC. According to Craver, finding these mutual manipulation relations
is su cient for establishing that indeed, task switching is (partly) constituted
by the ACC.
However, the correlation of manipulations can only be explained in three
ways: I causes a change in task switching, which then causes a change in
the ACC, I causes a change in the ACC, which then causes a change in task
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switching, or I is a cause of both a change in task switching and a change in
the ACC. The first two are ruled out, because constitution is supposed to be
non-causal. But the third is ruled out because according to Woodward, I should
be an ideal intervention in the sense that changing the ACC via changing task
switching should be the only route through which the ACC is manipulated. But
in the third scenario, the causal route becomes I ! ACC, which does not go
through the task switching variable. This means that the intervention variable
also directly caused change in the ACC, regardless of whether task switching
was changed or not.
Note that this problem obtains for every I we choose and also does not
depend on me specifying that it is the ACC that is the subvenient variable that
changes. Therefore Baumgartner and Gebharter maintain that it is impossible
to establish constitutive relations when using Woodward’s interventionism.
Woodward himself subsequently replied to this problem by relaxing his
criteria for pure interventions: ‘when an intervention occurs on X, its super-
venience base SB(x) should not be regarded as one of those ‘o↵-route causes’ in
IV that one needs to control for or hold fixed in intervening on X” (Woodward,
2015, p. 333). So according to Woodward, it is fine that I directly causes changes
in the ACC, independently of variation in task switching. The supervenience
relation between task switching and the ACC does not need to be held fixed.
This solution of Woodward’s is theoretically sound. However, Baumgartner
and Gebharter argue that in experimental practice, the manipulation relations
still cannot prove that the two variables stand in a constitutive relation. Every
time that we check the mutual manipulation relations, it could be that the
intervention variable I causes both a change in the constituted phenomenon,
and in the constitutive base. It could be that every time we intervene on task
switching, the intervention also has a causal relation with the ACC, regardless
of whether task switching and the ACC are actually constitutively related
(Baumgartner and Gebharter, 2015). They call this “fat-handed interventions”,
because the interventions have causal relevance both for the ACC and for task
switching. So, problems remain for the experimental context in which these con-
stitutive relations are established: “Yet, while [Woodward’s solution] generates
a consistent theory, it fails to account for mechanistic constitution on evidence-
based grounds” (Baumgartner and Gebharter, 2015, p. 19).
Baumgartner and Gebharter (2015) and Baumgartner and Cassini (2017)
propose that the pattern of fat-handed interventions can actually show whether
variables are constitutively related. When variables are constitutively related,
all interventions are fat-handed with respect to one of the components. That is,
“every cause of a mechanism’s macro level is a common cause of the macro level
and at least one element of the corresponding supervenience base” (Baumgartner
and Casini, 2017, p. 221).This proposal is actually equivalent to the one I put
forward in chapter 4, in which I argued that the component-of relation needs
a third criterion (in addition to mutual manipulability): every intervention on
the higher-level variable entails an intervention on at least one of the lower-level
variables.
Krickel (2018) thinks this solution is unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First,
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for the fat-handedness account to work, we need to know all the components
beforehand: “Baumgartner and Gebharter’s account (. . . ) is useless when it
comes to specifying how to identify individual constituents independently of a
complete set of constitutively relevant variables” (Krickel, 2018, p. 63). If we
do not know the complete set of constitutively relevant variables, then it is
impossible to find out if the third criterion is satisfied. Krickel’s second worry
is that we can only establish the third criterion abductively. It is empirically
impossible to test all possible interventions on the higher-level variable.
Krickel (2018) subsequently develops her own solution to the problem of
using interventionist causation to establish constitutive relations. She argues
that the way to solve the problems with combining interventionism and
constitution is to be specific about the spatiotemporal properties of the variables
in constitutive relations. For this purpose, she defines “spatial EIO-parts” and
“temporal EIO-parts”, where EIO stands for “entity-involving occurrent”—
which is basically another way of describing an event (see also (Krickel, 2017)
for a more elaborate explanation of this part of her theory). Spatial EIO-parts
are parts of a phenomenon in a spatial sense, in the way that a screen is part of
a smart phone. Temporal EIO-parts are parts of a phenomenon in a temporal
sense, such as when baking a cake is part of the party preparations.
Krickel’s modification of the mutual manipulability criterion is the following:
“(Causation-based CR [Constitutive Relevance]) X’s  -ing is constitutively
relevant for S’s  -ing i↵:
(i) X’s  -ing is a spatial EIO-part of S’s  -ing,
(ii) there is a temporal EIO-part of S’s  -ing that is a cause of X’s  -ing,
and
(iii) there is a temporal EIO-part of S’s  -ing that it is an e↵ect of X’s  -ing”
(2018, p. 64).
Krickel claims that this modification makes sure that constitution can
be empirically established. Constitution on her account only requires two
interventions, rather than many: intervening on X’s  -ing must have an e↵ect
on S’s  -ing and vice versa. The additional spatiotemporal requirements make
sure that constitution is not causal, and that we do not need to perform many
interventions on the higher-level variable to see whether the associated changes
in the lower-level variable are really due to constitution (as is the case for
Baumgartner and Gebharter’s fat-handedness account).
I agree that her account solves the problem with combining interventionism
and constitution in theory. However, in the next section I will argue that it
will not work for cognitive neuroscience. Krickel’s account requires us to know
spatiotemporal information about the variables that is not always available
within cognitive neuroscience.
5.3.2 Spatio-temporal profile of constitutive relations
While I think Krickel’s solution would work very well for mechanistic expla-
nations in the biological sciences, cognitive neuroscience adds some additional
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challenges for her account. For Krickel’s re-interpretation of the mutual ma-
nipulability account to work, we need to identify the spatial and/or temporal
EIO-parts. This means that we need to know how the variables relate to each
other in the spatiotemporal sense. In this section I will argue that in cogni-
tive neuroscience, this information is not easy to come by, because it involves
cognitive variables.
First, information about how variables relate to each other in the temporal
sense faces epistemological challenges. For Krickel’s proposed solution, this
means that we do not always know whether a variable is a temporal EIO-
part of another variable. There are two reasons for this: i) the interventionist
manipulations are always consecutive, and ii) the exact temporal profile of cog-
nitive (and neural) variables is di cult to determine.
One of the distinguishing features that separates constitutive relations
from causal relations (and causal feedback relations) is that the former are
simultaneous, while the latter are consecutive.4 Simultaneous means that the
cognitive process and the constitutive base happen “at the same time”, while
consecutive means that they happen at di↵erent times: in the case of causation,
the cause happens before the e↵ect.
However, “it is often di cult to distinguish between synchronic and diachronic
e↵ects of interventions in practice. More specifically, the e↵ects of interlevel
interventions may look diachronic even if they are in fact synchronic” (Leuridan,
2011, p. 420). Idealised constitutive relations might be simultaneous, but the
manipulation measurements that are supposed to establish them are usually
consecutive. In an experimental context, we have some manner of intervening
and some device for measuring, and the intervention usually happens before the
measurement.
Take the famous example of London taxi drivers who were found to have a
di↵erent hippocampus. Here, repeated and intense use of their spatial memory
functions had an impact on a structural part of their brain: significant changes
in their hippocampus’ grey matter was found compared to controls (Maguire
et al., 1997). This increased hippocampal volume also meant that they have
increased performance on spatial memory tasks.
It might seem as though this is a bona fide example of a constitutive relation
between the hippocampus and spatial memory. Manipulating spatial memory
entails manipulating the hippocampus, and vice versa. But this is hard to tell
whether these variables change simultaneously or consecutively, because of the
temporal framework in which the manipulations happen. It is the increased
spatial memory load that causes the hippocampus to grow. But the second
manipulation, measuring the e↵ect of the increased volume of the hippocampus
on the performance of spatial memory happens at a later time.5
4I use the terminology from (Kirchho↵, 2015) here, because these terms, unlike the more
common “synchronic” and “diachronic” do not imply that cognitive processes (and their
constitutive bases) are static.
5While in practice, we cannot directly manipulate hippocampal volume, we could do an
experiment in which two groups—one with a big hippocampus, and another with a small
hippocampus—perform spatial memory tasks. With the appropriate control conditions, this
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In fact, if we look at memory and the hippocampus closely, the mutual
manipulation relations are not between exactly the same two variables for the
top-down intervention and the bottom-up intervention. It is a memory task
that causes changes in the hippocampus, but changes in the hippocampus cause
changes in memory performance. The practice variable and the performance
variable may look alike, but are not necessarily the same in terms of their
temporal profile. This means that (perhaps) the hippocampus and memory are
related via causal feedback, rather than constitutively.
This is essentially what Harinen (2014) proposes: rather than a constitu-
tive relation between a higher-level variable Y and lower-variable X, we often
find causal relations from Y-as-input to X and from X to Y-as-output.6 So,
memory-as-input (a memory task) causes an enlarged hippocampus, and an
enlarged hippocampus causes memory-as-output (better memory performance).
It might be possible to circumvent this problem, by making sure the variables
are determined in the same way, but this is also di cult in practice. In neu-
roscience, the way to intervene on a neural variable via a manipulation on a
cognitive variable is to change a few task parameters. And intervening on a
cognitive variable by manipulating a neural variable is going to change the
task performance. Task parameters and task performance are related, but not
exactly the same kind of variable, see section 4.3.2.
So, it is di cult to find the di↵erence between constitutive and causal
relations in the temporal sense, because of the inherent consecutive nature
of experimentation. Moreover, the variables that are manipulated in these
“mutual manipulation” relations sometimes turn out to be between slightly
di↵erent variables for the bottom-up and top-down interventions. But there
is another added di culty for using temporal information to identify constitu-
tive relations involving cognitive variables. What exactly is the time-frame of
cognitive processes? Determining exactly when a memory process happens is
more di cult than determining when directly observable events happen, such
as baking a cake.
Is the time-frame of a cognitive process tied to the behaviour that displays it?
Or to the conscious awareness of it? Perhaps we would be able to answer these
questions if we would have a clear theory of what cognitive processes are. Most
of these theories focus on how to identify cognitive processes (functionalism,
behaviourism), and do not make any predictions about exactly where or when
these processes happen. What about using the connection between cognitive
processes and brain states, though? We could argue that the connection between
the two (be it one of identity, supervenience, etc) means that we only need to
look at the temporal profile of brain states, which we can see with functional
neuroimaging methods.
experiment could show whether hippocampal volume would have an e↵ect on spatial memory.
6I take Krickel’s approach (2017; 2018) to be very similar to Harinen’s (2014), in the way
that both introduce temporality in constitutive relations. But the lessons they draw from
the approach are di↵erent: Krickel concludes that her account saves the mutual manipulabi-
lity account of constitution, while Harinen thinks the adaptation renders many constitutive
relations causal.
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But this route would beg the question. The issue was how to find out whether
the neural variable and the cognitive variable stand in a constitutive relation.
Connecting a cognitive variable to a neural variable via identity or supervenience
already supposes that they happen simultaneously. Which in turn, means that
they are not causally related.
All in all, we should not rely on information about the temporal profile
of (cognitive) variables to identify constitutive relations. What about spatial
information? Here too, I want to argue that for cognitive neuroscience, relying
on spatial properties is not the way to go: either the requirement for spatial
overlap is mistaken, or it is empty. This is because it is hard to establish the
spatial location of a cognitive process, which means that establishing constitu-
tive relations between neural and cognitive (or cognitive and cognitive) variables
cannot rely on spatial information.
What is the spatial location of a cognitive process? Again, the answer to
this question will depend on your theory of mind. Extended mind theorists
will say the location of a cognitive process includes not just the brain, but the
whole person and their environment. On the other end of the spectrum, identity
theorists propose that the location of the process is a particular part of the brain.
My intuition is that to speak of the “location” of a cognitive process is mistaken,
or in any case not very helpful. Of course, processes like language switching or
memory happen at some spatial region on earth, i.e. me switching languages in
Amsterdam does not happen in Australia. But the exact boundaries are hard
to establish: does it happen in my frontal cortex, my whole brain, my body
(including for example my vocal chords), or me plus my linguistic environment?
Choosing any of these options (except localising cognitive processes in a
particular part of the brain) makes the requirement for spatial overlap of two
variables empty. Recall that for Krickel (2018), a constitutive relation means
that the lower-level variable needs to be a spatial EIO-part of the higher-
level variable. But this criterion will be satisfied for any cognitive process if
the location of cognitive processes is the whole brain, the body, and/or the
environment. Every time we ask the question of whether a neural variable
constitutes a cognitive variable, the neural variable will be a spatial EIO-part
of the cognitive variable. And the same goes for constitutive relations between
two cognitive variables, because their spatial location will be the same.
The only way in which this requirement is not empty is if we maintain that
the location of a cognitive variable is a particular part of the brain. Pinpointing
the location of a memory process to, say, the limbic system excludes certain
variables from constituting it: the cerebellum cannot be a constitutive variable.
However, this position is quite a particular stance in the philosophy of mind
and is incompatible with extended/embodied theories of mind. One of the great
appeals of interventionism is that it is compatible with most theories of mind:
we try to find out what the relations are between variables, and how exactly we
specify those variables is left open.
In conclusion, we should not have to rely on spatio-temporal information to
establish constitutive relations in cognitive neuroscience. This means Krickel’s
reinterpretation of the mutual manipulability criterion does not work for cogni-
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tive neuroscience.
Summing up: we are still faced with the problem of using interventionism to
establish constitutive relations: Baumgartner and Gebharter (2015) identify the
original problem. If we want to find out whether P constitutes M, then following
Woodward’s criteria, we will need to keep the supervenience base of M fixed.
But if they are constitutively related, then P is part of the supervenience base
of M. This means that it is impossible to establish the top-down criterion of
the mutual manipulability account: and intervention on M would not lead to
an intervention on P.
Woodward’s addendum to his theory (2015)—loosening the criteria so that
we do not need to keep the supervenient variables fixed—works theoretically, but
leaves us with epistemological di culties. It will not be possible to tell whether
the top-down manipulation is due to the variables being constitutively related,
or due to the intervention being a common cause of both variables changing.
Baumgartner and Gebharter’s solution of using the pattern of these fat-
handed interventions also faces epistemological problems, according to Krickel.
The information that all interventions on the higher-level variable entail a ma-
nipulation of one of the the lower-level variable hinges on the set of variables in
the constitutive base, and moreover, can only be abductively established.
Krickel’s adaptation of the mutual manipulability criterion also does not
work for cognitive neuroscience, I have argued, because it relies on knowing
spatio-temporal information of the variables, which is not or not easily available
for cognitive variables.
5.3.3 Constraining possibilities
How can we get out of this problem of combining interventionism and constitu-
tive relations? I want to argue that Baumgartner and Gebharter’s solution is
best for cognitive neuroscience. An intervention on a higher-level variable that
simultaneously involves a change of the lower-level variable might just be due to
a fat-handed intervention, rather than them being constitutively related. But
doing many interventions on that higher-level variable will show us more about
the relationship: if all of them entail a change in one of the lower-level variables,
then that criterion for mutual manipulability is satisfied.
But now we are faced with Krickel’s critique, that it is empirically impossible
to perform all interventions on a variable. Furthermore, the result is conditional
on the constitutive base. While I agree that this presents empirical di culties,
the problem is not as large for all kinds of variables. In a nutshell, we do not
need to know the set of possible interventions or the full set of constitutive
variables, we just need a constrained set of interventions and variables. Below I
will explain that we do not need to test all possible interventions on the higher-
level variable, we only need to test the ones that are relevant in the experimental
context.
As I have argued in chapter 4.3.3, the possible interventions on a variable
depend on the determination dimensions of the variable. These determination
dimensions, subsequently, are constrained by the interests of the field, and by
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the resulting causal relations between the variables. So while it might not be
easy, empirically speaking, to intervene on all the determination dimensions of
the higher-level variable, it is not an infinite set of possible interventions that we
have to take into account. Determination dimensions cannot be known a priori,
because they depend on the resulting causal relations between the variables.
But this is not necessary. They are initially constrained by the interests of the
field, and as the iterative process of determining variables and finding out about
their interrelations, the determination dimensions will be further constrained.
For cognitive variables such as bilingual language processing, the determi-
nation dimensions are speed and accuracy. Perhaps I have missed a few, but
in any case there are only a small number of manipulations we can perform on
bilingual language processing. This will be similar for most, if not all cognitive
variables.
What about neural variables? Here the ways to intervene are constrained
by technical considerations such as the neural areas that TMS (Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation) can reach, and how small or extensive the neural area
of inhibition can be. Those technical considerations are ever evolving, however.
Theoretically, these constrictions still leave us with plenty of ways to intervene
on a neural variable. There are qualitatively di↵erent ways, such as inhibiting
neural activation, exciting neurons, inhibiting/exciting synapse transmission,
etc. But also quantitatively, we can inhibit fewer neurons in an area such
as the cingulate cortex, or more. In the context of finding constitutive rela-
tions,however, this should not be a real problem. If a neural variable is a con-
stitutive element, then supposedly, there will be quite a few manipulations on
the neural variable that entail a change in the higher-level variable. If the ACC
is a constitutive element of language switching, then there would not just be
one very specific manipulation that results in a change of language switching.
Presumably, it would not matter too much whether we inhibit 60 percent or
65 percent of the neurons in the ACC; quite a substantial range of possible
manipulations would result in a change of language switching. This makes it
less of a challenge than Krickel supposes to find (neural) constitutive elements.
Second, the set of possible variables for the whole constitutive base of a
phenomenon is also more constrained than we might think. This is relevant
for the third criterion that I (and others) added to mutual manipulability: all
interventions on the higher-level variable must entail a change of at least one of
the lower-level components. If the candidate variables for the constitutive base
are very large, then it is epistemically di cult to satisfy this criterion.
For cognitive variables that constitute a cognitive phenomenon, the com-
ponents are functional components: their function contributes to the function
of the higher-level phenomenon. Sometimes this is a temporal sequence, like
encoding, storing, and retrieving are consecutive components of memory, and
sometimes this is more complicated, such as when working memory is said to
be a component of cognitive control (see section 4.4).
Because these variables are functional components, their functions are
relatively similar to the function of the constituted phenomenon. What I
mean with relatively similar is not that the functions align: working memory
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is di↵erent from cognitive control. But they are more similar to each other
than, say, cognitive control and olfactory processing, or language switching and
emotional processing.7 Note that I am not claiming that functional similarity is
in any way decisive about whether cognitive variables are constitutively related.
However, the amount of cognitive constructs is large, and if we had to test
all of them to see whether they are constitutively related to another cogni-
tive variable, that would be an enormous empirical challenge. Looking at their
functional similarity allows us to make an initial selection of variables that we
might want to test.
For constitutive relations between neural variables, we can draw on spatio-
temporal constraints on the possible variable set. Neural variables have a spatial
location and a time-frame, and the only neural variables that can be in their
constitutive base are those that are spatio-temporally part of them. This means
that we do not have to test for an infinite set of variables. For example, we get
the idea that ion channels constitute an action potential from the fact that the
ion channels are actually located within the neuron. We subsequently need to
test this constrained set on whether there are mutual manipulability relations
between them.
What do the di↵erent constraints on possible interventions and possible
variables tell us about the di↵erent kinds of constitutive relations? Most
constrained (and thus most easy to find) are constitutive relations between
cognitive variables. The possible interventions on cognitive variables are
quite well constrained, and also the set of possible cognitive constitutive
variables is limited. Second, constitutive relations between neural variables
are still somewhat constrained, though to a lesser degree. While the kinds
of interventions we can perform on the neural variables are larger in number,
the set of possible constitutive variables is limited, because of spatio-temporal
information about the variables.
The problem lies with finding constitutive relations between neural and cog-
nitive variables. Theoretically, this category has two subcategories: a neural
variable constituted by cognitive variables, or a cognitive variable constituted by
neural variables. I have never seen anyone in the literature propose a constitutive
relation of the former kind, so I will focus on the latter. A constitutive relation
between a higher-level cognitive variable and lower-level neural variables is least
constrained. The kinds of manipulations of cognitive variables are constrained,
and the kinds of neural interventions are also somewhat constrained.
However, the set of possible constitutive elements is unconstrained. Techni-
cally, any neural variable could be a constitutive element of a cognitive variable.
Most parts of the brain can have many di↵erent functions, so there are not
many ways to constrain the possible neural constitutive elements. This means
7Some would even say that the components jointly “add up” to the explanandum
phenomenon. But I would not go that far, because this assumes a specific interpretation of
what cognitive variables are, namely that they can be added up. Moreover, we were interested
in what the relation was between the variables in the first place, which means that we should
not assume anything about their interrelation. This is why I draw on the weaker notion of
similarity.
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that there is a considerable epistemic challenge in satisfying the (added) third
criterion: that every change in the higher-level variable should entail a change
of one of its components. If the set of possible components is large, then the
process of finding out whether every change of the higher-level phenomenon has
a simultaneous e↵ect on one of the lower-level components becomes empirically
costly.
Summing up, my analyses in this section show that first, Baumgartner and
Gebharter’s fat-handedness account is less problematic than Krickel supposes,
because there exist some constraints on the possible interventions and possible
variables. Second, however, finding constitutive relations between cognitive and
neural variables is still faced with serious epistemic challenges.
This in turn is problematic for constitutive mechanistic theory. One of the
central ideas of the constitutive mechanistic model is to be close to practice,
and even to provide scientists with a workable model with which to interpret
their results. If the most important relation (the constitutive relation) is hard
to find in an experimental context, then perhaps the model is not ideal for
neuroimaging studies.
5.3.4 Causal exclusion
The consequences of the incoherence problem can be extended further. Not only
does the incoherence problem show that interventionism is incompatible with
mutual manipulability, it also means that cognitive (or supervenient) variables
are causally ine cacious for interventionism, according to some. This would
be quite a disaster for interventionism, because one of its core features is that
it grants proper causal powers to cognitive variables. And by extention, it
would be a problem for my account in the next section: that causal relations
between cognitive variables, or between cognitive and neural variables should
be explicitly supported by an explanatory framework for cognitive neuroscience.
In this section I briefly explain the causal exclusion problem for interventionism,
and then argue that we can draw on the same solution as for the incoherence
challenge: we do not need to consider every subvenient variable when doing our
manipulation tests.
The exclusion problem, most famously described by Kim (2000), states that
mental (or cognitive) phenomena cannot have causal powers over and above
their physical realisers. This problem rests on two assumptions: the physical
is causally closed and the mental supervenes on the physical. The first is
roughly that physical events have complete physical causes. The second is that
every change in the mental is accompanied by a change in the physical. These
assumptions lead to the thesis that cognitive phenomena do not have causal
powers: their physical realisers appear to do all the work.
Many have already argued that this is not a problem for interventionist
causation, because it grants proper causal powers to cognitive phenomena
(see Eronen (2012); Menzies (2008); Raatikainen (2010); Shapiro (2010, 2012);
Shapiro and Sober (2007); Weslake (2017); Woodward (2008, 2015) in Eronen
(2017), but also earlier work in the same vein by Pettit (1995) and Menzies
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(2003)). The only requirement for a causal relation is that manipulating one
variable leads to a manipulation of the other. This requirement is satisfied for
many cognitive causes, so according to interventionism, they do have causal
powers.
But this is too quick. The incoherence challenge that I discussed in section
5.3.1 also applies more generally to cognitive causes: how do we know it isn’t
the supervenience base of a cognitive variable that is doing the actual work?
As Eronen explains neatly: “supervenience implies that it is impossible to hold
all neural (or physical) variables fixed, but holding all other variables fixed is
a necessary condition for interventionist causation, so this seems to lead to the
conclusion that interventionist psychological causation is impossible” (2017, p.
7).
Woodward’s solution, that subvenient variables do not need to be held fixed
when testing for causal relevance (2015) also does not work in this context.
The reason is that the way the causal exclusion problem is usually formulated,
the higher-level variable would need to have causal explanatory power over
and above its lower-level realisers. It is not enough to show that a cognitive
variable can causally influence another variable, it needs to do this in a better
(or di↵erent) way from its physical realiser. Woodward’s solution makes it
possible that a cognitive variable has causal explanatory power, because when
manipulating it, we do not need to keep its supervenience base fixed. But the
realisers of the cognitive variable might be the “real” drivers of the causal force:
it might be that the cognitive variable is only causally e cacious because it is
realised by underlying physical variables.
Luckily we can use the same argument that I have drawn on in section 5.2:
not all supervenience bases are variables that need to be taken up in an in-
terventionist model. When looking at type-level claims (instead of token-level
claims), cognitive variables are often better controls than their neural super-
venience base: they are a more specific, proportional, determinate, systematic,
stable, and/or prolific cause. A cognitive function can be multiply realised,
which means that compared to these neural realisations, the cognitive function
will be more stable as a cause. This argument is similar to Eronen’s solution:
“thus, even though [physical realiser] Px will be a cause of [some variable] B,
this causal relationship can be very shallow and uninteresting, and will certainly
be di↵erent from the more stable and general causal relationship between [cog-
nitive variable] M and B” (2017, p. 8). It is also similar to and Caspel (2019);
Polger et al. (2018), when they claim that we do not need to take all variables
into account when testing for causal relevance. The di↵erence between these
solutions and my view, however, is that theirs are metaphysical arguments,
while mine is practical.
These solutions are in line with the di↵erence-making view: “there are
generalisations expressing contrastive relations of causal relevance that are true
of realised properties and that are not true of their realisers” (Craver, 2007, p.
223). Cognitive variables can have causal relevance that is not solely derived
from underlying neural variables and should thus be allowed to be included in
explanatory models as causal powers.
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The reader might be left with lingering metaphysical worries. She still
worries that the physical or neural realisers are somehow more basic than the
supervening cognitive variables. Here, I follow Baker when she claims that
“Systematic explanatory success, in either science or everyday life, stands in
need of no metaphysical underpinning” (1993, p. 77). I suspect that the reason
we (intuitively) favour physical causes, is that we think they are generally more
stable. The natural sciences have provided us with generalisations that hold in
many background conditions. But if stability is the guiding principle for good
causal relations, and it turns out experimentally that in some cases, cognitive
causes turn out to be more stable, then there should be no reason to dismiss
them in favour of physical causes. If the science tells us that the cognitive cause
is more stable, then we should accept that.
I end this section with a quote from Woodward that expresses this general
view well:
“It seems to me that one of the great advantages of experimentation,
epistemically and methodologically speaking, is that one can often
use it to reliably establish conclusions about causal relationships
independently of underlying details that would be provided by some
lower level theory. The interventionist account attempts to capture
this observation. For example, a researcher may be able to establish
that some drug provides a cure for an illness without knowing the
underlying chemistry of the drug, much less how its action would
be modeled in quantum field theory. This is another case of what
I was describing above: a kind of independence or decoupling (in
this case epistemic independence) of more macroscopic behavior
from underlying physical details. From the point of view of
methodology and discovery the most reliable sources of knowledge
about the behavior of more macroscopic systems often is not found
in information about what you are calling grounds or truth makers,
insofar as these have to do with fundamental physics” (Woodward,
2017b, p.208).8
5.4 The web model of explanation
What about my positive account of explanation? How can we make sure consti-
tutive relations are not necessarily the most important explanatory relations? In
this section I outline the central tenets of the web model of explanation. While I
want to retain some elements of the mechanistic model, my explanatory model
di↵ers in two important respects: first, it takes all possible (and interesting)
relations between variables seriously, and second, the resulting picture is less
hierarchical, and perhaps more “messy”. I start with giving a general picture
8Although I do think that knowing the underlying chemistry of the drug is important,
because it would probably allow us to improve the drug’s e cacy, or to generalise it to other
diseases. Again, all of this hangs on the causal relations that are most stable, which in this
case could be between the underlying chemistry and curing the illness.
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of what an explanation looks like on the web model. Then I give an overview
of all the possible causal and dependency relations that might obtain within an
explanation.
5.4.1 The general picture
What do explanations on the web model look like? Roughly, the web model
is based on finding out what the dependency and causal relations are between
variables, without favouring neural over cognitive variables, and without being
necessarily concerned with placing variables in a constitutive hierarchy. What
results is a contextual explanation of a certain phenomenon, which resembles
a “web” of dependency and causal relations. This metaphor follows Stinson’s
when she says that “we need a more realistic picture of integration of the cogni-
tive and neural sciences, where their explanations fit together not like the tiles of
Craver’s mosaic, but instead like a garment held together by many overlapping
patches” (2016, p. 3), see also (Stinson and Sullivan, 2017).
This web model of explanation will turn out to have a number of advantages
over a model based on mapping relations and the mechanistic model. It makes
the epistemic challenges with finding constitutive relations that I pointed to in
the previous section less prominent, because constitution is no longer the main
explanatory relation.9 Furthermore, my model does not rely on a certain map-
ping between cognitive and neural variables. In so doing, the model is not biased
towards neural variables as an explanatory basis for the explanandum. It takes
both neural and cognitive variables seriously as explananda: cognitive variables
do not need to map onto certain neural variables, or need to be constitutively
explained by a set of neural variables. I will elaborate on these advantages
throughout this section.
A messy web of relations might not sound like a very desirable model for
explanation. But note that when we zoom in, the relationships and definitions
of variables are actually very precise. The most important desideratum for my
model—in alignment with the causal norm and specification of dependency re-
lations in chapter 3 and 4—is that we are very precise about the relata and
relations in the explanations. The variables in the model must be defined
by specifying their non-determinable necessities and their determination di-
mensions. The relations between these variables are specified either by their
causal relevance to each other, or in terms of the di↵erent categories of depen-
dency relations (synonymity, kind-of, component-of). This entails relaxing the
requirement that the resulting explanation should look a certain way—in the
case of the mechanistic model: like a hierarchical constitutive model. Instead,
when variables and their relations are specified properly, it is nature that will
decide what the explanation’s shape is. Here I follow Cartwright (1999) in her
emphasis on disunified models in science: science will always be pluralistic, and
we will not (and do not need to) end up with a unified picture of a phenomenon.
9Again, I am not saying that there is no constitutive relation in explanatory models, but
I claim that it is not the most prominent one, which is the case for Craver (2007) and others
that advocate for constitutive mechanisms.
128
This picture is in line with what Stinson has in mind: “the sort of explana-
tory texture we’re left with is an uneven one, where for any given phenomenon,
we might need to combine models or theories at multiple scales” (2016, p.1608).
In some sense, the web model of explanation is an elaboration of Stinson’s ideas,
or perhaps even an answer to her call: “the remaining problem is to figure out
how to combine di↵erent causally relevant factors into integrated explanations”
(2016, p. 1610).10
The web model of explanation is also similar to, and inspired by the network
model of mental disorders (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013; Borsboom et al., 2018).
Traditionally, disorders are modelled as a latent variable which gives rise to
a number of symptoms. In network models, “disorders are conceptualized
as systems of causally connected symptoms rather than as e↵ects of a latent
disorder” (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013, p. 93). Network models do not separate
the “disease itself” from its symptoms, and instead consider the causal web of
symptoms to be the real disease. The inspiration I draw from these network
models is that they are not inherently hierarchical, and that causal relations
take centre stage. Network models propose that in order to explain a disorder
properly, we do not need to look for an underlying “deeper” cause or mechanism
that gives rise to its symptoms. Causal relations take centre stage because it
turns out that they can model the correlations between symptoms well.
What results is a model that defies the borders of traditional hierarchical
explanations, and instead o↵ers a dynamic interplay between variables that
were previously considered to be on di↵erent levels. Borsboom and Cramer
give an example of such interactions: “genetic di↵erences may predispose to
the development of disorders, but persistent symptomatology (e.g., insomnia or
loss of appetite) may cause di↵erential gene expression just as well; in turn,
such changes may a↵ect a person’s brain state and ultimately feed back into the
environment” (2013, p. 117).
This dynamic interplay between variables at di↵erent levels is what I propose
an explanation should look like. I explain what shape this might take by
discussing an idealised picture of a web model explanation of language switching
(see figure 5.2). In this explanation, language switching performance is the
cognitive process that we want to explain. Neural variables such as the ACC and
the Caudate Nucleus have a causal e↵ect on language switching performance.
But also, there might be bidirectional feedback between these two variables.
Furthermore, there are cognitive variables such as sleeplessness that might
have an influence on language switching performance: the less sleep a bilingual
gets, the lower the performance of language switching might be. Then, there
can also be non-causal relations in the explanation. In this case, language
switching is a specific kind-of task switching, and inhibition and selection are
components-of language switching.
Let me recap the advantages of the web model of explanation over con-
10The web model of explanation then, is not just a reiteration of her view. She focuses
on arguing against the metaphysical and methodological seamlessness that new mechanists
(arguably) suppose, and then gives a general picture of how we should proceed. But her view
is (not yet) a worked out model of explanation
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Language switching
ACC
Caudate Nucleus
Sleep deprivation
Task switching
kind-of
Inhibition Selection
component-of
Figure 5.2: Example of web model explanation
stitutive mechanistic explanations. First, any kind of variable can directly
influence the explanandum: whether it be a neural, cognitive, or perhaps even
environmental variable. In constitutive mechanisms, cognitive variables can
only influence the explanandum if they share a constitutive element with the
explanandum (more on this in the next chapter). In the web model, sleep
deprivation can be taken up as an explanatory element of language switching
performance if it can manipulate the explanandum in the right way, regardless
of its constitutive elements. The reason that this is advantageous is that consti-
tutive elements do not always have a more stable manipulation relation to the
explanandum (see section 5.2).
This means that explanations that only contain cognitive variables can
also be explanatory. Here I argue against those who see cognitive models as
an incomplete version of mechanistic explanation—they call cognitive analyses
“mechanism sketches” (Piccinini and Craver, 2011). As others have argued,
explanations in psychology and neuroscience often do not and do not have
to include mechanistic details (Barrett, 2009; Chemero and Silberstein, 2008;
Van Gelder, 1998; Weiskopf, 2015; Woodward, 2017a).11
Second, the shift of focus from the constitutive relation as the cornerstone of
a successful explanation makes the problems with finding constitutive relations
based on interventionism less urgent, see section 5.3. Especially constitutive
relations between cognitive and neural variables are di cult to find in experi-
mental practice. Because the web model includes constitutive relations only as
one of the explanatory relations (and not the main one), it does not su↵er from
this problem in the same way.
Third, manipulation relations in the web model can be specified very
precisely. By following the guidelines that I discussed in section 3.4 —specificity,
11See (Craver and Kaplan, 2018) for a recent defence and clarification of the idea that
mechanistic theory entails that we should include as many mechanistic details as we can.
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proportionality, determinacy, systematicity, stability, and proliferation—we can
be very specific about what kinds of manipulation relations exist between the
variables in the web model. For example, we can (and should) specify the
range of manipulations, in the way that manipulating the proficiency of second
language from level A2 to B1 has an e↵ect on language switching performance
from 80 percent correct to 95 percent correct. Also, the stability of causal rela-
tions should be made clear. For example: manipulating the ACC has an e↵ect
on task switching performance, except when proficiency is too low, or when the
ACC is only marginally manipulated, etc. Furthermore, the determinacy (how
likely it is that the manipulation relation obtains) and systematicity (the shape
of the manipulation relation) should be specified.
Strictly speaking, this might not be a real advantage over constitutive mecha-
nistic explanations, because here too, requiring the same kind of precision could
be an added requirement. But for the web model, this requirement is made very
explicit, which justifies adding this as an advantage of this model.
5.4.2 Overview of relations
What are the possible relations between variables in the web model of
explanation? Table 5.1 gives an overview. Throughout this thesis, I have
distinguished between cognitive and neural variables. My use of cognitive
categories, as I have explained in chapter 2 is very broad and includes
computational functions. The category of neural variables is also quite broad,
and includes neural activation, neural connectivity, and structural features of
the brain. This interpretation lines up well with neuroimaging research. In
neuroimaging studies, there is quite a strict separation of the category of cog-
nitive entities (tasks, capacities, cognitive processing etc) and neural entities
(neural activity, structural brain features, connectivity, etc).
Besides the cognitive-neural division, there are two main types of relations
that I have discussed in chapter 3 and 4: causal relations and dependency re-
lations. A dependency relation obtains if it is not possible to manipulate one
variable without thereby manipulating the other. The subtypes are synonymity,
kind-of and component-of relations. Combining these possibilities gives rise to
eight possible types of relationships: causal and dependency relations between
two neural variables, causal relations and dependency relations between a neural
variable and a cognitive variable (in both directions) and causal and depen-
dency relations between two cognitive variables. Below, I will discuss these
relationships briefly.
First, there are causal relations between neural variables. When building
explanations in cognitive neuroscience (as well as in most other sciences), it is
very important to know when two neural variables stand in a causal relation
to each other: interacting structures are the bread and butter of most sciences.
In cognitive neuroscience, this relation comes up when neuroscientists examine
the structural connections between di↵erent brain areas, such as between the
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and MFG (Medial Frontal Gyrus) in Grant
et al.’s study (2015). Here, the ACC and the MFG stand in a causal relation
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Relation Example
n C n ACC ! MFG
n D n Sensory neurons are a kind-of neuron
n C c ACC ! GTp
n D c —
c C n BI ! ACC
c D n ACC is a component-of BIp
c C c BIprof ! CC
c D c WM is synonymous-with STM
Table 5.1: This table shows all possible relations between neural and cognitive
variables. ‘c’ stands for ’cognitive variable’, ’n’ stands for ’neural variable’, ’D’
for ’dependency relation’, and ’C’ for ’causal relation’. For the causal relations,
the variable that comes first is the cause, and the variable that comes second is
the e↵ect. For the dependency relations, the first variable is the “higher-level
variable” (if it concerns a hierarchical relation such as kind-of or component-of).
to each other, see chapter 6 for an elaboration of this study.
Second, there can be dependency relations between neural variables. Syno-
nymity and the kind-of relation between neural variables obtain in neuroscience,
for example when “neuron” and “nerve cell” are used synonymously and when
sensory neurons are considered a kind-of neuron. The component-of relation
is used for example when we want to find out which components of a neuron
contribute to its action potential and how they do so exactly. As I have argued
previously, I take constitutive relations to be component-of relations.
Then, there are neural variables that have a causal influence on cogni-
tive variables. This relationship is relatively uncontroversial, especially on a
di↵erence-making view of causation. Changing the visual cortex area V1 will
have a profound e↵ect on someone’s visual perception, disturbing hormonal
balance will impact mood and appetite, and (temporarily) lesioning Broca’s
area will manipulate someone’s speech performance. In the web model’s
interpretation of Abutalebi et al.’s study (2011) that I discuss in chapter 6,
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) has a causal influence on general task
switching. Structural changes in the ACC can influence performance of general
task switching (GTp).
Can there be dependency relations between a neural and cognitive variable
in which the neural variable is the higher-level variable? I find it hard to
imagine how a cognitive variable can be a kind-of neural variable (though
perhaps reductionists would disagree). Furthermore, the component-of relation
is never applied with the neural variable as the higher-level variable. While
these relationships are technically allowed in the web model of explanation, I
will not pay much attention to them.
Fifth, cognitive variables can have an e↵ect on neural variables. Take for
example the e↵ect that memory practice had on hippocampal volume in London
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taxi drivers. Another example is when fear leads to heart palpitations: if
someone is afraid of dogs, the thought of encountering a dog in an alleyway
will make their heart pound. In Abutalebi et al.’s study (2011), bilingualism
(BI) has a structural e↵ect on the ACC.
Then, there could be dependency relations between cognitive and neural
variables, where the cognitive variable is the higher-level variable. Again, I
find it hard to conceptualise how there can be a synonymous relation between
a cognitive and neural variable, or how a neural variable could be a kind-of
cognitive variable. But the component-of relation seems like a possibility here,
especially if it is conceived of as a constitutive relation. The ACC could be a
constitutive element of bilingual performance (BIp). However, establishing this
relation in neuroscientific practice is not always easy, as I have explained in
section 5.3.3. The web model of explanation does allow for this relation to be
established, even if in practice it might not happen often.
The last two sets of relations that are supported by the web model of
explanation are causal and dependency relations between cognitive variables.
As we have seen in chapter 4, these are both possible and interesting relations
for neuroscientific explanations. There are various sorts of dependency relations
between two cognitive variables: working memory (WM) is (near-)synonymous
with short-term memory (STM), working memory is a kind-of memory, and
encoding is a component-of working memory.
Causal relations between two cognitive variables obtain for example when
impaired visual perception causes distorted memories of a certain event, or when
bilingual proficiency (BIprof) has a causal influence on cognitive control (CC)
in bilingual language processing.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued that we should use the web model of explanation
as the explanatory framework for cognitive neuroscience. The mechanistic
model as Craver proposes it, which is currently much in vogue, relies too much
on constitutive relations. After introducing the mechanistic model, I argued
that for proper explanations, the supervenience base is not necessarily the
same as the explanatory base. If we accept the main premise of Craver and
Woodward’s theories, manipulation and control is the most important feature
of a good explanation. Sometimes, manipulation and control is better achieved
by identifying causal relations with the explanandum, rather than finding its
constitutive base.
There is another argument for diminishing the scope of constitutive relations
in an explanatory model: the challenge of finding constitutive relations with
interventionism. I explained the current debate on this incoherence challenge,
which rests on the combination of interventionist causation and the superve-
nience of the mental on the physical.
I argued that while Krickel’s adaptation of Craver’s mutual manipulability
criterion (2018) seems promising, it will not work for cognitive neuroscience.
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Her account draws too much on knowing the spatio-temporal relations between
variables; information which is not always available for cognitive variables.
Rather, we should go with Baumgartner and Gebharter’s solution (2015), for
which I countered Krickel’s criticism in section 5.3.3. This still leaves us with
the challenge that in experimental practice, it is hard to establish constitutive
relations, especially between cognitive and neural variables.
Some of the practice of neuroscience might be informed by implicit or explicit
mechanistic assumptions. But I have shown that thinking in terms of mecha-
nistic constitution does not add anything to research that tries to establish the
relations between variables empirically. The web model emphasises that there
is more than constitution. If we only focus on constitutive mechanistic expla-
nations, we miss out on other good explanatory relations.
Instead of restricting the shape that an explanation can take a priori, the
web model of explanation takes all dependency and causal relations between
variables seriously. It does not necessarily prioritise neural over cognitive
variables and does not rely on hierarchical constitutive relations. This means
that the web model of explanation grants a proper place to cognitive variables
as explanandum or as explanans. What results is a model that emphasises
precision and manipulation and control, and follows nature in determining the
exact shape of the explanation.
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Explanations in experimental practice

Chapter 6
Explanations in
experimental practice
Explanations in cognitive neuroscience are constructed in experimental practice.
The models of explanation that we come up with should work in this experi-
mental context. In the last chapter, I introduced the web model of explanation
and argued that it is a better model than the constitutive mechanistic model
of explanation. But good explanations should also work in practice. Moreover,
good models should change experimental practice, or at least the interpretation
thereof.
In this chapter I show how following the web model of explanation rather
than the mapping model (based on mapping relations) or the constitutive
mechanistic model can change (the interpretation of) experimental practice.
Removing the focus on mapping relations and constitutive relations changes
the way we look at neuroimaging studies: we interpret the data di↵erently and
ultimately should fine-tune the way we set up experiments. I will start with a
study by Abutalebi et al. (2011) about the relation between bilingualism and
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). I explain the set-up of the experiment,
and show what reasoning the authors use to get to their conclusions. I will
argue that this reasoning is based on a mapping model.
The mapping model runs into problems for reasons familiar from chapter 2:
it rests on problematic assumptions about mapping relations between cognitive
and neural variables, and does not give us specific information about how the
variables relate. The constitutive mechanistic model fares better, but in section
6.1.4, I show why the web model is superior.
Then, in section 6.2, I analyse another neuroimaging study, which examines
the relation between cognitive control and language learning (Grant et al., 2015).
Again, the mapping model and the constitutive mechanistic model are not the
right fit. The web model, on the other hand, forces us to be precise about the
variables we are dealing with, and fits experimental practice well. All in all,
this chapter makes it clear why explanations based on the web model should be
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preferred to those based on the mapping norm and the constitutive mechanistic
model; for theoretical, as well as practical reasons.
6.1 Bilingualism and the ACC
In this section, I introduce a study from the neuroimaging literature about
the relation between bilingualism and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). I
discuss how the data of this study can be interpreted within the framework of the
three models of explanation: the mapping model, the constitutive mechanistic
model, and the web model. But first I elaborate on the experimental set-up of
this study.
Abutalebi et al. (2011) want to know how bilinguals are able to control their
languages. More specifically: does bilingualism a↵ect conflict monitoring, and
if so, how? They devise their experiment on the basis of previous research,
which shows that “bilinguals use neural regions similar to those responsible
for nonverbal cognitive control including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), the prefrontal cortex, and the causate nuclei” (2011, p. 2076). So,
because language control and general, nonverbal control are linked to similar
areas in the brain, the researchers want to know whether this perhaps leads to
an advantage for bilinguals in general switching tasks. And if this is so, what
are the neural correlates that support this advantage? The authors hypothesise
that it is primarily the ACC that is responsible for this behavioural advantage.
In order to test this prediction, they gave a group of bilinguals and a group
of monolinguals two di↵erent tasks: a linguistic switching task and a conflict
monitoring task. For the bilinguals, the first was a language switching task in
which the participants had to name an object in either German or Italian. For
each trial, a green or blue square preceding the object indicated which language
the bilinguals had to use. If the participants had to use a di↵erent language on
consecutive trials, this was considered “switching”.
The monolinguals were given a linguistic task in which they had to use
either a verb or noun to name an object. If they had to use a di↵erent kind
of grammatical category on consecutive trials, then this was a switching trial
for the monolinguals. The conflict monitoring task for both groups was the
Flanker task, in which participants have to indicate the direction of an arrow.
This arrow is either flanked by arrows in the opposite direction (incongruent
trials), in the same direction (congruent trials) or by lines without arrowheads
(neutral trials). Bilinguals and monolinguals were given the linguistic task and
the flanker task in one session, and there were two sessions in total. Abutalebi
et al. recorded behavioural data such as reaction times and error rates, and also
measured brain activity with fMRI and structural data (grey matter density
volume) of the ACC.
Their results indicate that bilinguals improved their performance of the
Flanker task when comparing reaction times of the second session compared
to the first session. Monolinguals did not show this improvement. This means
that the bilinguals were able to improve their performance of conflict monitoring
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over time, while monolinguals were not.
The fMRI data showed first that for the bilinguals and monolinguals,
doing the language switching task (or its monolingual version) activated the
ACC. Second, the area that was activated for both tasks in both groups was
the (dorsal) ACC. Third, the activity in the ACC during the Flanker task
in the second session was reduced for the bilingual group compared to the
monolingual group. Finally, structural analysis showed that for bilinguals, there
was a positive correlation between grey matter volume density and behavioural
measures, and also a positive correlation between brain activity in the ACC and
grey matter volume density.
From these results, Abutalebi et al. propose that bilinguals are indeed better
than monolinguals at adapting to conflicts. This is shown by the increased
performance of bilinguals on the second Flanker task. They are able to do
so, because bilingual experience “tunes” the ACC to deal better with conflict.
Furthermore, from the finding that for bilinguals compared to monolinguals,
there was less activity in the ACC during the second Flanker task, the research-
ers conclude that “bilinguals require fewer neural resources to monitor cognitive
conflict in [the right ACC]”(2011, p. 2085). So, with increased performance,
came less neural activity in the ACC.
Apparently, being bilingual comes with neuroplastic changes in the dorsal
ACC which allows them to adapt to conflicts better than monolinguals. This
is shown by the positive correlations between grey matter volume density
and behavioural measures and between grey matter volume density and brain
activity in the ACC.
6.1.1 Mapping model
On what model of explanation do Abutalebi et al. (2011) base their reasoning
and their results? In this section, I will first check whether this could be
explained on a model based on the mapping norm. What do I mean with a
model of explanation that is based on the mapping norm? Essentially, this refers
to a model in which mapping relations between neural and cognitive categories
take centre stage. One example of such a model is the Deductive Nomological
model, as I have argued in chapter 3. The laws that allow for deducing the
explanandum on the DN model are the mapping relations that we find between
neural and cognitive categories.
But I have argued that neuroscientists can focus on mapping relations
without fully endorsing the DN model. A model that centres on mapping re-
lations (the “mapping model”, for short) does not necessarily think of these
mapping relations as exception-less laws, for example. So the mapping model
is broader than the DN model, even though it shares many of its features. This
will become clearer as I explain Abutalebi et al.’s study along the lines of a
mapping model.
Abutalebi et al. want to investigate the relation between bilingualism, task
switching, and the role of the ACC. Abstracting away, the researchers want
to explain why bilingualism (BI) has an e↵ect on performance of conflict
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monitoring (CMp). Why are bilinguals better at adapting to conflict monitoring
than monolinguals? They want to explain: BI ! CMp.
In short, their explanation is that bilinguals are better than monolinguals
in adapting to conflict monitoring, because their experience with language
switching has created structural changes in the ACC, which is also responsible
for conflict monitoring. On the mapping model, this reasoning would look
something like the following:
1. Conflict monitoring maps to the (dorsal) ACC.
2. Language switching maps to the ACC.
3. Observation: bilinguals are better at adapting to the conflict monitoring
task.
4. Observation: bilinguals have less neural activity in the ACC while
performing the second conflict monitoring task.
5. Less neural activity means using neural resources more e ciently.
6. Observation: better behavioural performance of cognitive tasks correlated
with a higher grey matter density.
7. Higher grey matter volume density is a structural change that is associated
with better behavioural performance.
8. Conclusion: Bilinguals use the neural resources in the ACC better, because
their bilingual experience has caused structural changes in the ACC (in
terms of grey matter density). This structural change in the ACC means
that they are better able to adapt to conflict monitoring.
Note that this is not a formal derivation, in that the conclusions do not
logically follow the premises. However, this list does reflect the key observations
and underlying assumptions that the researchers make. If we accept the premises
and observations, the conclusion does follow. So in that sense, this reasoning is
correct. However, there are a few problems with this model.
First of all, I think that assumption number 5—that less neural activity
means using neural resources more e ciently—is quite substantial, and possibly
not true. It seems to me that a contrasting assumption is also often made in the
neuroimaging literature: less neural activity means that the cognitive process
that is associated with the area is not so much involved in accomplishing the
cognitive task, or even not at all.
It could be argued that in this study, there is not much di↵erence between
doing a cognitive process more e ciently and not engaging in the cognitive
process so much. I think in general, it is substantially di↵erent, especially in
studies in which researchers try to prove that a certain cognitive process is
necessary for another process. For example, a study about autobiographical
memories (Arshamian et al., 2013) found more extensive activation in the
right middle frontal gyrus (DLPC) when those memories were cued by smell
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rather than words. This area has also been linked to people experiencing
autobiographical memories as more emotional. This is why the researchers
speculate that the more extensive activation in the DLPC is the reason why
people experience autobiographical memories cued by smell as more emotional.
In this study, then, less extensive activation in an area means that the
associated cognitive process (an emotional feeling) occurred less, rather than
that it was more e cient (or perhaps in this case: more automatic). Because the
researchers state they are only speculating, I am not attacking their study. But
it does make clear that the association between less activation and performing
a cognitive process more e ciently is muddled.
Another reason why the assumption is empty is that the opposite neural
activation pattern could have supported the same reasoning. If the researchers
found that there was more activation in the ACC for bilinguals during the
second conflict monitoring task, they could have argued that this is because they
were better at it. In a study about emotional discrimination, such correlations
between performance and more neural activation were found (Gur et al., 1994).
As I will explain later on, my web model is better able to capture and test the
supposed relation between neural activity and e cient use of neural resources,
without assuming a certain relation between them from the outset.
Second, there are the problems associated with using mapping relations like 1
and 2. In order for the reasoning employed by Abutalebi et al. to be valid, there
needs to be a one-to-one structure-function mapping or a one-to-two structure-
function mapping. That is, the researchers assume that when they observe
activity in the ACC, this neural activity is mapped to either conflict monitoring
or language switching (the one-to-two mapping). Alternatively, we could say
that they group together conflict monitoring and language switching into one
category: task switching. In this case, there is a one-to-one mapping between
the ACC and task switching.
But the problem is that if there were other cognitive variables that would
map onto the ACC, then the reasoning would not be valid, because then it could
be that during the experiment, the activity found in the ACC did not represent
task switching. And that subsequently invalidates the conclusion that the ACC
is ultimately responsible for the fact that bilinguals are better at adapting to
conflict. This corresponds to the fallacy of reverse inference as a deductive
inference, as I explained in chapter 2.
Indeed, we hardly ever find one-to-one (or one-to-two) mappings between
neural and cognitive variables. The ACC for example, has also been linked
to a↵ect (Bush et al., 2000). I am not saying that I think the activity found
in the ACC in this particular study is not linked to task switching. But we
do not know whether the activity represents task switching. Because of these
problems—unsupported assumptions and incomplete derivations, the model of
explanation based on the mapping norm is not ideal.
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Figure 6.1: Abutalebi et al.’s results on mechanistic model of explanation.
BI: bilingualism (cognitive variable).
Nn: activation in some neural structure (neural variables).
CMp: conflict monitoring performance (cognitive variable).
ACC: activation in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (neural variable)
6.1.2 The ACC, cognitive control, and the constitutive
mechanistic model
Perhaps the constitutive mechanistic model of explanation fares better as an
explanatory framework for Abutalebi et al.’s data? I propose that a constitutive
mechanistic model would look something like figure 6.1. We can see here that
bilingual language processing is constituted by a number of neural structures,
among which the ACC. These neural structures interact causally with each
other. Below, conflict monitoring is also constituted by a set of neural structures,
among which the ACC.
The explanation of why bilingualism influences conflict monitoring per-
formance is then that they are both constituted (partly) by the ACC. If
bilingualism and the ACC are constitutively related, Craver’s mutual manipula-
bility criterion states that there are manipulation relations between them in both
directions: manipulating the ACC can have an influence on bilingualism, and
bilingualism can have an influence on the ACC. This explains how bilingualism
can “tune” the ACC: bilingualism can manipulate the ACC.
Subsequently, the ACC can manipulate conflict monitoring. Because they
are also constitutively related, there can be manipulation relations in both
directions. Interpreting Abutalebi et al.’s data on a mechanistic model would
explain their findings: bilingualism trains the ACC and a trained ACC performs
better at conflict monitoring.
Note that I am not saying figure 6.1 is a complete constitutive mechanistic
141
BI ACC CMp
Figure 6.2: Abutalebi et al.’s results on web model of explanation.
BI: bilingualism (cognitive variable).
CMp: performance of conflict monitoring (cognitive variable).
ACC: activation in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (neural variable)
explanation. The variables in this study form the beginning of what a con-
stitutive mechanistic explanation would look like. To complete it, we would
need to add more levels, and find out what the other neural variables are that
constitutute bilingualism and conflict monitoring. But to form this complete
explanation on a constitutive mechanistic model, this is where the variables
would fit. This same reasoning applies to the web model application in the next
section, and to the figures in section 6.2: these figures are just the beginning of
a full explanation.
6.1.3 The ACC and the web model of explanation
The constitutive mechanistic model fares better as an explanatory framework
for Abutalebi et al.’s data than the mapping model, because it does not rely
on mistaken assumptions. But I propose that Abutalebi et al.’s data can and
should be interpreted with the web model of explanation.
In the web model interpretation of the study, there are two causal relations
that together would prove the hypothesis that bilingualism has an e↵ect on
performance of conflict monitoring, see figure 6.2. The first is that bilingualism
has a causal e↵ect on the ACC and the second is that the ACC has a causal
e↵ect on conflict monitoring. I will first detail how Abutalebi et al.’s data fit this
explanatory model. Then, in section 6.1.4 I will list the advantages of analysing
Abutalebi et al.’s study on the web model of explanation.
What kind of evidence would we need to establish the sequence of causes in
figure 6.2? The first step is to define the variables well, by specifying at least
some non-determinable necessities and the determination dimensions that we
would look at. Bilingualism (BI) is the capacity of regularly processing two
or more languages, in this case German and Italian. So a non-determinable
necessity of the variable BI would for example be: “regularly processing
language”. This is something that every participant has in common and which
is not varied. The main determination dimension is the number of languages,
which varies from 1 in the monolinguals to at least 2 in the bilinguals.
Specifying the ACC variable is slightly more complicated. The non-
determinable necessity would be the neural region that is usually described as
the ACC. The determination dimensions could be the extent of neural activation
when performing switching tasks, which can (theoretically) vary from zero
neurons to all of them. Another determination dimension could be the density
of grey matter volume.
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Last, conflict monitoring performance (CMp) has the non-determinable
necessity that someone performs a conflict monitoring task, and has “reaction
time” (measured in ms) and “error rate” (measured in number of errors) as its
determination dimensions. In order to establish a causal relation between BI
and ACC, manipulating BI must result in at least some change of ACC. And
indeed, as Abutalebi et al. show, bilingualism does have an e↵ect on the extent
of neural activation when performing a switching task: over time, there is less
extensive activation of the ACC. Moreover, bilingualism has an e↵ect on the
grey matter density.
Subsequently, varying these determination dimensions of the ACC would
have to have an influence on CMp in order to establish the causal link between
them. So, manipulating the extent of activation of the ACC would have to
influence the performance of conflict monitoring. Or alternatively, a change
in grey matter density of the ACC would have to influence the performance
of conflict monitoring. This particular set of manipulations has not been
established by Abutalebi et al. 1
Of course, establishing these kinds of manipulations is a general problem for
neuroimaging studies, because neuroscientists generally do not manipulate the
neural variables, but instead try to infer the relations from correlations between
cognitive and neural variables. There are exceptions such as TMS (transcranial
magnetic stimulation) which temporarily interfere with brain activation in
certain areas to see what this does to cognitive functioning, but TMS would not
be able to interfere with activation in the ACC because it is not near enough to
the skull.
But interventionism allows for causal inferences even if the manipulations
cannot be performed directly. What we can do in neuroimaging studies is to
find participants that have an ACC with a bigger grey matter density than
average. By letting this group, as well as a group of controls perform conflict
monitoring tasks, we can get evidence about what would happen to conflict
monitoring performance if the ACC were manipulated.
My model then proposes that Abutalebi et al.’s reasoning is not entirely
complete. Is this a problem for my model? No, because this set of manipulations
would have also been necessary for establishing the reasoning on a mechanis-
tic model. In order to say that the ACC (along with other neural variables)
constitutes CMp, we would need to say that a manipulation of CMp leads to a
manipulation of the ACC (or other neural variables in the constitutive basis),
and also that a manipulation of ACC leads to a manipulation of CMp. In
addition, we would need to prove that every manipulation of CMp has some
e↵ect on one of its constituents.
1Note that causation is not necessarily transitive in this way. Proving the two causal
relations does not conclusively prove that BI ! CMp. But Abutalebi et al. have already
proved that bilingualism has a causal influence on conflict monitoring, because the bilinguals
increased their performance on the conflict monitoring task compared to monolinguals. Still,
to conclusively prove that bilingualism causes increased conflict monitoring performance,
because of the changes in the ACC, would require another study. In this study we would
need to test the causal influence of bilingualism on conflict monitoring performance while
holding the functional and structural characteristics of the ACC fixed.
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So not only is the manipulation relation from the ACC to CMp necessary in
both models, following the mechanistic model requires more manipulation rela-
tions for it to be true. Compared to the web model, the additional intervention
relations would be: i) an intervention on the ACC leads to an intervention
on BI, ii) every intervention on BI leads to some intervention on one of its
constituents, iii) an intervention on CMp leads to an intervention on the ACC,
and iv) every intervention on CMp leads to some intervention on one of its
constituents.
6.1.4 Advantages of the web model
In the previous sections I have shown how the analysis of Abutalebi et al.’s
results would di↵er between taking the mapping model, the constitutive mecha-
nistic model, and the web model as an explanatory framework. Below, I argue
that we should prefer the web model. I will go through the advantages of the
web model that I mentioned in chapter 5 and show how they apply in an expe-
rimental context.
That the web model is better than the mapping model, should already be
clear. The web model includes much more information about the relations
between the variables beyond saying that there is some mapping between them.
Also note that the web model does not need to assume anything about a certain
structure-function mapping relation (one-to-one or many-to-one). Furthermore,
the web model does not include assumptions about the correspondence between
less neural activity and more e cient use of neural resources (see number 5 in
section 6.1.1).
Second, the web model is also better than the constitutive mechanistic
model. I argued in chapter 5 that when causal relations are epistemically
more stable than constitutive relations, they are also more explanatory. In
the context of Abutalebi et al.’s study, this means that even if the ACC turns
out not to be a constitutive element of bilingualism and/or conflict monitoring,
it can still be taken up in an explanation of why bilingualism has an influence
on conflict monitoring. The researchers found that the ACC functions in stable
manipulation relations with bilingualism (and possibly also conflict monitoring).
According to the web model, it is then up to science to find out what the relation
between the cognitive variables (BI and CMp) and the ACC is. The manipu-
lation relations will tell us whether there are causal or constitutive relations
between them.
Then, in section 5.3 I argued that in an experimental context, it is hard
to find constitutive relations between cognitive and neural variables. This
problem applies to the second and fourth added manipulation relations that
are necessary for establishing constitution: ii) every intervention on BI leads to
some intervention on one of its constituents, and iv) every intervention on CMp
leads to some intervention on one of its constituents. These are similar, in that
they require all interventions on a cognitive variable (BI or CMp) to result
in some intervention of one of the neural variables that supposedly constitute
it. These manipulation relations are key if we want to di↵erentiate between
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constitution and bidirectional causation. But establishing them is problematic,
because the number of possible components is large. This is because we cannot
be aided by spatial relations between the variables (as is the case for two neural
variables) or by similarity in function of two variables (as is the case for two
cognitive variables).
The last advantage I want to discuss here is that the web model forces us to
be very precise about the interpretation of the variables that we include in the
model. In this study, if we look at those interpretations closely, the constitutive
mechanistic model actually runs into problems. Take the supposed constitutive
relation between bilingualism and the ACC. The variable bilingualism can be
understood in at least two ways: the capacity or skill of speaking more than
two languages (or perhaps the regular experience of bilingual processing), and
secondly bilingual performance—the performance of some cognitive operation
that deals with bilingual input.
Abutalebi et al. vary between the two understandings of the variable BI.
Their main finding is that bilingualism “tunes” the ACC. This seems to indicate
that they see BI as the capacity of bilingualism or the regular experience of
bilingual processing. When they investigate whether BI has an influence on the
ACC, they understand the variable BI in this way: they contrast bilinguals (who
have the capacity of bilingualism or regular experience with bilingual processing)
with monolinguals to see how their activation in the ACC di↵ers.
But the opposite manipulation relation—the influence of the ACC on
bilingual language processing—must understand BI as bilingual performance.
Manipulations of the ACC will not change bilinguals into monolinguals or vice
versa. Rather, they influence the performance of bilingual processing.
As a counterargument, we could note that the capacity of bilingualism is
deeply intertwined, or even defined by bilingual performance. So in fact we are
dealing with the same variable in both manipulation relations. This could be
true for BI. But for CMp, conflict monitoring performance, this would be more
di cult. We manipulate the ACC by varying conditions in a conflict monitoring
paradigm, while manipulating the ACC results in a change of conflict monitoring
performance. It would be hard (and wrong) to argue that a cognitive task is
the same as performance of that task (see also section 4.3.2).
In any case it is good to realise that in the web model of explanation, we do
not have to make that move in the first place. The web model is not based on
constitutive relations, and it is perfectly acceptable that there are two di↵erent
variables for bilingualism and for conflict monitoring. The causal relations in
figure 6.2 do not require that the ACC has a causal influence on bilingualism as
a capacity, or that conflict monitoring performance has to be a cause of changes
in the ACC. In the web model of explanation, we can define variables in the
way that suits their role in the manipulation relations that we find in nature.
So, the web model provides a good framework for recognising these variations
in variable definition. Trying to specify the non-determinable necessities and
the determination dimensions of a variable makes clear that BI and CMp can
have two di↵erent interpretations. Constructing explanations on the web model
requires precision in specifying these variables.
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The advantages that I have outlined in this section indicate a normative
claim about the web model versus the mechanistic model. Not only can the
web model be used to interpret Abutalebi et al.’s findings; it is also better at it.
Because it circumvents the problems with constitution, and it forces us to be
precise about variables, the web model should be preferred over the constitutive
mechanistic model.
6.2 Cognitive control and language learning
The web model of explanation also works for other neuroimaging studies. In
this section, I will apply it to a study by Grant et al. (2015). They asked a
similar (but di↵erent) question to Abutalebi et al: what is the role of cognitive
control over the time-course of learning a second language? Applying the web
model of explanation to this study will show some extra advantages of this
model over the mapping model and mechanistic model. The web model allows
us to be precise about the exact question that is asked, and also takes cognitive
variables seriously as explananda.
In more detail, Grant et al. want to provide neural evidence to prove one of
two hypotheses: H1 predicts that the role of cognitive control increases when
proficiency increases, and H2 predicts that the role of cognitive control decreases
when proficiency increases. Both have some intuitive appeal. Perhaps bilinguals
need more cognitive control when proficiency increases: as they get better at
their second language they have more information to control. Or alternatively,
as they increase their proficiency, controlling their languages becomes easier,
and hence they need less cognitive control.
In order to substantiate one of the two hypotheses, they asked English
speaking participants to perform a semantic judgement task at two di↵erent
sessions. These English speakers were doing a Spanish course, so their
proficiency of Spanish increased from the first to the second sessions. In the
semantic judgement task, they were presented with words that were either
English words, Spanish words, or words that are found in both languages, with
di↵erent meanings (homologues). Participants were asked to judge whether a
word was Spanish or not, and respond a rmatively for homologues.
Grant et al. used fMRI to find out about neural activity for judging Spanish
words compared to English words. They found that participants had less
neural activity in typical control areas (such as the Anterior Cingulate Cortex,
Inferior Frontal Gyrus and Middle Frontal Gyrus) for this contrast in session
2, compared to session 1. Subsequently, connection analyses2 showed that with
increased proficiency, connections between control areas were weakened. The
researchers found that “connections between the MFG and other areas of the
control network (e.g., IFG and MFG [Medial Frontal Gyrus]) have weakened,
and the connection with the ACC is lost entirely” (Grant et al., 2015, p. 45).
Furthermore, connections with meaning processing areas, such as the MTG
(Middle Temporal Gyrus) and IFG increase. These results leads Grant et al.
2A euSEM connectivity analysis
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BIprof CC
CNa/c
Figure 6.3: Grant et al.’s results as they interpret them.
BIprof: proficiency of bilinguals (cognitive variable).
CC: cognitive control (cognitive variable).
CNa neural activation in control areas (neural variable).
CNc: connectivity between control areas (neural variable).
CNa,c combines neural activation and connectivity in and between control areas
(neural variable.
to infer that as their proficiency of Spanish increases, bilinguals are better able
to focus on semantic processing, and need less cognitive control. They support
H2: cognitive control decreases with increased proficiency.
How can we break down the argument pattern that the researchers use?
Essentially, they say that an increase in proficiency of bilinguals (BIprof)
causes a decrease in cognitive control (CC), because i) BIprof causes decreased
activation in control areas (CNa) and decreased connectivity between control
areas (CNc), and ii) decreased CC maps to decreased CNa and CNc. See figure
6.3 for a graphic representation of this reasoning.3 Because this reasoning uses
mapping relations, they follow what I call “the mapping model of explanation”.
Part ii) of this argument is quite substantial, and not proven by the research-
ers in their study. It is a statement about the mapping between CNa/c and
CC: the cognitive process of cognitive control maps onto the neural variables of
activation in and connectivity between cognitive control areas. For the argument
to work, the structure-function mapping must be one-to-one, or many-to-one.
The activation and interconnectivity in these neural areas must correspond only
to cognitive control. Otherwise, these neural data could correspond to other
cognitive variables that are unrelated to the study.
But this assumption is problematic: these areas might be called cognitive
control areas, but they also have other functions. As I mentioned before, the
ACC has also been linked to a↵ect (Bush et al., 2000). And the (left) IFG and
(left) MFG are also important areas in the articulatory network (Ma˚rtensson
et al., 2012). Cognitive control then, does not map onto that set of neural
areas in a one-to-one or many-to-one fashion. So the mapping model runs into
3With the variable CNa/c, I am lumping together decreased connectivity between control
areas and increased connectivity with areas connected to semantic processing. I do this to
simplify the reasoning that Grant et al. use. I think it is justified, because in some sense the
increase in connectivity with semantic processing areas just serves to fortify the finding that
connectivity between control areas decreases. So, the variable CNa/c represents “connectivity
data” in general.
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CN CC
BN
Figure 6.4: Grant et al.’s results on mechanistic model of explanation.
BN: activation in bilingual processing regions (neural variable).
BI: bilingual processing (cognitive variable).
CN: activation in cognitive control regions (neural variable).
CC: cognitive control (cognitive variable).
problems.
Perhaps the researchers mean that these cognitive control areas cause
(among other things) cognitive control. Then, we would replace the line between
CC and CN in figure 6.3 with an arrow from CNa/c to CC. This would save
their conclusion: BIprof has a causal influence on CC because BIprof causes
CNa/c and CNa/c causes CC. An increase in bilingual language proficiency
causes decrease of activation and connectivity in cognitive control areas, which
subsequently causes a decrease in cognitive control processing. But this causal
influence from CNa/c to CC is also not established by Grant et al.’s study.
Replacing the mapping relation by a causal relation is more in line with the
web model of explanation. But in section 6.2.3, I will explain why this picture
is not quite the right analysis. I will show that we need to be aware of the
dependency relations that come into play between these variables.
6.2.1 Cognitive control, language learning, and the mecha-
nistic model
What would the constitutive mechanists say about Grant et al.’s study? They
would probably propose a model such as the one in figure 6.4. Here, the activity
of a set of neural regions (BN) is bilingual processing (BI), the activity of
another set of neural regions (CN) is cognitive control (CC). Proficiency of
bilinguals has an e↵ect on cognitive control, because CN (possibly along with
other areas) constitutes BN.
But there is no adequate evidence to support this interpretation. First, it
is doubtful whether CN does constitute BN . Constitutive relations between
neural variables are only possible if there is also some spatial containment.
Constitutive mechanistic explanations explain an explanandum in terms of
its constitutive parts. These “parts” have to be discovered through Craver’s
mutual manipulation method, but they must also be spatially contained in
the mechanism. Although spatial containment is not the primary criterion
for establishing constitutive relations, new mechanists such as Craver assume
148
that spatial containment and functional componency generally align (see section
5.2.2).
The areas that have been linked to cognitive control, however, are not
spatially contained in those linked to bilingual language processing. Generally,
the control network is more extensive than the network for bilingual language
processing (Abutalebi and Green, 2008). This means that the control network is
not spatially contained in the bilingual language processing network, and hence
that the constitutive relation between them is problematic.
More importantly, the constitutive mechanistic model does not reflect the
questions that Grant et al. are interested in, and the data that they provide.
The main question that the researchers ask, is what the influence of proficiency
is on cognitive control in bilingual language processing. But the mechanistic
model in figure 6.4 does not even include the variable proficiency (and this
is not an artefact of my reconstruction). In the next section I will investigate
whether the constitutive mechanistic model could accommodate proficiency, and
conclude that it cannot do so easily or elegantly.
Furthermore, Grant et al. have not researched the areas that supposedly
constitute bilingual processing (BN). In order for the constitutive mechanistic
model to make sense, BN needs to be included. But for their research and
for answering their main question, Grant et al. do not need to investigate BN .
They do not need to know how bilingual processing is constituted, in order to
find out how proficiency influences cognitive control. In section 6.2.3, I will show
that the web model of explanation accommodates Grant et al.’s study better,
because there it is easy to add proficiency and we do not need to add BN .
6.2.2 Adding proficiency?
Defenders of the constitutive mechanistic model might say that we could just
adapt the variable BI to BIprof , to indicate that it is not just bilingual
processing that we are interested in, but the proficiency of bilinguals. Or
alternatively, we should add the variable P as another variable that influences
bilingual language processing in figure 6.4. In this section I will argue that both
options fail. Adapting BI to BIprof distorts the variables we are interested
in, and adding P is not straightforward, because the constitutive mechanistic
model does not allow for causal or dependency relations between two cognitive
variables.
Why can’t we adapt BI to BIprof to reflect that we are dealing with the
proficiency of bilinguals? Here the two interpretations of BI are important,
just like they were for Abutalebi et al.’s study. If we interpret BI as the
capacity of bilingualism, then proficiency is one of its determination dimen-
sions. Every bilingual has some proficiency, and among the group of bilinguals
there can be variation in this proficiency. But if we consider BI to be bilingual
processing, then proficiency is not a determination dimension. Rather, a
bilingual’s proficiency can have some (causal) influence over their bilingual
processing.
Both interpretations of the variable BI are an option for accommodating
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Grant et al.’s study. Their hypothesis could be translated as: how does the
proficiency of the capacity of bilingualism influence cognitive control processing?
Or alternatively: how does proficiency influence bilingual processing, which in
turn influences cognitive control processing? None of these interpretations are
an option in the constitutive mechanistic model, however.
Adapting BI to BIprof in figure 6.4 (in either a capacity- or processing-
interpretation) runs into problems, because it is unlikely that there is a specific
set of neural areas that has bilingual proficiency as its function. BN in this
figure refers to the set of neural areas that have bilingual processing as their
function. If we adapt BI to BIprof , then the interpretation of BN should also
change. But I doubt that this adaptation would be a specific or stable cause.
The full analysis of this variable would make for a long detour, but I think
that there is no particular activation pattern in the brain that corresponds to
a bilingual’s proficiency. I do not expect there to be a “bilingual proficiency
network” in the brain, which functions as a specific, proportional, determinate,
systematic, stable, and/or prolific cause.
On the constitutive mechanistic model, getting this set of neural areas right
is important. In order to establish constitutive relations, it is the variables
BN and CN that are manipulated. Checking whether CN is a constitutive
element of BN requires manipulating CN to see if this changes BN , and vice
versa. In addition, all manipulations of BN should have some e↵ect on one
of its constituents. Therefore, characterising BN (and CN) in the right way
is important for the constitutive mechanistic interpretation of Grant et al.’s
study. At the same time, characterising these variables and manipulating them
is not easily done. What Grant et al. manipulate in this study is the bilinguals’
proficiency, not the neural areas that supposedly have this proficiency as their
function. The web model, as I will argue in the next section, does not require
precise specification or manipulation of the variable BN .
The second option is to add P as a separate variable, which has a causal
influence on bilingual processing. But the constitutive mechanistic model does
not accommodate causal (or dependency) relations between cognitive variables.
As I have explained in section 5.1, the constitutive mechanistic model can
include causal relations between components at the same level, and constitutive
relations between elements at di↵erent levels. So, the only place where variables
can stand in a causal relation to each other in a constitutive mechanistic model
is when they are constitutive elements at the same level.4
New mechanists might argue that P and BI are connected, because they
share constitutive elements. That is, the set of neural variables that constitutes
P overlaps (partly) with the set of neural variables that constitutes BI. This
is how the two variables are connected, and this means that P can be included
in the constitutive mechanistic model. But again, this requires that there is a
set of neural variables that constitutes proficiency. I highly doubt that there
is such a set. Empirical research is needed to back this claim up, but I find it
4Alternatively, on Krickel’s interpretation (2017), there can be causal relations between
variables at di↵erent levels that are constitutively related. But I do not think anyone would
argue that proficiency constitutes bilingual processing, or vice versa.
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BIprof
CC
CNa/c
Figure 6.5: Grant et al.’s results on the web model of explanation.
BIprof: proficiency of bilinguals (cognitive variable).
CC: cognitive control during bilingual language processing (cognitive variable).
CN: activation in cognitive control regions and/or connectivity between cogni-
tive control regions during bilingual language processing (neural variable).
hard to imagine that parts of the brain stand in the right mutual manipulation
relations to proficiency.
Hence, adding proficiency as a separate variable, or adapting BI to BIprof
is not supported by the framework of constitutive mechanistic theory. Therefore
it does not suit experiments like that of Grant et al. At best, the model does
not suit the experiment easily. In the next section, I will argue that the web
model can deal with these issues a lot better.
6.2.3 Applying the web model
Figure 6.5 shows what the interpretation of Grant et al.’s study would look
like on the web model of explanation. In this model, BIprof refers to the
capacity of proficiency of bilinguals. This capacity has a causal influence on
cognitive control processing during bilingual language processing (CC), and
BIprof also has a causal influence on activation and connectivity of control
areas (CN) during bilingual language processing. This means that manipulating
the proficiency of bilinguals would have a causal e↵ect on CC and on CN .
Why is this model more desirable than the constitutive mechanistic model?
First, it allows us to manipulate proficiency explicitly, as a determination
relation of bilingualism. It is useful and important to manipulate proficiency
explicitly, because the whole study is based on the question: what happens to
cognitive control as bilinguals get more proficient? The web model, then, fits
well with what Grant et al. want to investigate.
Second, the web model forces us to be precise about the cognitive control
processing variable. What do Grant et al. mean when they ask what kind of
influence bilingual proficiency has on cognitive control? I think they take cog-
nitive control to be a kind of resource (Klein, 2018). This resource is necessary
for all kinds of tasks, like bilingual language switching and general language
switching. Although cognitive control is unlike a resource such as gasoline for
a car, it still has many of the same features: its availability is necessary for
processes to run, and it is “causally promiscuous” in the sense that many kinds
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of cognitive processes would be a↵ected by a lack of cognitive control. This
interpretation aligns with what Grant et al. have in mind when they say that
bilinguals need less, or more cognitive control as they get more proficient.
How would we prove either of the two hypotheses that Grant et al. test?
We need to know the exact shape of the relation between BIprof and CC. An
increase in BIprof leads to either an increase or decrease of CC. An increase
in CC would indicate that bilinguals need more cognitive control as they get
more proficient, and a decrease shows that they need less cognitive control with
increased proficiency.
How can we measure an increase or decrease of CC? Grant et al. take the
neural route. They assume that a decrease in activation in cognitive control
areas, and a decrease in connectivity between control areas corresponds to a
decrease of cognitive control processing. Conversely, an increase in cognitive
control processing would show up as increased activation in cognitive control
areas and increased connectivity between control areas. I have already argued
in section 6.1.1 that these kinds of assumptions are problematic.
The web model shows how we could still prove the hypothesis. For
example, we could devise an experiment in which cognitive control processing
is hampered by simultaneously giving participants a bilingual language task
and also another cognitive control task. We would manipulate proficiency, by
teaching participants more Spanish (as Grant et al. have done). If cognitive
control is a resource, then arguably it has a limit. Just like working memory
is said to have a maximum capacity, we cannot control an infinite number of
items in a task.
I am not proposing that the capacity of cognitive control is not dynamic.
There might be substantial variation in the capacity of cognitive control
depending on training, or interpersonal variation. But there will be some limit.
So, letting participants perform a cognitive control task simultaneously, would
take up some of their cognitive control resource.
Behavioural results, then, could indicate whether bilinguals need less, or
more cognitive control for their bilingual language processing. If error rates and
reaction times go up as they become more proficient, then they needed more
cognitive control. If error rates and reaction times drop as their proficiency
increases, then they needed less cognitive control. Note that this pattern could
show up in both tasks: the bilingual language switching task or the other cogni-
tive control task. It could be that the increased load on cognitive control results
in worse performance of bilingual language switching, or worse performance of
the other cognitive control task, or both.
This means that technically we do not even need the neural data to prove
the hypothesis. The third advantage is then that my model is able to separate
the two questions: what happens to cognitive control as a cognitive variable as
bilinguals get more proficient, and what happens to the brain as bilinguals get
more proficient? In this second question, cognitive control is interpreted as a
neural variable. The question then becomes about whether bilinguals use more
or less neural resources as they become more proficient.
The second question is indeed answered by recording neural activity and
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connectivity data in the way that Grant et al. have done. If they want to
explain why cognitive control goes down as proficiency goes up with brain data,
then what they need is to establish causal relevance from BIprof to CN . An
increase in the proficiency of bilinguals should decrease activity in cognitive
control areas and decrease connectivity between cognitive control areas. This
pattern is exactly what they found.
Of course, Grant et al. could be interested in both questions: they want
to know the influence of bilinguals’ proficiency on both cognitive control as a
cognitive resource and on the neural areas that have been termed control areas.
This is perfectly fine by the web model. But what the web model reflects, is
that we cannot just assume the relation between the two.
This brings me to a final advantage of the web model: it is up to science to
determine the relation (if there is any) between CC and CNa/c. In figure 6.5
I have not drawn any relation between the two variables. But there are other
options. There could be a constitutive relation between the two variables, in
which CNa/c constitutes CC. The second option is that CNa/c has a causal
influence on CC. Or the reverse could be true: CC has a causal influence on
CNa/c. Last, there could be a bidirectional causal relation between CNa/c and
CC. More empirical work should be done to determine which of the options is
the right one for Grant et al.’s study. Of course, the problems with establishing
constitutive relations that I described in chapter 5 still hold. This is why it is
an advantage of the web model that the other options are also supported.
All in all, the web model captures data from neuroimaging studies such as
those of Abutalebi et al. and Grant et al. in a fundamentally di↵erent way. I have
shown how the web model is more accurate and often more detailed. In Grant
et al.’s case, the web model allows us to manipulate proficiency explicitly and
it forces us to be very precise about what we mean with cognitive control and
thereby separates two questions that Grant et al. seem to conflate. Furthermore,
it does not rely on mapping relations to arrive at the conclusions about the
relation between bilingual proficiency and cognitive control, and instead leaves
it up to science.
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed two neuroscientific experiments. Abutalebi et al.
investigated the role of bilingual’s Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) in cognitive
control. Grant et al. asked whether bilingual proficiency has an influence on
cognitive control in bilingual language processing.
The choice between explanatory models has an influence on how we interpret
neuroimaging studies. With Grant et al.’s study, we saw that the interpretation
of the explanandum phenomenon changed between frameworks. With both
studies, the analysis of data was di↵erent for each of the three models. The
relation between bilingualism and the ACC in Abutalebi et al.’s study was a
mapping relation in the mapping model, a constitutive relation in the mechanis-
tic model, and a causal relation in the web model. This in turn has consequences
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for the kind of evidence we should look for: information about mapping for the
mapping model versus manipulation relations for the constitutive mechanistic
and web model. In addition, the pattern of manipulation relations for the con-
stitutive mechanistic model and web model are di↵erent: the former focuses on
mutual manipulability, while the latter is open to any pattern of manipulation.
I argued that we should use the web model of explanation to interpret the
neuroimaging results. It is better than the mapping model because it does not
rely on problematic assumptions about the mapping relation between cognitive
and neural variables. It is also better than the constitutive mechanistic model
of explanation, because i) establishing constitutive relations between cognitive
and neural variables in experimental practice is problematic, ii) the web model
forces us to be precise about the variables in the explanation,which leads to more
accuracy, and iii) the web model lets science determine the relations between
variables, rather than imposing a particular shape of explanation.
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Conclusion
What can neuroimaging tell us about the connection between the brain and
cognition? Quite a lot, as I have argued. To unlock this information, however,
cognitive neuroscience needs to abandon its fixation on mapping cognition to
the brain, and rather focus on what makes a di↵erence. This idea that what
counts is manipulation and control of both cognitive and neural phenomena
runs through this whole thesis. Categories in our cognitive ontology should not
be adapted on the basis of their mapping to the brain; instead a cognitive or
neural category has a place in our cognitive ontology if it can make a di↵erence
to other categories. Explanations in neuroimaging should not be founded on
mappings between brain and cognition; rather, we should construct a web of
di↵erence-making relations that can explain the target phenomenon.
Traditionally, philosophy of neuroscience has focused on two practices within
neuroimaging research: localisation and reverse inference. With localisation, we
start with a cognitive theory and try to find its corresponding neural areas, and
with reverse inference we try to make inferences for cognitive theory from our
neural data. In chapter 1 I have argued that practices in cognitive neuroscience
are more diverse. Among other practices, researchers have questions about how
neuroimaging can help us improve categorisation of cognition, and about how
cognitive and neural processes influence each other.
When categorising cognition, functional neuroimaging data can be important,
but not in the way it has been used in the cognitive ontology debate thus
far. To solve the many-to-many mapping problem, some try to adapt cognitive
categories to be more in line with neural categories. In its most radical form,
this means they propose to fundamentally change familiar cognitive categories
to for example “dimensions 1 through 6” in order to end up with a one-to-one
mapping of cognitive to neural phenomena. But as I have argued in chapter
2, almost all positions in the cognitive ontology debate base their proposed
adaptations on the mapping norm: taking a certain structure-function map-
ping relation between cognitive and neural concepts as a normative guide when
building a cognitive ontology.
The mapping norm comes with substantial metaphysical assumptions about
the relation between cognition and the brain, and will not give us the right
cognitive ontology or neuroscientific explanations. In chapter 3 I argued that
we should rather base our revisions on which categories make the right kind of
di↵erence. If categories have causal relevance to other phenomena according
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to the guidelines of specificity, proportionality, determinacy, systematicity,
stability, and proliferation, then they should be taken up in our cognitive
ontology.
Finding causal relations between variables can be disrupted when there are
dependency relations in play such as synonymous-with, kind-of, or component-
of. Chapter 4 deals with these dependency relations. In this chapter I explain
how di↵erence-making can actually reveal these relations, in a way that mapping
never could. The key idea is that for dependency relations, there is no way to
manipulate one variable that does not result in a manipulation of the other:
the variables are inextricably linked. Chapter 4 concludes my discussion of
cognitive ontology: I explain how we can define variables properly by fixing
their determination dimensions and non-determinable necessities, and also how
cognitive variables relate to the tasks that measure them.
These variables subsequently need to be combined to form an explanation.
The shape of this explanation, and the way that experimental data is used to
support the explanation depends on the model of explanation we choose. In
chapter 5 I argued that the constitutive mechanistic model of explanation is not
good enough for cognitive neuroscience. It focuses too much on the constitutive
relations between variables. If we follow the central idea of di↵erence-making—
the idea that what matters is manipulation and control—then any di↵erence-
making relation that is specific, proportional, determinate, systematic, and
stable can be important in an explanation. This, combined with the episte-
mological and practical di culties that establishing constitutive relations faces,
means we should not restrict the shape of an explanation to a constitutive
mechanistic explanation. The web model of explanation provides that freedom,
while retaining the emphasis on precision in specifying the variables and their
relations.
Following the web model of explanation has a profound impact on the way
we conduct and interpret neuroimaging studies. Chapter 6 shows how. By
comparing an analysis of two neuroimaging studies based on the mapping model,
the constitutive mechanistic model, and the web model, I argue that the web
model is superior. It circumvents the problems attached to mapping relations
and constitutive relations, it increases precision about the variables involved,
and leaves it up to nature to determine the exact shape of the explanation.
Manipulation and control turns out to be the basis for our cognitive ontology
and for explanations in neuroimaging. Like Woodward, I do not explicitly argue
for the importance of manipulation and control. I actually doubt whether this
regulative ideal for explanations can really be argued for. There are good reasons
for its intuitive appeal: that it aligns with good practices of experimentation
in science, that even children usually learn about objects by exploring what
they can do, but an appeal to intuition it remains. The central intuition can be
summarised like this: that if you know all the ways to manipulate a phenomenon,
in every context, then you have fully explained it.
This is a very pragmatic way of looking at explanations, and science in
general. But the familiar counterargument, that this implies that “anything
goes” is misguided. The second pillar of this thesis is precision. We should be
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precise about how we interpret the cognitive and neural variables, and about
what manipulations we perform. Only with true precision can we integrate the
findings from the many neuroimaging studies that cognitive neuroscientists have
produced.
We are now in a position to see why the two seemingly di↵erent parts of this
thesis: cognitive ontology and neuroscientific explanations, belong together. In
fact they are interdependent. Variables belong in our cognitive ontology when
they can figure in the right kind of manipulation relations, which together form
explanations. Explanations are constructed from these variables in our cognitive
ontology. This interdependency is not circular; rather I see it as an optimisation
process, in which we go from variables to explanations and back, to find the best
manipulation relations for the phenomenon we want to explain.
Throughout this thesis I have opposed neural and cognitive variables. But
my distinction is only heuristic. While cognitive and neural variables will
generally have di↵erent characteristics, I do not see (or care about) a deep
metaphysical divide. Nor do I mean to imply that these are the only categories
that matter in neuroscientific explanation.
This subsequently means that other types of variables can easily be added
to the web model. I consider it a feature of the web model of explanation
that it is in principle compatible with embodied cognition, psychiatric models,
and dynamical systems theory. To extend web models to embodied models
of cognition, we would include variables that represent the environment. In
this way, an embodied web model could reflect the tight coupling between
the organism and its environment. Psychiatric models deal with symptoms,
diseases, and their causes. Because the only real requirements for the web model
is that variables and the manipulation relations between them are specified
with precision, symptoms and diseases can in principle be included in a web
model of explanation. Due to this flexibility, the web model can also include
computational variables and its variables can also be made dynamic. This
means dynamical systems can be modelled in the framework of the web model
of explanation.
I see the connection between the web model and embodied cognition, psy-
chiatry and dynamical systems as directions for further research. We would
have to find out how to specify these new kinds of variables and whether their
interplay requires di↵erent ways of investigating causal and dependency rela-
tions. Another avenue for further research could be to formalise web expla-
nations. There have been very interesting initiatives using causal information
theory to formalise di↵erence-making relations, which I think could be applied
to cognitive neuroscience as well. This formalisation could speed up the process
of finding the optimal variables and their manipulation relations.
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Appendix A
Online collaborative
databases for cognitive
ontologies
Neuroimaging literature grows exponentially. How can we keep track of what
has been published and compare studies with each other? The numbers are so
high that it is hard to keep up with the literature, even in a specific sub-field.
These issues lie at the foundation of a number of online collaborative databases
for cognitive ontologies that have been developed. These databases contain
neuroimaging data from many studies. BrainMap for example (Laird et al.,
2005), “currently contains over 100,000 activation coordinates from over 2,600
fMRI studies that span diverse cognitive domains (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016,
p. 592). Online cognitive ontologies try to streamline this data for multiple
purposes.
One goal is to make sure that investigators are using the same terms, or at
least that they are aware of conflicting terms if there are any. Another is to
facilitate meta-analysis of a certain neural area or a certain cognitive construct.
Those interested in language switching can look up what neural areas have been
implicated in these experiments and how researchers have used the terminology
thus far.
Some of these meta-analyses are geared towards solving the reverse inference
problem. By focussing on a certain neural area, they try to find out in
what kinds of experiments this area has been active, and subsequently try to
determine the function of that neural area (see chapter 1 and 2 for a more
elaborate explanation and analysis of reverse inference).
The aim of this appendix is twofold. First, I want to introduce collaborative
online databases and show how they relate to cognitive ontology building as I
have discussed it in chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4. Second, I make normative claims
about the databases, and provide recommendations for future developments. In
structuring the neuroimaging data in a particular way, online collaborative cog-
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nitive ontologies make decisions on how to treat cognitive and neural categories
and their interrelations, even if this usually happens implicitly.
In this appendix, I analyse these underlying assumptions by focussing on
four projects: the BrainMap, CogPO, Cognitive Atlas, and NeuroSynth. I
analyse how these projects structure their data and how they deal with the
interrelations between the categories. I structure the analysis by discussing
the following three topics: i) experts’ definitions versus semantic mining, ii)
determining dependency relations, and iii) the relation between mental con-
structs and tasks. Through discussing these topics, I will make clear how these
assumptions relate to the di↵erence-making framework that I proposed for cog-
nitive ontology building. In section A.4, I take these analyses together and turn
them into guidelines for future developments.
There are many databases for neuroscientific and more broadly, biological
data in development. Why do I only focus on these four? First of all, this
chapter’s aim is not to give a comprehensive overview of all existing databases.
Rather, I am using an analysis of a select group to show the general assumptions
that underlie these databases and more importantly, how these assumptions
relate to my proposed di↵erence-making framework for cognitive ontology. I
have selected the BrainMap, CogPO, Cognitive Atlas, and NeuroSynth because
they include cognitive constructs (and often connect them to neuroscientific
data).
This excludes for example the Human Connective project (Smith et al.,
2013), which tries to generate a map of human functional connectivity based
on a large sample of connectivity data. The aim of this database is not to
connect connectivity data to behavioural or functional data directly, but rather
to find out general connections between areas. NeuroSynth, and BrainMap,
on the other hand, aim to establish these connections between cognitive and
neural constructs directly. The Cognitive Atlas and CogPO focus exclusively
on cognitive constructs.
The discussion in this appendix rests on the assumption that these colla-
borative projects can be useful for cognitive ontology building. This seems to
run counter to Sullivan’s verdict: “How do databases facilitate the pragmatic
goal of scientific taxonomies? The short answer is ‘they don’t’ ” (2017, p. 134).
While I agree with her that in their current form, they are not well equipped
to support adequate revision and discussion of our cognitive ontology, I think
that with the right changes, they can be of vital importance for the integration,
curation, and standardisation of the neuroimaging literature.
A.1 Expert’s definitions versus semantic mining
What kind of cognitive constructs do the four projects propose and how do
they define and retrieve them? The cognitive terms of all four projects are
the familiar terms derived from folk psychology, such as auditory perception,
goal formation, and response inhibition. This contrasts with the bottom-up
categories described in chapter 2, for example the “dimensions” (numbered 1
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through 6) that Poldrack et al. propose (2009).
The methods of retrieving and defining these cognitive constructs, however,
di↵er substantially among the databases. Whereas the BrainMap, CogPO, and
Cognitive Atlas rely on a pre-determined vocabulary of cognitive terms—often
defined by a select group of experts in the field—NeuroSynth uses semantic
mining techniques. In what follows I will say more about each database’s
vocabulary of cognitive terms.
A.1.1 BrainMap
BrainMap (Laird et al., 2005) contains thee main levels of information:
descriptions of the Paper that is uploaded, the Experiments that were performed
and the neural Locations that were found to be active. The Paper category has
subcategories like citation, submitter, conditions, and imaging (the process of
analysing the raw data). The Experiment level contains information about
for example the experimental context, the paradigm class, and the behavioural
domain. On the Locations level, the precise anatomical locations of functional
activation are described. For present purposes, paradigm class and behavioural
domain are the most interesting categories. As Laird et al. explain: “Paradigm
class categorizes the challenge of the experiment using field-specific terminology
and includes such options as action observation, delayed match to sample, finger
tapping, saccades, Stroop task, and word-stem completion. Behavioral domain
classifies the mental operations, both conscious and unconscious (. . . ) [and] is
divided into six main categories: cognition, emotion, perception, interoception,
action, and pharmacology. Each main category has various subcategories”
(2005, p. 70).1
A paradigm class in this context thus basically refers to a particular task, or
set of tasks, although as we will see in section A.3, this category is not very well
defined and mixes together cognitive constructs and tasks. The behavioural
domains of BrainMap refer to cognitive constructs and include Action-Motor
learning, Cognition-Language syntax, and Interoception-Thirst. BrainMap’s
coding scheme (all the categories that are used to define the available data) is
defined by a group of researchers, and updated when research trends demand
it. All the data are coded manually: researchers or students have to describe
and code each paper individually.
A.1.2 CogPO
The researchers that developed CogPO recognise that BrainMap’s use of
paradigms can be problematic: “Cognitive paradigms are not standardized; they
are infinitely flexible, and can vary by choice of stimuli, timing, the instructions
given to the subject, and the responses the subject is expected to make” (Turner
and Laird, 2012, p. 58). CogPO therefore extends BrainMap’s coding scheme to
include more details about the experimental conditions. It takes the paradigms
1In April 2017, I found only five categories in BrainMap’s taxonomy: pharmacology being
deleted.
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from BrainMap and then focusses on representing these conditions in terms of
the stimuli presented, the instructions given, and the responses requested.
The stimuli, instructions, and responses can be represented in great detail.
The stimulus, for example, has a modality such as “auditory” or “visual” or
“tactile”, and also its type is characterised: “eye pu↵s”, “letters”, and “odour”
are some of the options in the ontology. The responses also have a modality
and a type. The modality basically refers to parts of the body, such as “eye” or
“torso”. The response type includes familiar responses such as “button press”,
but also includes “whistle” or “drink”. The instructions that were given during
the experiment can be characterised by for example “attend”, “fixate”, or “rest”.
The ultimate aim of CogPO is to identify paradigm classes from the bottom-
up, using these detailed ontological categories. This contrasts with current
practice in cognitive neuroscience, where paradigm classes are stipulated top-
down. It is the researcher’s prerogative to choose a paradigm from the literature
and adapt and name it. This means that sometimes, a paradigm that is very
similar to another in terms of the stimulus, instructions and response gets a
di↵erent name (such as the Sternberg task and the Working Memory task).
But also vice versa, paradigms that have the same name can vary a lot in terms
of their details.
CogPO would like to change this: “the paradigm classes and behavioral
domains should eventually be defined (. . . ) based on patterns in the annotated
experimental results, rather than from the top-down, based on researcher intent
and the then-current view of cognitive processes” (Turner and Laird, 2012, p.
65). As the database grows, perhaps in the future these classes could even be
determined automatically.
A.1.3 Cognitive Atlas
Another future project is to harmonise CogPO with the Cognitive Atlas. The
Cognitive Atlas is an ontology of cognitive constructs and behavioural tasks
which tries to reach agreement between researchers about those terms and their
definitions. Just like CogPO, it does not contain neuroimaging data. It does,
however, take neuroimaging data as a basis for interpretation, by trying to
extract the important cognitive constructs and tasks from this literature.
This extraction process was done manually. The founders of the database
(Poldrack et al., 2011) initially identified more than 800 terms that were
prevalent throughout the cognitive science literature. They subsequently
opened up the discussion with other cognitive scientists about the terminology:
scientists can discuss and comment on the definitions and interrelations of
mental constructs and tasks.
An important distinction in the Cognitive Atlas is made between mental
constructs and mental tasks. Also, a category of disorders was added. Mental
constructs are for example “auditory memory”, or “optical illusion”. Mental
tasks refer to the tasks that are used to measure these constructs, such as
the “logical reasoning task” or the “delayed memory task”. The category of
disorders contains a list of mental disorders, for example “mood disorders” and
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“sleep disorders”. There are several possible relations between mental con-
structs, and also between mental constructs and mental tasks. I will discuss
those relations in more detail in section A.2.
A.1.4 NeuroSynth
The previous three databases have defined the cognitive terms from the top-
down. That is, a select group of researchers identified a taxonomy of cognitive
constructs and terms, and have subsequently revised that list based on the
needs of the cognitive science literature. NeuroSynth, on the other hand, relies
on automatic text-mining methods to extract the terms. NeuroSynth is “an
automated brain-mapping framework that uses text-mining, meta-analysis and
machine-learning techniques to generate a large database of mappings between
neural and cognitive states” (Yarkoni et al., 2011, p. 665).
These text-mining methods take neuroimaging papers and extract cogni-
tive terms by counting the words and determining whether they occur more
frequently than expected. This way, the methods can analyse what cogni-
tive constructs the article is about, though usually it extracts rather broad
categories rather than specific constructs. Some of these are familiar terms like
“language comprehension”, but others are terms like “absent” or “containing”.
Similarly, neural coordinates are automatically extracted from the papers and
subsequently linked to those cognitive terms.
NeuroSynth still relies on the vocabulary that is used by researchers in the
field. It does not work from the bottom-up in the sense of looking at the brain to
see what the cognitive categories should be. Instead, what I mean by bottom-up
is that it works from the papers up to the cognitive terms that end up in the
database. This is di↵erent from the other three because it results in a di↵erent
list of terms. But it is similar in the way that it does not depart from the
familiar vocabulary that is currently used in cognitive neuroscience.
The reason for using automatic extraction is that NeuroSynth is able
to process many more papers than the other databases: “because manual
annotation and verification of published articles is a time-consuming process,
existing coordinate databases such as BrainMap are no longer able to keep
up with the growth of the primary literature (cf. Derrfuss and Mar (2009))”
(Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016). Because NeuroSynth does not rely on manual
annotations, the database has grown rapidly. In 2016, it contained over 10.000
studies (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016). As the initiators themselves admit,
NeuroSynth trades quality for quantity. The cognitive terms are less precise
than for the top-down methods, and the relations between the constructs and
tasks are not clear. I will analyse this trade-o↵ below.
A.1.5 Analysis
What are the advantages and disadvantages of a top-down determination of
cognitive constructs versus a bottom-up extraction of those terms? And what,
if anything, does the causal norm for cognitive ontology building that I proposed
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instead of the mapping norm (see chapters 2 and 3) have to say about these
di↵erent approaches?
Despite the di↵erences in method, the two approaches do rely on similar
assumptions. Both take the existing cognitive terminology derived from folk-
psychology as their starting point. None of the databases try to fundamentally
revise this terminology. Similarly, neither of the approaches are fundamentally
based on the mapping norm (or on the causal norm). They would be based
on the mapping norm if the constructs were reformed on the basis of their
corresponding neural activations. For example, if BrainMap were to decide
that language switching and cognitive control are in fact the same because
they correspond to overlapping neural activation, that would be a revision of
categories based on the mapping norm. But again, this is not the case.
While not drawing on the mapping norm, BrainMap and NeuroSynth do
present a good platform for revisions based on the mapping norm, because it
is easy to tell what kind of brain activation is mapped to a particular cognitive
construct. It is then easy to tell whether cognitive constructs are neurally
discriminable, and whether they map onto neural categories consistently. This
is why some of the authors who advocate revision of our cognitive ontology based
on the mapping norm use BrainMap or NeuroSynth as their starting point (see
chapter 2).
But for all databases, determining the meaning and interrelations of the
cognitive constructs and tasks is done independently from the neuroimaging
data. Instead, they are based on behavioural and logical analyses and do not
directly question the current terminology of cognitive research.
There is a di↵erence, however, in how well top-down and bottom-up methods
represent this terminology. Whereas the Cognitive Atlas, BrainMap, and CogPo
keep up with the definitions in the literature manually, NeuroSynth does this
through computational methods. NeuroSynth thereby “rests on the assumption
that simple word counts are a reasonable proxy for the substantive content of
articles” (Yarkoni et al., 2011, p. 664). For individual studies, this assumption is
not reasonable: extracting data from only one study is likely to misrepresent that
study’s content (and also its exact neural activations). But because NeuroSynth
contains a large number of studies, overall, the datamining procedures work
relatively well, according to its founders (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016).
I think Poldrack and Yarkoni (2016) are right to favour datamining
procedures over manual entering of the data, because the latter will not be able
to keep up with the growing body of literature (except perhaps if BrainMap
receives a large amount of funding, or if entering one’s data is made mandatory
somehow). As for the issue of the mapping norm versus the causal norm, the
choice between expert’s definitions of cognitive constructs and the bottom-up
methods does not reflect a particular stance on cognitive ontology revision. This
choice follows neither the mapping norm nor the causal norm.
But what the method of experts’ definitions versus text-mining does impact
is the way we define or are able to extract the dependency relations between
cognitive constructs and between cognitive constructs and neural categories.
This I will discuss in the next section.
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Furthermore, I think it is important to define the cognitive tasks that cog-
nitive scientists use in a rigorous manner, because the names that the scientists
attribute to them are not the best handles for a cognitive ontology, for the
reasons described above. In section A.3, I will discuss this issue.
A.2 Determining dependency and causal rela-
tions
Do the online collaborative databases contain a vocabulary for dependency re-
lations or causal relations between their categories? If so, how do they go about
defining them? In this section, I will analyse how the four databases conceive of
the relations between cognitive categories, tasks, and neural categories. Then, I
will argue that they should implement the di↵erence-making methods described
in chapter 3 and 4.
First, let us look at the possibility of defining causal relations in the
databases. I can be quite brief about it, because none of the online collaborative
databases explicitly define causal relations. The relations between cognitive and
neural entities in NeuroSynth and BrainMap are mapping relations, not causal
relations. Furthermore, none of the databases defines causal relations between
cognitive constructs.
What about dependency relations, such as the synonymous-with, kind-of,
and component-of relations that I have described in chapter 4? The only
database that does not define any dependency relations is NeuroSynth. In
keeping with their bottom-up approach of extracting cognitive terms from the
neuroimaging papers, they do not impose a pre-defined hierarchical structure
on the cognitive data.
BrainMap contains a fairly basic hierarchical scheme for cognitive constructs.
There are five higher-level cognitive categories (cognition, emotion, perception,
interoception, and action) which all contain between 8 and 18 subcategories.
The relation between the categories and their subcategories is consistently a
kind-of relation, even if this is not explicitly defined or explained. For example,
action-inhibition is a kind-of action.
CogPO seems to allow for some structure between their categories, but only
identifies parent-sibling-child relationships. These are simple relationships that
are used to denote a hierarchy: a parent sits at one level above the child, and
siblings sit at the same level. The terms in CogPO are only used to describe
experiments, not cognitive constructs. The parent “stimulus” has “implicit
stimulus” and “explicit stimulus” as its children, for example.
The most extensive taxonomy can be found in the Cognitive Atlas. Here,
four relations between cognitive constructs can be defined: “ is-a (e.g.,
‘declarative memory is a kind of memory’), part-of (e.g., ‘memory retrieval is a
part of declarative memory’), transformation-of (e.g., ‘consolidated memory is a
transformation of encoded memory’), preceded-by (e.g., ‘memory consolidation
is preceded by memory encoding’)” (Poldrack et al., 2011, p. 5).
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The “is-a” relation in the Cognitive Atlas corresponds to my kind-of relation
in chapter 4. Similarly, the “part-of” relation corresponds to my component-
of relation. The “transformation-of” and “preceded-by” do not correspond to
any relation that I have defined. I have not included these relations, because
according to my theory in chapter 4, they are not necessary. The interventionist
framework that I draw on implies that relations between these components in a
series of subprocesses are usually causal. For example, I expect that experiments
would show that memory encoding has a causal influence on memory storing,
and memory storing has a causal influence on memory retrieval. So we would not
need dependency relations such as “transformation-of” or “preceded-by”. Here
my theory aligns with the mechanistic model of explanation (see also chapter 5,
in which the components that work together to produce a certain phenomenon
stand in causal relations to each other).
What about the information about the time sequence of components that
“transformation-of” and “preceded-by” give us? Both relations tell us which of
the two cognitive constructs occurs earlier than the other. But causal relations
do the same: causal relations tell us that the cause preceded the e↵ect. In fact,
causal relations might give a more accurate picture of what is going on between
cognitive components, because there can also be feedback relations between the
components. Transformation-of and preceded-by seem to suppose a relatively
simple linear sequence of cognitive components (like encoding-storing-retrieving
for memory processes). But identifying causal relations allows for a more
complicated picture, in which perhaps some constructs stand in bidirectional
causal relations. All in all, I propose we are better o↵ using manipulation
relations between cognitive constructs than including transformation-of and
preceded-by in our list of relations between cognitive variables.
Then, there are relations between cognitive constructs and tasks. In the Cog-
nitive Atlas, the “measured-by” relation is defined between a cognitive construct
and a task. Attention shifting, for example, is measured-by the attention
switching task. I will come back to these relations and their validity in the
next section.
Compared to the other databases, the Cognitive Atlas has much more room
to define dependency (and other) relations between its categories. Like in the
other projects, however, the range of relationships that exist are defined from
the top-down. The collaborators of the cognitive ontology determine what kind
of relations can exist. This in itself is not a problem: I did the same in chapter 4.
However, finding out which constructs relate to which and in what way, is also a
manual task in these databases. These results are based on the previous cogni-
tive literature and on intuition. That declarative memory is-a kind of memory
and that memory retrieval is a part-of declarative memory, was determined by
the collaborators of the ontology, by thinking about the meanings of the terms
and by checking the various definitions and models in the cognitive literature.
Of course, I do think that declarative memory will turn out to be a kind-of
memory. But finding the exact relation between two cognitive constructs is not
always easy, and there should be a systematic way of checking these relations.
The Cognitive Atlas makes space for discussions between researchers about the
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definitions and interrelations of the terms, but these discussions are informal.
There is no clear-cut method for defining who is right and thus, whether the
proposed relation is right.
I propose that cognitive ontologies in general, and by extension the online
collaborative databases discussed here, would benefit from applying the inter-
ventionist method of finding dependency relations. The method provides a
systematic way of finding the most basic dependency relations by determining
whether we can intervene on one variable without thereby manipulating the
other. This way, there can be a systematic discussion about the relation between
terms, based on experimental data.
A.3 The relation between cognitive constructs
and tasks
A fundamental distinction within the terms in a cognitive ontology is that
between cognitive constructs and the tasks that are used to measure them.
As I have argued in section 4.3.2, it is important to keep cognitive constructs
and tasks separate, because it is often only a specific contrast within the
task conditions that measures the construct, and furthermore, there might be
disagreement about what a certain task measures. Do the online databases
make a distinction between the two?
BrainMap distinguishes between cognitive constructs and tasks, by defining
two separate lists of terms for them: Paradigm class versus Behavioural domain.
CogPO makes the distinction by design, because its domain only contains terms
for experiments, and not for cognitive constructs.
The Cognitive Atlas makes an explicit distinction between Concepts and
Tasks (and Disorders) and also specifies the measured-by relation between
concepts and tasks and the descended-from relation between tasks (as we have
seen above). NeuroSynth does not make a distinction at all. Text-mining
methods extract words describing cognitive constructs and tasks alike, which
results in lists of terms that contain both “Stroop task” and “speech perception”,
for example. Note that the list of terms also contains many words that neither
describe a cognitive construct or a task, such as “usually” or “specialised”.
All databases except Neurosynth, then, distinguish between cognitive con-
structs and tasks. Given the importance of the distinction, I think an adequate
online cognitive ontology should distinguish between constructs and tasks.
Furthermore, an online cognitive ontology could help us standardise tasks,
and facilitate agreement about which task contrasts measure which cognitive
construct. In order to find similarities and di↵erences between tasks, we need
to specify the parameters of paradigms and tasks in detail: “categorization
of paradigms according to stimulus, response, and instruction has been shown
to allow advanced data retrieval techniques by searching for similarities and
contrasts across multiple paradigm levels” (Turner and Laird, 2012, p. 57). I
agree then, with the central aim of CogPO, which tries to capture all these
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details.
Another way to standardise tasks is just to provide a standard repertoire of
experiments that everyone should use. The Experiment Factory2 is a platform
that provides this repertoire, it is an “open source of behavioral experiments for
reproducible science” (Sullivan, 2017, p. 136), see also (Sochat et al., 2016). This
website allows researchers to download experiments for deployment in their own
research, or for developing them further. While I believe this is a great initiative,
it does not make projects such as CogPO redundant. Some researchers will still
want to use their own experiments, or adapt the online experiments to their own
taste. To make sure that everyone agrees on what all neuroscientific experiments
measure, we need some way of keeping track. We need to be able to compare
the di↵erent experiment paradigms across the literature, and a project such as
cogPO is vital for doing so.
A.4 Conclusion and way forward
In this appendix, I have introduced four online collaborative databases for cogni-
tive ontology: BrainMap, CogPO, the Cognitive Atlas, and Neurosynth. I have
provided an analysis of these projects with respect to three features: the way
that they define or extract the list of cognitive constructs, the way in which (if at
all) they define interrelations between cognitive constructs, and the distinction
they make between cognitive constructs and tasks.
I have already made some normative claims about the online initiatives, on
the basis of the causal norm that I have argued for in this thesis. In this section
I will recap these claims, and add other normative reflections on the databases
to come up with some suggestions for the future.
My causal framework does not directly constrain the choice between
determining the list of cognitive constructs from the top-down (BrainMap,
CogPO, the Cognitive Atlas) versus extracting them from the literature
(Neurosynth). However, this di↵erence does fundamentally influence the other
two areas of analysis: the facilitation of defining relations between cognitive
constructs and the distinction between cognitive constructs and tasks.
That is, because NeuroSynth does not structure the terms they extract from
the literature from the outset, it does not provide a framework for determining
relations between the terms, or for distinguishing between tasks and cognitive
constructs. As I have argued in the last two sections, we would actually need this
framework if we want to follow the causal norm for cognitive ontology building.
Still, the method of automatic retrieval of terms in the cognitive neuro-
scientific literature is promising, because it captures a much larger sample of
the literature in a relatively e↵ortless way. It also allows much more room
for finding and defining new variables, and finding out whether those variables
perhaps have the right causal relevance to others. Moreover, it seems to work
better in practice: manually annotating your experiments so that they can be
2http://expfactory.org
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added to a database seems to be too much work for most researchers (Derrfuss
and Mar, 2009).
What if Neurosynth could automatically extract not only cognitive (and
other) terms, but also their interrelations and make distinctions between con-
structs and tasks? It is doubtful that we would be able to do this with fully
automated retrieval methods. As Poldrack and Yarkoni themselves admit,
Neurosynth’s weakness is that it “cannot readily identify key metadata fields
(e.g., sample size, direction of experimental contrast)” (2016, p. 598).
In this sense, the other three databases fare better; at least they provide
some structuring of their data. BrainMap identifies the kind-of relation between
cognitive constructs, CogPO has a very basic parent-sibling relation, and the
Cognitive Atlas has a much more extensive framework of relations (is-a, part-of,
transformation-of, and preceded-by). Still, as I mentioned in section A.2, these
relations do not align with my proposed relations (synonymous-with, kind-of,
component-of, and the causal relation). Moreover, the method for determining
what relation exists between cognitive constructs is based on experts’ analyses
of the meaning of these constructs and how they have been used thus far in the
literature. Following the causal norm, on the other hand, implies that we should
base the interrelations between constructs on the manipulation relations that
we find. If it turns out that all manipulations of memory have an influence on
working memory, and some manipulations of working memory have an influence
on memory, then working memory is a kind-of memory. Below I will formulate
some recommendations to implement this in an online collaborative ontology
project.
The same disadvantage of the top-down methodology can be found for the
distinction between cognitive constructs and tasks. It is important that there
is a distinction (such as for BrainMap, CogPO by design, and the Cognitive
Atlas), but only CogPO allows for a systematic and fundamental way to compare
experimental paradigms to foster agreement about which tasks measure what
cognitive process.
To align the online collaborative projects with my interventionist framework
for cognitive ontology building, I want to propose two things: we should
hybridise automated retrieval methods with manual annotation, and we should
capture manipulation relations instead of mapping relations.
First, I want to follow Poldrack and Yarkoni’s suggestion of combining
automated approaches such those used in NeuroSynth with manual annotation:
“we suggest that the next wave of advances in the area of neuroimaging meta-
analysis may result from successful hybridization of manual and automated
ap- proaches, particularly from the development of user-friendly crowdsourcing
interfaces that allow researchers to easily apply their expertise to manual
curation of communal databases” (2016, p. 607). A full manual approach to
annotating data is a lot of work for researchers, but if the annotation is already
preprocessed by automated retrieval processes, it is much less work.
There are many variations of combining automated with manual processing,
but one way to improve automated retrieval methods is to ask the community to
curate the results. The automated process could suggest a particular annotation
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of the experiment, and the research community can check if this is correct.
This is similar to for example Google Translate, which relies on artificial neural
networks, but tries to improve its translations by crowdsourcing.3 Brainspell.org
is an example of such an initiative in cognitive neuroscience. On this website,
researchers can “manually validate, annotate, and tag all data presently in
Neurosynth” (Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016, p. 607). Step by step, this can
improve an automated database.
My second suggestion has more extensive consequences. Instead of mapping
relations, I think online collaborative ontologies should capture manipulation
relations. Now, when you type in a cognitive term in NeuroSynth or BrainMap,
it yields the mapping relation to the brain that has been found. And vice versa,
inputting neural coordinates gives you the terms that have been associated with
that area. But as I have argued in chapter 2, the mapping norm is not a good
guide for cognitive ontology building (or revision). Mapping relations do not
give us much information, and are thus not in line with what we want from
neuroscientific explanations (which is causal information).
From the causal norm that I proposed in chapter 3 it follows that it
would be better to capture the manipulation relations that have been found in
experiments. Then, typing in “language switching” would yield the di↵erence-
making relations it has with other variables. For example, it would say that
manipulating the proficiency of bilinguals makes such and such a di↵erence to
language switching, and has another type of causal relation to neural activity in
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex. Combining such information across experiments
can give us information about how variables are related exactly: do they stand
in a dependency relation, or are they causally related? Moreover, all this
information combined could tell us about the situations in which the causal
relation holds (the stability) and how likely it is that the relation occurs (the
determinacy).
Such manipulation relations are more detailed than mapping relations. The
advantage of this is that it brings us closer to constructing adequate explana-
tions; it creates the web of relations that the web model proposes (see chapter
5). But perhaps this is practically more di cult? In some sense: yes. However,
I don’t expect it to be unattainable.
First, there would need to be a structure in place for specifying the de-
termination dimensions and non-determinable necessities of the variables that
are manipulated in the study (see section 4.3.1). Then, for each study it
should be clear how the variables are being manipulated (what range, what the
intervention variable is, etc) and what the resulting changes are. Furthermore,
I would suggest to keep CogPO or a similar project in place, to be able to
compare, discuss and improve research paradigms and their relation to the cog-
nitive variables.
If this was all done manually, it would probably be too much work for the re-
searchers. But perhaps an automated approach could already suggest a number
3See https://translate.google.com/intl/en/about/contribute.html, accessed on 27
August, 2018.
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of variables and their determination dimensions. Then, the researchers would
only need to adjust what is there. Of course, the actual practicability remains
to be seen, but I do not think it needs to be more work than capturing map-
ping relations, and capturing manipulation relations would be an enormous step
forward towards adequate explanations. Representing neuroimaging data from
a large sample of studies in this way would hopefully lead to an ontology that
is accurate, complete, and clear.
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Appendix B
Natural Kinds
The causal norm in chapter 3 describes how we can find the categories that
we should use in cognitive neuroscience. A philosopher might wonder: are the
cognitive categories that the causal norm prescribes Natural Kinds? The debate
on natural kinds is a long-standing debate within philosophy of science and it
tries to tackle the question: what categories are we supposed to use in science?
Or, formulated di↵erently: which kinds are real and which kinds are not?
Before answering these questions, it is important to note that there
are actually two di↵erent issues: there is a question about natural kinds
versus non-natural kinds, and another question about realist versus non-realist
interpretations of (cognitive) categories. These questions diverge, because not
all natural kinds have a realist interpretation (see for example Franklin-Hall
(2015)), and conversely, some non-natural kinds have a realist interpretation
(see Dennett (1991)).
In this section, I will focus on the first question, and come back to the
second question at the end. I will argue that the natural kinds debate is not
very relevant for cognitive neuroscience. While there is a position within the
debate that more or less fits the causal norm account that I have provided,
the position comes with a lot of unnecessary philosophical baggage. I therefore
propose that the natural kinds debate can be abandoned, at least for cognitive
neuroscience.
In order to argue for this view, I will first discuss the position within the
natural kinds debate that seems most promising for cognitive science: the
homeostatic property cluster view. On this view, natural kinds are clusters of
properties that are “supported” by an underlying mechanism. After explaining
its main tenets, I outline a few adaptations that have been proposed to the
theory to make it a proper fit for cognitive categories specifically. I choose
these adaptations (Gri th’s projectability criterion (2008), and Khalidi’s causal
network analysis (2015)), because taken together, they almost fit my causal
norm account for cognitive ontology building. I end the section by arguing that
the main tenets of these positions can be lifted from the natural kinds debate.
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B.1 Homeostatic property clusters
The theory of homeostatic property clusters was developed by Boyd in the
context of a debate about what distinguishes natural kinds from socially
constructed kinds (1991). The premise of the natural kinds debate is that
there are some kinds that are found “in nature”: these categories follow the
way the world is structured and thus carve nature at its joints. The chemical
elements found in the periodic table, for example, are usually considered natural
kinds. These natural kinds contrast with more socially constructed kinds, like
neoliberalism, hipsters, and gentrification. Those categories are fundamentally
dependent on our classificatory practices.
The debate concerns questions such as: what distinguishes natural kinds
from other kinds? Is there even a distinction to be made? What kind of
categories belong on either side of the aisle? And, how can we find out whether
something is a natural kind?
Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster view contrasts for example with the
natural kinds essentialists, who maintain that natural kinds have essences that
can be defined by necessary and su cient criteria (Devitt, 2008; Ellis, 2001).
One of the reasons for criticising this view is that often, the boundaries between
kinds are fuzzy and they cannot be captured in terms of necessary and su cient
criteria.
But Boyd’s theory also does not align with the conventionalists (or anti-
realists), and can be viewed as a middle way between these two main positions
of the natural kinds.1 Conventionalists hold that the categorisation of the
world depends at least partially on humans and their interests and aims.
Strong conventionalists maintain that there simply are no mind-independent,
objective ways of categorising the world (Woolgar, 1988). A weaker version of
conventionalism entails that either that there are those objective categories, but
we do not have access to them, or that there are no clear objective boundaries
between kinds, which means that our interests will partly determine the right
categories (Reydon, 2015).
Boyd’s view combines both behavioural and underlying causal mechanism
criteria: the instances of one natural kind have properties that cluster together,
due to an underlying homeostatic causal mechanism. In other words: “to
count as a natural kind, a category must be the maximal class of items in
which a significant number of scientifically interesting properties cluster, due to
the operation of at least one shared causal mechanism” (Buckner, 2015, p. 3).
The properties that are scientifically interesting, depend on what Boyd calls a
“disciplinary matrix”, which refers to the methods and practices that are shared
in a (sub)discipline (1999).
He elaborates on the homeostatic aspect of his theory with the example
of the mechanics of a ping-pong ball: “[i]t is the operation of the underlying
replacement processes which constitute the persistence of the ping pong ball over
1Although Craver (2009) and Tobin (2017) show that the HPC theory is less realist than
it intends to be. The delineation of mechanisms necessarily includes some conventional
elements—both from a theoretical perspective (Craver) and a practical one (Tobin).
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time. Moreover (. . . ) they have the stable macroscopic properties (like shape
and coe cient of restitution) which makes them fall under the non-accidental
generalizations of Newtonian mechanics” (1999, p. 94). In this way, a mechanism
is homeostatic if, even when its parts are replaced the main operation is still
preserved.
B.2 Applying the HPC theory to cognition
Boyd thinks that biological species are a paradigm case of homeostatic natural
kind clusters. Buckner (2015) and Gri ths (2008) subsequently apply it to
cognitive categories as well. Buckner applies the homeostatic cluster theory to
cognition, specifically (2015). He first observes cognitive behaviour that we are
interested in explaining. Then, he theorises about a minimal set of capacities
that cluster together—i.e. they are mutually correlated—which together could
give rise to this behaviour. Then, we should “develop a model of the underlying
mechanisms that could produce those capacities and explain why they would
tend to cluster together” (2015, p. 5). In the context of neuroscience, Buckner
thinks this can be done via the lesion-and-localise method, or a distributed
network analysis (and favours the latter).
While it might seem that Boyd’s reference to the homeostatic mechanism as
the “essence” of the natural kind bars more socially constructed kinds, in fact
this does not need to be the case: “the concept of causal homeostasis entails
a very broad conception of the essence of a category. An essence can be any
theoretical structure that accounts for the projectability of a category. The
microstructural essences that have received so much attention in discussions of
natural kinds are merely one kind of essence” (Gri ths, 2008, p. 188). Other
essences can for example be “descent” in case of biological taxa, “intent” and
“design” for artifacts, and psychological mechanisms for emotions.
Gri ths explains what he means by the projectability of a category: “the
correlations of properties that these categories represent can be relied upon
to hold up in new instances” (2008, p. 174). Thus, the way in which the
properties of a certain token of a natural kind correlate is a pattern that will
be found in other tokens of the same natural kind. If the category “bilingual
language switching” is projectable, the pattern of features that the individual
bilingual language switching behaviours have—switching between two or more
languages within a relatively short time-frame, certain performance patterns,
ways performance can be influenced, etc—will be alike. If these property
clusters can then be causally explained by a certain underlying mechanism, then
bilingual language switching is a natural kind according to Boyd and Gri ths.
Homeostatic mechanisms, then, include psychological mechanisms, which are
not necessarily physical.
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B.3 Causal nodes and the causal norm
Which positions in the natural kinds debate are compatible with the causal
norm for cognitive variables that I have described in chapter 3? The causal norm
proposes that good cognitive categories should be causally relevant, understood
in a di↵erence-making framework. If the categories can form the appropriate
causal relations (specific, proportional, determinate, systematic, stable, and
prolific, see section 3.4), then they should be taken up in our cognitive ontology.
This idea contrasts with the mapping norm that most of the current positions in
the cognitive ontology debate are based on (see chapter 2). The mapping norm
states that cognitive categories should be individuated based on the mapping
they have with neural categories.
The mapping norm versus causal norm is not the same distinction as that
between the realists and conventionalists in the natural kinds debate. But
neither are the debates orthogonal. You will not find a strong conventionalist
that believes cognitive categories should be individuated by the neural structures
they map on to, nor are there many realists that would accept the causal norm
as I described it. This is because conventionalists believe our categorisation of
the world depends on human interests and aims, whereas neural categories are
often thought to be free of those constraints. So the mapping norm aligns more
with the realist position. Conversely, the causal norm includes these human
elements in the way that the variable selection is dependent on the interests
and aims of the research field.
Is Bruckner and Gri th’s application of the HPC theory compatible with
the causal norm? Almost, but not entirely. The HPC theory requires that
the projectable features of the natural kind are supported by a homeostatic
mechanism. Even though Bruckner and Gri th show that this does not need
to be a physical (or neural) mechanism, the causal norm does not make any
such normative claim about underlying mechanisms. Even if there are widely
di↵erent mechanisms that constitute a phenomenon with projectable features,
the causal norm would include it in a cognitive ontology, provided it can enter
into the right kind of causal relations. In chapter 5 I argued for this position
in the context of explanations: the constitutive relations that are central to the
mechanistic account are not always the most explanatory relations. Similarly,
the projectable features of a natural kind do not need to be explained by a
mechanism.
The proposed amendment of the HPC theory by Khalidi (2015) is the
position within the natural kinds debate that is the closest to the causal norm.
He argues that there are causal processes that lead to projectable features of
natural kinds, but that these causal processes do not need to be mechanistic:
“there need be no single causal mechanism that leads these properties to be co-
instantiated nor need there be any kind of feedback process that ensures that
these properties do not depart from an equilibrium state of co-instantiation”
(2015, p. 8).
Khalidi’s view hereby opens the door to multiply realised natural kinds,
because it relaxes the requirement that there is one underlying mechanism
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that gives rise to the clustered properties.2 While Gri ths would also allow
for multiple physical mechanisms that can give rise to the cognitive category,
Khalidi’s view goes further in that theoretically, even multiple psychological
mechanisms could give rise to one cognitive category.
Khalidi also wants to adapt the interpretation of the clustered properties
that go with the natural kind. Rather than these properties being an unordered
set, he proposes that they are causally structured. The properties are thus not
merely unconnected, but are usually causally connected. The property that gold
has atoms with atom number 79 and the property that it is a particular shade
of shiny yellow are are causally connected: the atoms having atom number 79
is a cause of the colour.
Taking these adaptations of Boyd’s theory together, Khalidi thinks that
natural kinds are hierarchies of causally connected properties—they are “highly
connected nodes in causal networks” (2015, p. 9). So, instead of the two
levels that Boyd proposes for natural kinds (the property clusters and the
underlying mechanism), Khalidi thinks that natural kinds are nodes in the
(Woodward-style) networks that connect causes to their e↵ects. There is still
a di↵erence between core properties and derivative properties, however, where
core properties are causally prior to the derivative properties. The atom number
of gold atoms is one of these core properties, because (together with other
properties), it causes other properties.
These natural kinds as causal nodes display a few features of projectability:
their properties are generalisable to many di↵erent contexts, and there is usually
more than one property that is generalisable in this way. These features actually
correspond to the guidelines in section 3.4 The first feature of the projectability
of natural kinds corresponds to “stability”: a causal relation is stable when it
holds in many di↵erent contexts. The second corresponds to “proliferation”,
which entails that a cause will have many di↵erent kinds of e↵ects.
B.4 Relations between determination dimen-
sions
There are more links between my account of cognitive ontology building and
Khalidi’s understanding of natural kinds. First, recall my application of
Funkhouser’s determination dimensions to characterising cognitive variables in
chapter 4. On this understanding, cognitive variables are a combination of deter-
mination dimensions and non-determinable necessities. For these variables to be
good variables, their determination dimensions must display causal patterns in
accordance with the guidelines in 3.4: specificity, proportionality, determinacy,
systematicity, stability, and proliferation. Similar to Khalidi’s account, then,
there must be a web of causal relations that is specific, determinate, stable, and
prolific.
An important di↵erence between the two accounts, however, is that Khalidi
2See (Slors, 2002) for a similar argument.
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proposes causal relations between the properties of natural kinds (or variables),
whereas my framework emphasises the causal relations between the variables
themselves. Translated to Funkhouser’s dimensions: Khalidi’s account is saying
that there are (specific, determinate, stable, and prolific) causal relations
between these dimensions of variables.
Would that accord with the view that I have proposed so far? On a
standard view of multi-dimensional models, these determination dimensions are
orthogonal, which means that there are no “interactions” between them. A
standard xy graph allows all combinations of x’s and y’s: there is nothing in the
graph itself that tells us that certain xy combinations are impossible, or more
likely. But we need not follow this standard model.
Let’s start with “colour” and its three determination dimensions hue,
saturation, and brightness. In this case, the three dimensions do not interact
causally. We can manipulate colour to any value of hue without thereby
changing the value of its saturation or brightness. And so on for the other
combinations of dimensions. But if we move to a triangle with determination
dimensions like angle, length of sides, and overall size, changing any of these will
necessarily have some e↵ect on at least one of the others. Changing the angle
of the corners will thereby impact the length of the sides, and increasing the
length of the sides will thereby impact its overall size. Similar to the analysis in
chapter 4 then, these three determination dimensions are all dependent on each
other.
Dependency relations are not causal, however. So can there be causal rela-
tions between the dimensions? I think there can be. Khalidi’s own example of
the atoms of gold causing its colour and other properties is one, but also a cog-
nitive concept like memory can contain causal relations between its properties.
The length of retention—the amount of time someone is required to hold one
or more items “in” memory—has a causal e↵ect on the accuracy of memory.
The longer we are required to remember something, the more likely we are
to forget. As in chapter 4, the exact relation between these dimensions can be
tested empirically, but I expect that this relation is causal and not a dependency
relation. Some manipulations of the length of retention will have an impact on
accuracy, but not all.
So now we have seen that indeed, there can be causal relations between
the properties of a variable. Whether it is very likely is another question. I
think Khalidi is right that there are certain (hierarchical) patterns in a kind’s
properties. But I think that dependency relations between those properties are
more common than causal relations. Or minimally: dependency relations are
at least as common. This distinction might not matter for Khalidi’s purposes
in the natural kinds debate, but for cognitive ontology building it does.
This is because it shows that variables can be characterised at di↵erent levels.
Similar patterns of causation and dependency occur at a more fine-grained level.
We can characterise memory as the variable, and the type of memory as one
of its determination dimensions, which could then form causal or dependency
relations with other dimensions—suppose that a change in the type of memory
has a causal influence on the accuracy of recall. Or we can characterise working
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memory as the variable, which means that the relation between working memory
and accuracy is an external one. So, the view that I am expounding here is that
we are dealing with a network of causal and dependency relations and that
we should group these into variables according to specificity, proportionality,
determinacy, systematicity, stability, and proliferation.
B.5 Conclusion and way forward
The view I have expounded in the previous chapters thus almost fits with
Khalidi’s, and would in fact fit completely if he would accept dependency rela-
tions between a natural kind’s properties. This shows that in principle, my view
would accord with a particular stance within the natural kinds debate. However,
the whole debate comes with a lot of philosophical baggage. Whether natural
kinds have essences, whether they should be interpreted realistically, and where
exactly to draw the boundary between social and natural kinds does not interest
me. In fact, I think it should not interest too many other philosophers either.
What matters is that variables, categories or kinds can be used in proper
scientific explanations. This means that their properties are projectable, and
that they can enter into causal relations that are specific, proportional, deter-
ministic, systematic, stable, and prolific. In this sense, my view is thoroughly
pragmatic about the realist versus anti-realist interpretation of natural kinds: if
the patterns that the variables enter into are real enough for science, then they
are real enough for me—in accordance with the my view in section 3.1.5.3
With the argumentation outlined above, I have showed that while tech-
nically, the causal norm for cognitive ontology building could fit a particular
position within the natural kinds debate, we should actually rather abandon
the debate, at least for cognitive science. We should take the elements that
are useful for proper scientific understanding, and leave the details to those
interested in pure metaphysics.
3This statement is adapted from Dennett’s view on the reality of beliefs (1991).
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Samenvatting
Wat kunnen hersenscans ons vertellen over de relatie tussen ons brein en
cognitie? We hopen dat hersenscans zoals fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
imaging) en MEG (magnetoencephalography) ons meer informatie kunnen geven
over wat er zich afspeelt in onze geest. Het liefst zouden wij meer willen weten
over hoe ons geheugen precies werkt, of hoe het kan dat een tweetalig persoon
thuis Spaans spreekt en in de klas Engels en niet in de war raakt.
We weten tegenwoordig ontzettend veel over de hersenen en hebben zeer
precieze meetinstrumenten. Zo kan een fMRI scanner op de kubieke millimeter
nauwkeurig aangeven wat er gebeurt in de hersenen. MEG kan heel nauwkeurig
aangeven wanneer een verandering in hersenactiviteit optreedt. Het populaire
beeld van hersenscans als ”foto’s van de geest” klopt echter ook niet helemaal.
De mooi gekleurde beelden van hersenactiviteit die we soms in de media
tegenkomen tonen niet direct iemand’s cognitieve processen. Geheugen kunnen
we niet “zien” op een hersenscan. Wat MEG en fMRI wel tonen zijn
magnetische eigenschappen. Een fMRI scanner is gevoelig voor het verschil in
de magnetische eigenschappen van zuurstofrijk bloed en zuurstofarm bloed. Als
een hersengebied actief wordt, is er een grote toevoer aan zuurstofrijk bloed. Een
fMRI scanner meet dus hersenactiviteit via de magnetische eigenschappen van
bloed. MEG meet de magnetische velden die gepaard gaan met de electrische
signalen die neuronen aan elkaar geven.
In dit proefschrift betoog ik dat hersenscans ons veel informatie kunnen
geven over de wisselwerking tussen de hersenen en cognitie. Echter, om
deze informatie te ontsluiten, zou de cognitieve neurowetenschap zich minder
moeten richten op correspondenties, en meer op causale informatie over hoe we
fenomenen kunnen manipuleren.
Correspondentie houdt in dat er een regelmatig verband is tussen twee
gebeurtenissen. Als we op de barometer een lage luchtdruk lezen, is de kans
op neerslag hoog. Er is een correspondentie tussen de barometer lezing en de
kans op neerslag. Maar dit is geen causaal (of “oorzakelijk”) verband. Het
manipuleren van de barometer verandert niets aan de kans op neerslag. We
kunnen doen wat we willen met het meetinstrument, maar het zal de kans op
neerslag niet verlagen. Het oorzakelijke verband vinden we tussen de luchtdruk
zelf en de kans op neerslag. Wanneer de luchtdruk omlaag gaat, gaat de kans
op neerslag omhoog.
Het idee dat we op zoek moeten naar oorzakelijke verbanden vormt de rode
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draad in dit proefschrift, dat grofweg uit twee delen bestaat. In het eerste deel
bespreek ik het “cognitieve ontologie debat”. Dit debat houdt zich bezig met
de vraag wat de juiste categoriee¨n zijn voor onze cognitieve functies. Moeten
we ons standaard repertoire van “werkgeheugen”, “taalverwerking” en “emotie”
blijven gebruiken, of moeten we deze radicaal veranderen op basis van wat we
in het brein vinden? De cognitieve ontologie hangt fundamenteel samen met
neurowetenschappelijke verklaringen. In het tweede deel bespreek ik welke vorm
deze verklaringen precies moeten hebben. Zoeken we naar een kaart van de
hersenen waar precies staat aangegeven welk deel welke functie heeft? Zien
we het brein als een soort machine waarbij we proberen uit te vinden hoe
de radartjes samenwerken om een cognitieve functie te bewerkstelligen? Of
willen we vooral weten hoe hersenactiviteit en cognitie invloed op elkaar kunnen
hebben?
Het cognitieve ontologiedebat komt voort uit een probleem met de multifunc-
tionaliteit van de hersenen. Cognitiewetenschappers stuitten op dit probleem bij
het lokaliseren van cognitieve functies en omgekeerde gevolgtrekkingen (reverse
inferences) die zij probeerden te maken op basis van hersenscans. Het proces
van reverse inference begint met lokalisatie; hersenwetenschappers proberen
cognitieve functies te lokaliseren in delen van de hersenen. Activiteit in de
FFA (Fusiform Face Area) bijvoorbeeld, correspondeert met het herkennen van
gezichten.
Vervolgens meten hersenwetenschappers hersenactiviteit bij een andere cog-
nitieve taak, zoals het herkennen van objecten (fictief voorbeeld). Bij deze taak
blijken de hersenwetenschappers bijvoorbeeld ook activiteit in de FFA te vinden.
Hieruit concluderen ze dat de functie “gezichtsherkenning” een rol speelt het
herkennen van objecten: we proberen eerst een gezicht te herkennen in objecten,
en kijken daarna naar andere eigenschappen van een object.
Strikt genomen klopt deze redenering niet. Het klopt alleen als we aannemen
dat de FFA alleen gezichtsherkenning als functie heeft. Elke keer als we
hersenactiviteit observeren in de FFA, zouden we dan weten dat er een cognitief
proces van gezichtsherkenning gaande is. Maar als blijkt dat de FFA ook andere
functies kan hebben, mogen we niet concluderen dat gezichtsherkenning een rol
speelt bij het herkennen van objecten.
En inderdaad, tegenwoordig blijkt dat de meeste delen van de hersenen
meerdere functies hebben. De FFA correspondeert niet alleen met gezichts-
herkenning, maar ook met het herkennen van vogels en met een emotionele
reactie op angstige gezichten. Bovendien blijkt dat er vaak meer dan een
hersengebied correspondeert met een cognitieve functie. Het lezen van woorden
correspondeert met (minstens) twee neuronale netwerken.
Deze wirwar aan correspondenties wordt het many-to-many probleem ge-
noemd. Een hersengebied of neuronaal netwerk correspondeert vaak met vele
cognitieve functies, en cognitieve functies kunnen op hun beurt met meerdere
hersengebieden of neuronale netwerken corresponderen. Het many-to-many
probleem bemoeilijkt de interpretatie van hersenscans. Als we iets zien oplichten
in de hippocampus weten we nu niet welk cognitief proces er gaande is. En
omgekeerd: we kunnen niet voorspellen welk hersengebied iemand gebruikt als
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we diegene een cognitieve taak laten uitvoeren.
Het cognitieve ontologie debat hoopt dit probleem op te lossen door de
neuronale en/of cognitieve categoriee¨n aan te passen. Sommigen auteurs stellen
bijvoorbeeld voor dat we beter naar hersennetwerken dan naar hersengebieden
kunnen kijken. Netwerken bestaan uit meerdere hersengebieden die intiem met
elkaar samenwerken. Aan netwerken kunnen we hopelijk weer e´e´n cognitieve
functie toeschrijven. Zo zijn er aanwijzingen voor een “rust-netwerk”: een
netwerk van hersengebieden dat actief is wanneer iemand rust.
Anderen stellen voor om de cognitieve functies aan te passen: in plaats
van meerdere specifieke functies zoals “het benoemen van kleuren” en “het
herkennen van visuele woordvormen” toe te schrijven aan een hersengebied,
kunnen we ook spreken van een algemene functie: “het integreren van zintuiglijke
en motorische informatie”. Zo hebben hersengebieden hopelijk weer een
(algemene) functie. Door deze aanpassingen hopen de auteurs dat de categoriee¨n
weer mooi met elkaar corresponderen, het liefst op een e´e´n-op-e´e´n manier. Elke
cognitieve functie correspondeert zo weer met e´e´n hersengebied of -netwerk, en
elk hersengebied of -netwerk heeft e´e´n functie.
Inmiddels bestaat het debat over cognitieve ontologie uit vele verschillende
standpunten. Maar de standpunten hebben iets gemeen: ze zijn allemaal
gebaseerd op wat ik de “correspondentienorm” noem. De correspondentienorm
houdt in dat men eerst de juiste correspondentierelatie kiest, en vervolgens de
cognitieve functies of afbakening van de hersenen daaraan aanpast.
De correspondentienorm is problematisch. Ten eerste is de correspondentie-
norm een a priori positie over de relatie tussen het brein en onze cognitie: het
is een aanname die aan het onderzoek voorafgaat, in plaats van een uitkomst
van het onderzoek. Daardoor is deze norm niet wetenschappelijk. De corre-
spondentienorm is niet gebaseerd op wetenschappelijke feiten: de hoop op een
e´e´n-op-e´e´n correspondentie is niet gebaseerd op wat we zien op hersenscans.
Maar belangrijker nog is het argument dat correspondentierelaties ons erg
weinig informatie geven. Correspondentie tussen hersenactiviteit en cogni-
tieve functies geeft ons alleen de informatie dat er een correlatie bestaat.
De correspondentie tussen de kans op regen en het aantal paraplu’s in het
straatbeeld geeft aan dat deze twee gebeurtenissen correleren. Maar het
betekent niet dat het aantal paraplu’s invloed heeft op de kans op regen, net als
de barometer daar geen invloed op had.
Causale relaties kunnen veel meer informatie geven dan correspondentie-
relaties. We willen niet alleen weten dat geheugen correspondeert met de
hippocampus. We willen precies weten hoe activiteit in de hippocampus het
geheugen kan manipuleren. Bovendien hangt de werking van ons geheugen ook
samen met omgevingsfactoren, hormonen, en de activiteit in andere delen van
de hersenen. Causale relaties kunnen ons precies vertellen hoe deze elementen
in elkaar grijpen.
Hoe kunnen cognitieve processen en neuronale activiteit causaal verbonden
zijn? Het standaard beeld dat we hebben van causale relaties is er een waarbij
twee fysieke objecten tegen elkaar opbotsen. De kracht van mijn tennisracket
veroorzaakt de snelheid en richting van de tennisbal. Maar geheugen en
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de hippocampus kunnen niet tegen elkaar opbotsen. De interpretatie van
causaliteit die wel geschikt is voor de cognitieve neurowetenschappen heet
“di↵erence-making”. Volgens deze theorie kun je een causale relatie vinden als
je het ene fenomeen manipuleert en daardoor een e↵ect observeert bij het andere
fenomeen. Er bestaat een causale relatie tussen paracetamol en hoofdpijn omdat
de sterkte van de de hoofdpijn gemanipuleerd kan worden door de hoeveelheid
paracetamol die iemand inneemt.
Di↵erence-making vormt de basis voor mijn positie in het cognitieve
ontologie debat en voor het verklaringsmodel dat ik voorstel voor de cog-
nitieve neurowetenschappen. We moeten de categoriee¨n in onze cognitieve
ontologie aanpassen aan de hand van hoe goed zij andere fenomenen kunnen
manipuleren, in plaats van aan de hand van hun correspondentie met het brein.
Als uit onderzoek blijkt dat de categorie “omschakeling tussen twee talen” goed
andere fenomenen kan manipuleren, en zelf ook gemanipuleerd kan worden door
andere fenomenen, moeten we deze opnemen in onze cognitieve ontologie. Op
een vergelijkbare manier moet de ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) opgenomen
worden als blijkt dat dit hersengebied goed kan fungeren als oorzaak of e↵ect
in causale relaties.
Leidt deze zogenaamde “causale norm” voor cognitieve ontologie niet tot een
ware explosie van het aantal categoriee¨n? Niet als we ons richten op causale
relaties die stabiel, proportioneel, specifiek, systematisch, gedetermineerd, en
productief zijn. Door deze richtlijnen te volgen, kunnen we een verschil maken
tussen meer en minder belangrijke manipulatierelaties. Manipulatierelaties
zijn stabiel als ze gelden in een groot aantal situaties. De relatie tussen
paracetamol en hoofdpijn is stabieler als deze geldt voor iedereen, in plaats
van een select aantal personen, en als deze ook geldt in combinatie met andere
medicijnen of andere aandoeningen. Een manipulatierelatie is proportioneel als
de oorzaak precies genoeg informatie bevat voor het e↵ect. De relatie tussen een
wapperende lap stof en het bokken van een stier is proportioneler dan de relatie
tussen een rode wapperende lap stof en het bokken van een stier: de informatie
dat de lap rood is, is niet noodzakelijk in dit geval.
Manipulatierelaties zijn specifiek als de oorzaak het gevolg fijnmazig kan
manipuleren. De volumeknopjes op een telefoon zijn bijvoorbeeld een betere
oorzaak van het volume van de telefoon dan de aan-uit knop. Beiden hebben
een e↵ect op het volume: als je de telefoon uitzet, gaat het geluid uit. Maar
de volumeknoppen kunnen het volume op een fijnmazige manier manipuleren.
De systematiek van manipulatierelaties refereert aan de numerieke vorm die de
relatie aanneemt. Als je de relatie tussen het genre van een liedje en de “next-
song button” op een eclectische speellijst zou plotten op een grafiek, zou deze
bijvoorbeeld een stuk minder systematisch zijn dan de relatie tussen het volume
en de volumeknoppen.
Een gedetermineerde relatie is een relatie die een hoge kans van slagen heeft.
Als iemand een appel loslaat op een hoogte van een meter, valt die altijd naar
beneden. De relatie tussen roken en kanker is minder gedetermineerd: roken
geeft een hogere kans op kanker. Als een fenomeen een e↵ect kan hebben op
vele andere fenomenen, kunnen we deze productief noemen. De hypofyse is een
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productief deel van de hersenen, omdat deze een rol speelt bij de regulatie van
vele hormonen. Bij elkaar genomen kunnen deze richtlijnen de categoriee¨n die
we willen opnemen in onze cognitieve ontologie beperken.
Naast causale relaties tussen de categoriee¨n bestaan er ook afhankelijkheids-
relaties. Twee categoriee¨n kunnen synoniemen van elkaar zijn, zoals korte-
termijn geheugen en werkgeheugen bijvoorbeeld. Verder kunnen we de soort-van
relatie en de onderdeel-van relatie onderscheiden. Werkgeheugen is een
soort-van geheugen: het is een specifieke vorm van geheugen, net als lange-
termijn geheugen dat is. De onderdelen van geheugen zijn: opslaan, vast-
houden en terugvinden. Tussen geheugen en deze onderdelen bestaat dus een
onderdeel-van relatie.
Het is erg belangrijk om deze afhankelijkheidsrelaties te vinden en te
onderscheiden van causale relaties. Ten eerste omdat het ons in staat stelt een
cognitieve ontologie goed te structureren. Als we goede communicatie tussen
wetenschappers willen bevorderen, hebben we niet alleen een platte lijst met
categoriee¨n nodig; we willen weten hoe de categoriee¨n met elkaar samenhangen,
zodat iedereen weet dat werkgeheugen en geheugen geen onafhankelijke cogni-
tieve processen zijn.
Ten tweede kunnen afhankelijkheidsrelaties in de weg staan van het vinden
van de juiste causale relaties. Stel dat we willen weten of het verminderen van de
populatie van hagedissen een e↵ect heeft op de populatie van goanna’s. Als we
dit experiment uitvoeren blijkt inderdaad dat er een manipulatierelatie bestaat
tussen de twee. Maar na verder onderzoek blijkt dat vele andere manipulaties
van de populatie van hagedissen ook een e↵ect hebben op de populatie van
goanna’s: het inbrengen van chips bij hagedissen zorgt ervoor dat de goanna’s
ook gechipt zijn en het knippen van de teennagels van hagedissen heeft als e↵ect
dat de teennagels van de goanna’s ook geknipt zijn. In dit voorbeeld is het niet
mogelijk om hagedissen te manipuleren zonder ook goanna’s te manipuleren.
Dit betekent dat de goanna een soort-van hagedis is.
In dit geval wisten we al dat de goanna een soort-van hagedis is, maar in
de cognitieve neurowetenschappen weten we dit vaak niet. Daardoor kan het er
soms op lijken dat een categorie een causaal e↵ect heeft op een andere categorie,
terwijl ze eigenlijk in een afhankelijkheidsrelatie staan. We kunnen het patroon
van manipulatierelaties tussen twee (of meer) categoriee¨n gebruiken om erachter
te komen welke relatie we precies mee te maken hebben.
Een cognitieve ontologie zoals ik die voorstel bevat dus categoriee¨n die
causaal relevant zijn, in plaats van categoriee¨n die afgeleid zijn van het brein.
Verder is een ontologie gestructureerd door de manipulatierelaties die er bestaan
tussen de categoriee¨n. Een cognitieve ontologie is onlosmakelijk verbonden met
de verklaringen waar we naar op zoek zijn in de cognitieve wetenschappen. De
raison d’eˆtre van een cognitieve ontologie is het leveren van bouwstenen voor
verklaringen.
Ik stel voor dat verklaringen in de cognitieve neurowetenschappen als
centraal doel hebben om uit te leggen hoe een fenomeen gemanipuleerd
kan worden en zelf ook andere fenomenen kan manipuleren. Als we het
wisselen tussen twee talen door tweetaligen willen uitleggen (het explanandum),
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moeten we aangeven welke e↵ecten andere cognitieve processen (leeftijd van
het leren van de tweede taal, of hoe vaardig iemand is in de tweede taal) en
breinactiviteit in bepaalde hersengebieden hebben op het wisselen tussen deze
talen. Verder heeft het wisselen tussen talen e↵ect op andere fenomenen, zoals
hoe goed iemand zich kan bewegen in een andere taalcontext en de structurele
verbindingen tussen bepaalde hersengebieden. Als we kunnen uitzoeken wat
deze manipulatierelaties precies zijn, hebben we een volledige verklaring.
De verklaringsvorm die hierbij past is het web model van verklaringen.
Dit model is ge¨ınspireerd door het constitutieve mechanistische model van
verklaringen, maar bevat een aantal belangrijke aanpassingen. Het idee achter
het constitutieve mechanistische model is dat we een fenomeen verklaren door
te zoeken naar zijn componenten en hun interactie op een onderliggend niveau.
Het voortbewegen van een fiets kan bijvoorbeeld verklaard worden door de
interactie tussen de trappers, ketting en wielen. Vervolgens kan de werking van
de trappers weer verklaard worden door de interactie tussen de schroefdraad en
het platform te beschrijven. Dit betekent dat het constitutieve mechanistische
model uit meerdere niveaus kan bestaan, waarbij de relaties tussen componenten
op hetzelfde niveau causaal zijn, en die tussen componenten van verschillende
niveaus constitutief zijn.
Het constitutive mechanistische model van verklaringen is een populair
model voor verschillende wetenschapsgebieden, maar voor de cognitieve neuro-
wetenschappen is het niet geschikt. Dit komt voornamelijk omdat het con-
stitutieve mechanistische model te veel focust op constitutieve relaties. Het
is niet altijd makkelijk om constitutieve relaties te vinden tussen cognitieve en
neuronale variabelen, en bovendien zijn constitutieve relaties niet altijd de beste
manipulatierelaties voor het explanandum.
Neem het voorbeeld van een storm: de componenten van een storm kunnen
o.a. regen, hagel en bliksem zijn. Maar geen van deze componenten is nood-
zakelijkerwijs een component van een storm: er zijn genoeg stormen zonder
hagel. Dit betekent dat de relatie tussen een storm en zijn componenten niet
erg stabiel is: de relatie treedt lang niet in alle situaties op. De oorzaak van
de storm aan de andere kant—een centrum van lage luchtdruk omgeven door
hoge luchtdruk—treedt elke keer op als er een storm is. De relatie tussen dit
luchtdrukpatroon en een storm is zeer stabiel. Als we centrale boodschap van
di↵erence-making volgen, dat manipulatie en controle het belangrijkste zijn bij
het opstellen van verklaringen, dan betekent dit dat in dit geval, de oorzakelijke
relaties belangrijker zijn dan de constitutieve relaties.
Deze conclusie reikt verder dan alleen dit voorbeeld van een storm. Over
het algemeen kunnen we stellen dat een constitutieve relatie niet noodzakelijker-
wijs de beste relatie is om een fenomeen uit te leggen. Gecombineerd met de
praktische uitdagingen om neuronale constitutieve elementen te vinden van een
cognitief fenomeen—iets waar ik hier in deze samenvatting verder niet op in
ga—betekent dit dat de focus op constitutieve relaties onhoudbaar is voor een
verklaringsmodel voor de cognitieve neurowetenschappen.
In plaats daarvan zouden we het web model van verklaringen moeten
gebruiken. Dit model neemt alle mogelijke manipulatierelaties serieus. De
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variabelen die de sterkste manipulatierelaties hebben met het explanandum
moeten worden opgenomen in de verklaring, waarbij het niet uitmaakt of
dit neuronale of cognitieve variabelen zijn. Het web model laat het aan de
experimentele praktijk om de vorm van verklaring te bepalen, in plaats van
vooraf een bepaalde vorm op te leggen.
Welke lering kunnen de neurowetenschappen trekken uit het belang van
manipulatie en controle? Moeten we andere experimenten doen, andere analyses
uitvoeren op de data, of zelfs helemaal stoppen met fMRI? Gelukkig hoeven we
fMRI en andere beeldvormende technieken zeker niet aan de kant te zetten.
Als we de data op een andere manier interpreteren, kunnen we recht doen aan
de centrale rol die manipulatie zou moeten spelen in neurowetenschappelijke
verklaringen. In grote lijnen zoeken we naar informatie over welke factoren er
precies invloed hebben op elkaar, en in welke omstandigheden. Zo verklaren we
cognitieve processen in de toekomst met behulp van precieze informatie over
welke neuronale, omgevings- en cognitieve factoren er invloed op hebben.
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